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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines Japan’s engagement in Africa in the period 2008-2013 through analysis of 
relations with South Sudan.   The study focuses on three dimensions of Japan’s presence in South 
Sudan – Official Development Assistance, resource-focused investment and peacekeeping – as a lens 
through which to understand Japan’s broader strategic objectives and tactical approaches towards 
engagement in Africa.   The study examines the development and implementation of Japan’s Africa 
policy through the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism, which incorporates both structural 
factors and intervening domestic considerations in explaining foreign policy outcomes.   The thesis 
demonstrates that Japan’s policies towards Africa have undergone a significant realignment in the 
years since 2008.   In applying a neoclassical realist framework this study outlines the international 
structural drivers of Japan’s engagement in Africa while also incorporating domestic considerations 
such as norms, and policymaker’s perceptions in developing a theoretically-informed empirical 
analysis of Japan’s presence in South Sudan.  The study examines how efforts to re-invigorate the 
Japanese economy, secure resources, ensure energy security and respond to the rise of China are all 
reflected in Japan’s relations with Africa – and specifically in Japan’s activities in South Sudan.  In this 
respect the research demonstrates that South Sudan is a particularly relevant location from which to 
better understand the evolution of Japan’s Africa policies, as well as the significance of those policies 
in the broader context of Japanese foreign policy.   The nature and extent of Japanese engagement 
in South Sudan can thus also be seen as a significant precedent for Japan’s future interaction in 
Africa and this thesis contributes to the literature on Japanese foreign policy with specific reference 
to Japan’s strategy towards Africa. 
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Figure 1: Map of Africa
1
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 United Nations, “Map of Africa”, accessed 12 February 2015, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/africa.pdf  
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Figure 2: Map of South Sudan
2
 
 
 
  
                                                          
2
 United Nations, “Map of South Sudan”, accessed 17 September 2014, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/southsudan.pdf 
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Figure 3: Map of the Horn of Africa
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 United States Department of State, “Horn of Africa: Map”, accessed 6 October 2014, available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/af/rt/hornofafrica/169532.htm 
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1. Introduction  
 
Starting towards the end of 2007 Africa began to take on far greater strategic importance in the eyes 
of Japan’s policymakers and business leaders, leading to a significant re-alignment of policy priorities 
and extensive re-engagement with the continent.  While this change was not sudden, in the years 
since 2008 there has been a marked shift in Japanese perceptions of Africa from a place of aid, to a 
place of investment, a potential consumer market and a strategic location from which to reaffirm 
Japan’s aspirations as a great power.  In this respect Japan’s re-engagement in Africa reflects as 
much a change of attitude as policy, and should be understood as an element within a much broader 
discourse in Japan about the country’s position in the world.  As such, Japan’s engagement in South 
Sudan reflects the “revitalised Japan” discourse that is championed by the administration of Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe through his assurance that “Japan is back”4 – and is finding expression through a 
more proactive foreign policy and an increased international profile.  The title of this thesis therefore 
refers both to Japan’s re-engagement in Africa and the narrative of Japanese renewal promoted by 
the Abe administration that is increasingly shaping Japan’s foreign policy approaches.   Against this 
backdrop this study seeks to identify and contextualise the changes that have characterised Japan’s 
re-focused and re-energised involvement with Africa through analysis of Japanese engagement in 
South Sudan.   
 
Japanese engagement in Africa is multifaceted and the factors underpinning this engagement are 
multidimensional – and in many instances overlapping.  Yet as this study will explore, the particular 
dimensions of Japan’s activities in South Sudan can be identified as policy responses to the shifting 
realities of the global system.  Moreover, South Sudan is a particularly relevant location in which to 
                                                          
4
 Prime Minister of Japan’s Office, “Address by H.E.  Mr.  Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the New York 
Stock Exchange”, 25 September 2013, accessed 15 May 2014, available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/statement/201309/25nyse_e.html 
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examine the evolution of Japan’s African engagement.  It is the only country in Africa in which Japan 
has deployed peacekeepers, is pursuing a controversial oil pipeline, as well as developing key 
infrastructure and providing development aid.  These multiple layers of interaction reflect Japan’s 
growing engagement on the continent but also the extent to which South Sudan is emerging as a 
location from which to expand Japanese influence on the continent.  The nature and extent of 
Japanese engagement in South Sudan can thus also be seen as a significant precedent for Japan’s 
future interaction in Africa and beyond.     
 
Furthermore, South Sudan’s external political relations are well suited to Japan’s foreign policy 
strategy in that the country’s international relations are built around strong ties with the United 
States (US) and historically complicated relations with China.   In this respect, Japan’s engagement in 
South Sudan broadly supports its existing foreign policy aims, while strengthening its profile and 
presence in the East African region.  Indeed as this study will demonstrate, Japan’s growing activities 
in South Sudan can be seen to inhabit a frontier on a “strategic arc” of East African engagement 
stretching from Djibouti to Mozambique5 – an arc of interest that encompasses infrastructure 
developments, energy investments and the establishment of a naval base.   
 
South Sudan is a frontier state, drawn towards East Africa yet still tied inextricably to Sudan and the 
Muslim-majority, Arab North Africa.  As a pre-independence Sudanese expression held, “Sudan is the 
heart of Africa and the backdoor to the Middle East”– and since realising independence in 2011 the 
country continues to balance between its past and its aspirations of a future aligned towards East 
Africa.  Moreover the country represents a frontier of opportunity: rich with resources it is an 
emerging location for competing interests as it searches for allies, donors, and investors.   Thus 
                                                          
5
 Japan has established a naval base in Djibouti that will be explored in chapter 6 and Japanese company Mitsui 
has a significant equity investment in Mozambique’s developing gas fields.  See Page 11 for a map of Africa.  
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South Sudan whilst fragile and conflict-affected is a surprising location in which to find a 
multidimensional Japanese presence.  It is for these reasons that South Sudan is understood in this 
study to inhabit the “frontier” of Japan’s Africa strategy – a high-risk location on the edge of a region 
of emerging importance to Japanese policymakers. 
 
Yet primarily this research seeks to understand how Japan’s interactions in South Sudan, and more 
broadly in Africa, demonstrate a renewed interest and a new approach towards engagement with 
Africa.  As the chief researcher at the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO)6 points out, “re-
engagement with Africa is the correct assessment”7, because starting around 2008 a number of 
structural pressures and domestic factors coalesced to underpin Japan’s re-focused engagement 
with the continent.  In this respect this thesis comprises a history of the present with themes that 
echo with theory.  The development and implementation of Japan’s Africa policy will be interpreted 
through the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism, which incorporates both external drivers 
and domestic considerations in explaining foreign policy outcomes.  Thus as the following chapters 
will explore, domestic debates around how best to respond to a changing global environment by re-
invigorating the Japanese economy, securing resources, ensuring energy security and responding to 
the rise of China are all reflected in Japan’s relations with Africa – and specifically in Japan’s activities 
in South Sudan.    
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 JETRO is a government-related organisation that works to promote mutual trade and investment between 
Japan and the rest of the world, JETRO has 76 offices in 56 countries.  
7
 Author’s interview with chief Senior researcher JETRO, Tokyo, 27 September 2013  
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1.2 Research Objectives  
 
A number of Japanese academics and ministry officials interviewed for this study observed that 
Africa is very far from Japan geographically, and perhaps even further from the everyday 
consciousness of the Japanese public.  Japan’s activities in Africa are thus to a large extent being 
conducted beyond the awareness of most people in Japan – despite  the fact that Japan has a 
growing interest in Africa, and as this study will explore, a notable presence in South Sudan.  In this 
respect this study aims to explore and understand this presence in the broader context of Japan’s 
foreign policy strategies.   
 
In the decades since Japan’s first resource-led engagement in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s the 
world has changed fundamentally – and Japan’s current economic and political imperatives reflect 
these changes.  In this context the analytical objective guiding this research is to identify the factors 
– at both the systemic and domestic levels, that can explain Japan’s presence in South Sudan and 
relate these to the shifts in Japan’s Africa policies over the period of investigation.   Therefore the 
central questions this study sets out to answer are: 
1. What explains Japan’s extensive engagement in South Sudan?  
2. Does this engagement reflect the ambitions and approaches of Japan’s broader Africa 
strategy? 
3. To what extent can Japan’s presence in Africa be understood to reflect a policy response to 
structural forces at the global level perceived through the lens of domestic considerations 
and priorities?    
While the parameters of this research project are focused primarily on the particular aspects of 
Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, the study also seeks to place this engagement in the broader 
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context of the structural factors driving the development of Japan’s Africa policies, the domestic 
dimensions of Japanese policymaking, and the regional context of Japan’s activities in East Africa.  In 
this context neoclassical realism will operate as a vehicle of analysis and provide a theoretical 
framework through which to interpret the various elements driving and influencing Japanese foreign 
policy in Africa.  The research objective therefore is to provide a theoretically-informed empirical 
analysis of Japan’s policy towards Africa in the years 2008 to 2013, as explained through 
engagement with South Sudan.    
 
The timeframe of this study are the years 2008 to the end of 2013 – with some earlier references 
providing context.  As the following chapters will explore, the fourth Tokyo International Conference 
on African Development (TICAD) held in Yokohama in 2008 signalled a marked change in Japan’s 
policy approach towards Africa and is thus a useful point from which to examine the evolution of 
Japan’s activities in Africa.  However with respect to the primary case study of South Sudan, the 
analysis will focus on the first years of the country’s independence from July 2011 to December 
2013, again with references to the period before South Sudan’s independence where relevant.       
The period of research ends as the current conflict in South Sudan erupted at the end of 2013, thus 
events that happened after the research period are not included in the analysis.  Of particular 
importance in this regard is the significant, and as yet sustained, drop in oil prices that began in 
2014, as well as new developments associated with the on-going war in South Sudan.     
 
Thus while the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan complicates this study (as described in more 
detail in section 1.4 Research Method) it does not ultimately affect the objectives of this research 
project, nor its findings.  South Sudan remains a compelling case study to plot the emergence of a 
bolder, multidimensional Japanese approach to engagement in Africa in part because the country is 
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unstable, and also because it is a new player on the frontier of the East African region which along 
with South Africa remains the focal point of Japan’s presence in Africa.        
 
1.2.1 Why This Research Matters 
 
This study is a response to an under-researched dimension of Japanese foreign interaction, as well as 
a contribution to the very limited existing literature on South Sudan as an independent country.  Yet 
while this study focuses on the particular example of Japanese interaction in South Sudan, the 
research is also significant in that it explores themes around Japan’s policy responses to shifting 
global conditions.  As such, an important element within this research is the notion of change and 
how states adapt to change.  And while this thesis does not engage with the extensive literature on 
change in international relations (IR) (for example see works by Buzan and Jones,8 Gilpin,9 Holsti, 
Siverson and George,10 or Katzenstein11), the following chapters will outline how Japan’s current 
engagement in Africa is in many ways a journey beyond its foreign policy comfort zone.  As such, this 
research is also about relevance and how states respond to relative decline.  Faced with an aging 
population, a stagnant economy and the new reality of a global order in which its place is not 
assured, Japanese policymakers are expanding the boundaries and approaches to their international 
engagement – of which an increased presence in Africa is an important component.   
 
                                                          
8
 Buzan, Barry and Jones, Barry, Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension, 
London: Frances Pinter, 1981  
9
 Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981  
10
 Holsti, Ole, Siverson, Randolph, George, Alexander, Change in the International System, Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1980  
11
 Katzenstein, Peter, “Analysing Change in International Politics: The New Institutionalism and the Interpretive 
Approach”, Max-Planck-Institut Discussion Paper 90/10 November 1990  
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The ramping-up of Japanese engagement on the continent discussed in this study coincided with 
South Sudan’s independence and there is no existing scholarship related to this particular dimension 
of Japan’s presence in Africa.  Moreover, there is limited literature on South Sudan as independent 
state, and the publications that do exist tend to be focused on the complexities of the country’s 
separation from Sudan and on the multitude of internal challenges that the new nation faces (for 
example see works by Copnall12, LeRiche and Arnold,13 Malwal14 and Thomas15).   
 
The lack of existing research on South Sudan’s external engagement with key investors and donors is 
understandable given the country’s short and unstable history, but it also provides an opportunity 
for this study to add genuine value to an unfolding policy environment – and place Japan’s 
interaction in the country in the context of the growing relevance of Africa in international affairs.  
As Harman and Brown point out, “Africa is increasingly present in IR in a significant way.  It is the 
geographical space where much that is systemically important in international relations has played 
out.”16 Put another way, what happens in Africa matters.  As the World Bank outlines, the continent 
experienced 4.7 per cent growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2013, well above the global 
GDP growth rate of 2.4 per cent.17  Sub-Saharan African countries are also among the fastest-
growing countries in the world, and the GDP growth is widespread: more than a third posted annual 
growth rates of at least six per cent in 2012.18  
 
                                                          
12
 Copnall, James, A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts, Sudan and South Sudan’s bitter and incomplete divorce, 
London: Hurst & Company, 2014 
13
 LeRiche, Matthew, Arnold, Matthew, South Sudan, from revolution to independence, London: Hurst & Co, 
2012 
14 Malwal, Bona, Sudan and South Sudan, from one to two, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 
15 Thomas, Edward, South Sudan  A Slow Liberation, London: Zed Books, 2015 
16 Harman, Sophie and Brown, William, “In from the Margins? The Changing Place of Africa in International 
Relations”, International Affairs, Vol. 89 No. 1, 2013, pp. 69-87  
17
 World Bank, Africa’s Pulse, Vol. 9, April 2014  
18
 World Bank, Annual Report 2012  
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Indeed a brief overview of recent publications on Africa captures this optimism, with titles including: 
Africa – the Ultimate Frontier Market: A guide to the business and investment opportunities in 
emerging Africa,19 Africa Rising: How 900 million African consumers offer more than you think,20 
Africa’s Turn?,21 and Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way.22 And as the World 
Bank further reports, “Foreign direct investment (FDI) to Sub-Saharan Africa expanded more than 
30-fold in the last 20 years, 7.5 times faster than in high-income countries and nearly ten times 
faster than global GDP.”23  Thus as international investors increasingly turn to Africa, this study offers 
context in understanding the extensive range of dynamics underpinning relations between advanced 
economic powers such as Japan and complex developing countries such as South Sudan.  Detailing a 
particular relationship in amongst a plethora of bilateral agreements, aid commitments and private 
sector investments offers insights into the multiple layers at which external engagement between 
countries occurs.  Moreover as this study demonstrates, the complex interplay between 
international systemic drivers and domestic considerations provide texture and nuance to a 
relationship that an overarching statistical analysis of Africa’s external engagement does not.      
 
Yet quite apart from the growing significance of Africa’s economic relations, Japan is the world’s 
third largest economy, a significant contributor to international institutions, and a mature 
democracy, how it engages with Africa also matters.  The relationship is significant both in terms of 
Japan’s presence in Africa, and in terms of how the interaction unfolds.  This study therefore seeks 
to examine how Japan is responding to the growing international interest in Africa in the broader 
context of its foreign policy priorities and complex domestic debates around how the country should 
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operate on the international stage.  Thus in exploring a little-known dimension of Japan’s foreign 
relations this research will offer a wider perspective on how the challenges of global power 
dynamics or domestic constitutional debates can be identified in a particular dimension of a state’s 
external engagement.       
 
1.2.2 Contributions of the Study  
 
This study seeks to contribute to the literature on Japanese foreign policy with specific reference to 
Japan’s strategy towards Africa.   In this context analysing Japan’s engagement in South Sudan will 
provide a valuable addition to the scholarship on Japan’s Africa policies since 2008 and contribute 
more broadly to an understanding of the evolution of Japan’s approach to foreign policy.  In 
addition, this study seeks to contribute to the literature on South Sudan’s external donor and 
investor relations.  While the complex dynamics underlying South Sudan’s independence and the 
conflict in Sudan have been researched extensively, there is almost no literature addressing the new 
reality of South Sudan as a sovereign nation and its international engagement.    
 
There are also distinct gaps in the existing literature on Japan’s relations with Africa.  Particularly in 
terms of the current dynamics of Japanese engagement on the continent such as energy 
investments, the emerging security dimension of Japan’s presence on the continent as well as an 
assessment of Japan’s contemporary engagement in East Africa and its activities in South Sudan.  
The relatively limited literature on Japan-Africa relations points to the low profile of Japan’s 
presence in Africa and the resultant limited interest it has gained from researchers.  Yet as this study 
will demonstrate, given the global significance of Japan as an economic power and its stated aim to 
increase its presence and profile in Africa, this study is timely.  Moreover, as this research will 
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demonstrate, Japanese policy towards Africa has undergone a distinct shift in recent years and this 
thesis seeks to recognise and understand these changes while also contributing to the literature on 
Japan-Africa relations by exploring under-researched contemporary dimensions of the relationship 
and interpreting those dynamics in the broader context of Japanese foreign policy responses to 
international pressures. 
 
Japan’s foreign policy in the post war era is often described in terms of Calder’s reactive state thesis 
which maintains that “the impetus to policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure, and 
reaction prevails over strategy.”24 Indeed Inoguchi and Jain described Japan’s approach to foreign 
policy as “karaoke diplomacy”25 while Pharr maintained the country followed a “low-cost, low risk” 
defensive foreign policy.26  Miyashita and Sato’s examination of ten case studies however found that 
some cases support the reactive thesis of Japanese foreign policy and others do not.27  This study will 
therefore seek to demonstrate that the evidence of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan and more 
broadly in Africa reflects the emergence of a more strategic and confident foreign policy.  In this 
respect this research project reflects the neoclassical realist view that “states respond to the 
uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment.”28   
Indeed Samuels29 and Pyle30 point to the emergence of a conspicuously more robust foreign policy – 
one that reflects Rose’s assertion that regardless of the many ways states may define their interests 
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“they are more likely to want more rather than less influence, and pursue such influence to the 
extent that they are able to do so.”31  
 
This research project will thus integrate the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism into the 
study of a contemporary aspect of Japan’s foreign policy – thereby relying on neoclassical realism as 
a vehicle of analysis for Japan’s engagement in Africa.  In developing the neoclassical realist 
argument this study will further contribute to the existing interpretations of Japanese foreign policy 
by exploring the influence of structural and domestic factors in policy development.  For example 
Pyle’s historical analysis of Japan’s policies since the Meiji period maintains that:  
Few countries in modern history have been as subject – and as sensitive, 
responsive, and adaptive – as Japan to the forces of the international 
environment.  The international system has held a powerful effect on Japan’s 
foreign policy, and it has exercised an extraordinary role in shaping Japan’s 
domestic institutions.32  
Pyle thus argues that Japan is again in the midst of an adaptation to changing international 
conditions and this explains Japan’s more proactive international presence.  Katzenstein by 
comparison believes that “Japan’s security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather 
than the international balance of power.”33 Thus in applying a neoclassical realist framework this 
study will outline the international structural drivers of Japan’s engagement in Africa while also 
incorporating domestic considerations such as norms, and policymaker’s perceptions in developing a 
theoretically-informed empirical analysis of Japan’s presence in South Sudan.   
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Furthermore, this research project broadly contributes to analysis of Japan’s prevailing political and 
business culture of kiken kaihi, or “uncertainty avoidance.”34  Adem and Mazrui explain that “risk 
avoidance or kiken kaihi is one of the key principles of Japanese diplomatic and bargaining 
actions.”35  And yet as the following chapters will explore, the emergence of a more robust and self-
assured Japanese foreign policy is being accompanied by a higher tolerance for risk in pursuing the 
country’s interests in Africa.  In this respect this research will synthesise arguments in the secondary 
literature with current data collected through interviews related to the particular example of 
Japanese activities in South Sudan to provide a new perspective of Japan’s foreign policy approaches 
and objectives in Africa.   
 
Finally, the study contributes to the literature on Japan-Africa relations.  There is not a very 
extensive range of literature published in English in recent years on Japanese relations with Africa, 
and this study is the first to focus on South Sudan, and explore the particular changes in Japanese 
policy since 2008.  Indeed much of existing literature examines the Cold War period and Japan’s ties 
with Apartheid South Africa in analysing Japanese engagement in Africa.  For example Ampiah’s 
landmark study on Japan’s relations with South Africa, Tanzania and Nigeria covers the period from 
the mid-1970s to the early 1990s.36  While both Owoeye37 and Sono38 focus on this period, Sono also 
provides a broad history of Japan’s relations with Africa since the 1500s.  Ampiah’s work examines 
the particular dynamics driving Japan’s relations in Africa, and the nature of the “economic 
determinants of Japanese foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa.”39 In comparison, Morikawa 
critiques Japan-Africa relations by arguing that “there is a general tendency to overemphasise the 
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economic aspects”40 of Japan’s presence in Africa.  In exploring the Western anti-communist strategy 
in Africa, Morikawa maintains that Japan’s policies are essentially elements within the broader 
framework of US-Japan relations and reflect Japan’s desire to “become politically more powerful and 
influential on the world stage.”41  
 
However the largest body of literature related to Japan’s interaction with Africa deals with 
development aid.  And while there are a number of studies such as Ensign,42 Lancaster,43 and 
Schraeder, Hook and Taylor44 which reference or compare Japan’s aid policies in Africa to other 
regions or donors, the recent literature on Japan-Africa relations tends to focus on Japan’s aid and 
the extent to which Japan’s development model offers lessons for Africa.   For example Osei-Hwedie 
and Osei-Hwedie, 45  Nafziger,46 Raposo47 and Lehman, who explores the “Asian economic model in 
Africa” and argues that Japan’s vision for development could be applied in Africa.48 Moreover, 
Lehman’s exploration of Japan’s non-Western donor identity is particularly relevant to this study’s 
assertion that Japan’s evolving presence on the continent reflects a changing foreign policy identity49 
and international presence.  This dynamic is discussed in Chapter Four and remains an important 
theme running throughout this study.     
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Taking the end of the Cold War as a point of departure, Lumumba-Kasongo’s comprehensive analysis 
of Japan-Africa relations examines the real purposes of foreign economic assistance, its philosophical 
basis and methods used in dispensing it.  In doing so Lumumba-Kasongo goes beyond Japan’s aid 
policy to explore the connections between Japan’s domestic political and economic environment 
and its foreign policy towards Africa.  He concludes that “Japan-Africa relations are dynamic, as they 
are constantly changing to respond to the claims and agenda of their states, the imperatives of the 
international political economy, and the demands of their national economies.”50  In this respect this 
study builds on Lumumba-Kasongo’s work in that it explores the dynamic nature of Japan-Africa 
relations by examining the changes that have characterised relations since 2008 through analysis of 
a particular dimension of Japan’s presence in Africa.  As such this research is valuable in that it 
examines a relatively little-known dimension of Japan’s foreign engagement but places it in the 
context of the country’s response to changing global and domestic conditions.    Through the use of 
a neoclassical realist framework of analysis (outlined in Chapter Two) this thesis will detail the 
structural, political and economic imperatives driving Japanese policy in Africa today, as well as the 
domestic perspectives and considerations that that shape Japan’s activities on the continent.   
 
1.3 Case Study: South Sudan  
 
This research project primarily seeks to understand the dynamics underlying Japan’s relations in 
Africa through exploration of its presence in South Sudan.  Consequently, the analytical focus of this 
thesis remains centred on Japan and its policies, while South Sudan should be understood as the 
arena in which Japan’s Africa engagement is examined.  The South Sudan case study therefore 
serves to provide a theoretically-informed explanation of the factors driving Japan’s engagement in 
the country and more broadly in Africa.  As such, the case study research approach is well suited to 
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the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism which underpins this study.  As Rose explains, “the 
major neoclassical realist works to date have been narratives or case studies of how great powers 
have responded to relative material rise or decline.”51 Christensen52 on the US and China, Schweller53 
on the belligerents of World War II, Wohlforth54 on the Soviet Union, and Zakaria’s55 study on US 
history.  In this context Japan’s engagement with South Sudan will serve as a barometer of Japan’s 
broader Africa policy and as an example of its response to changes at the structural level.    
 
This case study also echoes Thomas’ definition of a case study as comprising two elements: firstly, 
the subject – “a practical, historical unity”, and secondly, the object – “an analytical or theoretical 
frame.”  South Sudan can thus be understood in terms of Thomas’ description as “the case that is 
the subject of the inquiry (and) will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an 
analytical frame – an object – within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates 
and explicates.”56    
 
As the following chapters will illustrate, the case of South Sudan was not identified because it is 
representational of African states nor because it is a typical example of Japanese interaction on the 
continent.  Rather it reflects Stake’s definition of the case study as “the study of the particularity and 
complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances.”57 
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Indeed as Thomas explains “the essence of selection must rest in the dynamic of the relations 
between subject and object.  It cannot rest in typicality.”58 Thus as Thomas further describes, “the 
subject will be selected because it is an interesting or unusual or revealing example through which 
the lineaments of the object can be refracted.”59 And while the particular relevance of Japan’s 
engagement in South Sudan within a broader study of Japanese interaction with Africa will be 
demonstrated throughout this study, it can be understood to meet Thomas’ criteria as a “key case” – 
one which exemplifies the analytical object of the enquiry.  Furthermore, in addition to the selection  
of South Sudan due to its inherent interest it was also identified for this study due to what Thomas 
refers to as “local knowledge”, or prior familiarity with the case.  In this respect the author has 
worked on issues related to political dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan for several years and lived 
in South Sudan before undertaking this study.  Thus South Sudan is both a compelling example of a 
fragile state seeking to develop relations with foreign investors and donors, and a revealing case 
study of Japan’s engagement with an emerging state on the frontier of their growing economic and 
political interests in Africa.     
 
1.3.1 A brief History of South Sudan   
 
South Sudan’s emergence as an independent country on 9 July 2011 was the product of a peace 
agreement that ended Africa’s longest and arguably bloodiest civil war.  Yet while the country’s 
cessation effectively ended Sudan’s second civil war, it did not bring an end to conflict and political 
instability in either country.  Indeed South Sudan’s descent into civil war less than three years after 
achieving independence is testimony to the inherent fragility of the new state at its birth – Cockett 
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even asks if the country was a “Pre-failed state.”60  Thus while the complex history surrounding the 
break-up of Sudan remains integral to any analysis of South Sudan; this section will briefly explore 
the historical context that defines the country today.     
 
Before separation Sudan was the largest country in Africa, brought together in the 19th century as a 
single entity under colonial Turco-Egyptian rule.  The country that was then known as Turkiyya 
comprised the Sultanates of Funj and Dar Fur and a southern periphery which as Mamdani explains 
“both Sultanates had over the centuries turned into a reserve for the capture of prized booty, mainly 
slaves and ivory.”61  Thus under the Turkiyya the beginnings of central administration were extended 
into what is now South Sudan, although as Copnall points out, “the motivation was economic 
plunder, rather than building a state.”62  Moreover in establishing Khartoum as the military and 
administrative centre of the new state, the Turco-Egyptian colonial rulers effectively put in place a 
framework of centralisation that would define Sudan’s political and economic life for the next 190 
years.    
 
The Egyptian revolution in 1952 and Sudan’s subsequent unusual status as a colony of two 
countries63 precipitated it becoming the first African territory administered by Britain to gain 
independence in January 1956; the first in a wave of African countries to gain independence in the 
decades that followed.  Yet the tensions between Northern and Southern Sudan that had been 
accentuated and exacerbated by colonial rule only increased after independence and the country 
slid into civil war.  Indeed a brutally quashed mutiny by Southern Sudanese troops at Torit in 1955 
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effectively started the first Sudanese civil war even before the country’s independence.  The war, or 
Anyanya Rebellion as it became known, lasted until 1972 and was ostensibly the result of the new 
government reneging on previous commitments to establish a federal government and guarantee 
autonomy for the southern states.  The factors that undermined the peace of 1972 and created the 
conditions for a return to war in 1983 are complex and are dealt with in detail by Cockett,64 
Johnson,65 as well as Sidahmed and Sidahmed.66  However in summary, the failure of peace can be 
understood as driven by changing political dynamics within the elite politics of Khartoum that 
resulted in the emergence of what became known as “political Islam”, and the on-going 
marginalisation of the South.     
 
This study will not examine the Sudanese Civil Wars and subsequent Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in much detail as those elements relevant to South Sudan’s engagement with 
Japan are discussed in the following chapters (see works by Cockett,67 Johnson, 68 LeRiche and 
Arnold,69 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Thomas,70 as well as Young71 ).   However in essence the second 
civil war tore the country apart and the peace agreement that ended the conflict in 2005 laid out the 
framework for the separation of the South.  The organisation that emerged to lead the war against 
Khartoum, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), has in turn struggled to 
transition from a rebel army to a supposedly democratic ruling party, and the war-time fractures 
within the SPLA are manifesting in the current conflict in South Sudan.  In this respect the war still 
defines the political dynamics within and between both states.    
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Indeed the frailties that defined South Sudan at its independence were exposed when on 15 
December 2013 South Sudan effectively descended into civil war.72  Rivalries within the Presidential 
Guard erupted in a violent clash that quickly spilled into the streets of Juba and across the country.  
Following accusations by President Salva Kiir73 of an attempted coup d’état by former Vice President 
Riek Machar, the ruling SPLM and SPLA quickly split along divisions unaddressed from the 
independence war and the conflict escalated.  Taking on distinct ethnic dimensions, the conflict 
spread to the oil producing states of Unity and Upper Nile.  And while the government has been 
quick to downplay the ethnic dimensions of the conflict, political constituencies are routinely 
mobilised along ethnic lines, and civilians have also been targeted for attack based on their ethnicity.   
Despite a series of ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreements sponsored by the regional 
organisation Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), fighting continued in the states 
of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei.  As previously described, this study ends its analysis in December 
2013, so while the ramifications of the current conflict may impact on Japan’s activities in the 
country they are not considered within this research project.  But the current conflict also 
demonstrates the complex layers within the political system that led to the current crisis, and within 
which Japan’s engagement was occurring.   
 
South Sudan’s history is therefore defined by war, marginalisation, and a struggle for identity.  
Effectively experiencing two anti-colonial struggles, the region existed on the periphery of the Anglo-
Egyptian colony and post-independence Sudan.  Yet as this study will explore, South Sudan as an 
independent country remains a frontier state.  Inhabiting the limits of East and North Africa, the 
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country embodies what Parish termed the “vanguard of progress”74 – a land of rich opportunity 
whose riches are still to be exploited.   South Sudan should thus be understood to represent a 
particular frontier within Japan’s broader African engagement – at the western edge of a strategic 
arc of interest in East Africa where risk is tempered by the promise of reward.   
 
1.3.2 South Sudan on the Frontier of Japan’s Africa Policy 
 
In conceptualising South Sudan in the broader context of Japan’s foreign policy, the country can be 
said to inhabit a frontier within Japan’s Africa policy – a location in which to observe the expansion 
of Japan’s presence on the continent as well as the potential for future changes in Japan’s 
engagement in Africa.   Thus much as Turner observed in his essay on the American West, expanding 
the frontier means “breaking the bond of custom, offering new experiences, calling out new 
institutions and activities.”75  In this respect this study utilises a conceptual metaphor of the frontier 
in explaining the manner and motives of Japan’s presence in South Sudan.   
 
As Bach explains, “the concept of the ‘frontier’ has become widely associated with the increasing 
importance of Africa in international relations and the global economy.”76 Pointing to the current 
depiction of Africa as a “global frontier” Bach notes there has been a dramatic shift in perceptions of 
the continent among corporate decision makers.  A view echoed by Carmody in his book The New 
Scramble for Africa where he notes that Africa which had long been by-passed by globalisation is 
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witnessing a “massively increased interest and investment” from major world powers.77  Indeed as 
this study will explore, the discourse on Africa as the “last great investment frontier” has a growing 
resonance in Japan and is shifting perceptions of the continent’s value in Japan’s strategic 
calculations.   
 
Yet while the concept of the frontier has been extensively utilised in the context of international 
relations – from US President John F. Kennedy’s invocation of a New Frontier78 to Slaughter’s 
interpretation of the social, developmental, and digital frontier of foreign policy79 – it remains a 
loaded concept in the context of Africa.  As Rundbell explains, Turner’s frontier thesis of the 
American West “liberated the frontier from a strictly geographical definition” but in so doing 
established the overwhelming understanding of the frontier as a constantly evolving location from 
which “civilisation pushed into the wilderness.”80 The frontier has thus come to be analogous with 
expansion and appropriation of new territory for farming and mining, while overlooking the impact 
on indigenous peoples and ecosystems.81 As Bach further describes, “the frontier’s association with 
the assertion of control by a core over its periphery also accounts for the widespread metaphor of a 
‘new scramble for Africa’ based on the extraction of Africa’s resources.”82 Yet at the same time, 
while external engagement with Africa in the post-colonial era has ranged from indifference to 
sympathy and exploitation, the increasing integration of Africa into the global economy is in turn 
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breaking down some of the essentialist perceptions of the continent, and writing-over patronising 
stereotypes.    
 
Thus in looking beyond the neo-colonial interpretations of the concept, the frontier metaphor 
remains a useful conceptual tool to explore Japan’s activities in South Sudan.  Accordingly, the 
frontier metaphor used in this study references the emerging discourse in Japan of untapped African 
opportunities, a location for policy experimentation, as well as South Sudan’s geographic and 
figurative location on the outer edge of the East African region.     
 
Furthermore, despite the conceptualisation of South Sudan as being on the frontier of Japan’s Africa 
strategy the country remains an important case study and should not be considered merely as a 
global interface, or a location which is acted upon.   As this study will demonstrate, the country’s 
agency in pursuing its own interests when interacting with foreign actors is apparent.  Similarly, 
Harman and Brown argue that the “new scramble for Africa” narrative ignores the accompanying 
potential for African states to demonstrate their agency using the interest of competing powers and 
shifts in global power dynamics to pursue their own interests.83  Thus while this study is grounded in 
the Japanese perspective on engagement with Africa, and is by definition attuned to Japanese 
interests, it also recognises areas of mutual interest between the two countries.  As the following 
chapters will explore, Japan’s activities in South Sudan strengthen the country’s integration with East 
Africa through important infrastructure and a potential oil pipeline.  In this way this study will show 
that Japan’s presence in South Sudan is blurring the lines of the frontier by expanding the scope of 
its own activities and challenging its norms around engaging in Africa.   
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1.3.3 South Sudan as a Testing Ground for New Policies 
 
As this study will establish, Japanese attitudes and approaches towards Africa have undergone a 
significant shift in the years since 2008 and in challenging Japan’s pre-existing norms of engagement 
with Africa, Tokyo is developing new policies and methodologies of operating on the continent.  
Indeed as the following chapters will outline, important aspects of Japan’s presence in South Sudan 
reflect new approaches to the strategic use of development assistance, energy security and the 
deployment of military personnel abroad.  In this respect the conceptual metaphor of the frontier 
will be further developed to demonstrate that South Sudan can also be understood to represent a 
testing ground for new Japanese methods and policies.   
 
Bach argues that “the African frontier is also a global interface and a space for expression and 
experimentation of new strategies and paradigms.”84  Meanwhile Harman and Brown point out that 
“Africa is a key space in which a wide range of these new policy ideas are applied, replicated and 
developed.”85  In this respect this study understands South Sudan as both a frontier of opportunity 
within Japan’s Africa policy, and a location where new policy approaches are developed and honed.  
Indeed as this thesis will demonstrate, key policies and methodologies which impact Japan’s energy 
security approaches or the deployment of military personnel overseas are being defined in East 
Africa.   
 
Yet as previously noted, Africa is far from the everyday concerns of most Japanese people, and these 
activities face little in the way of public scrutiny as they are taking place far away in a little-known 
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location.  For these reasons the renewed interest in Africa by Japanese policymakers has potential 
far-reaching implications for Japan’s broader foreign policy agenda.  As Chapter Six will highlight, this 
is especially true of security policy where decisions made in South Sudan regarding the deployment 
of peacekeepers effectively creates a precedent and circumvents uncomfortable political debates.  
Thus just as Bach points to a European Union-led86 peacekeeping operation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo as being “a test as much as a symbol”87, Japan is testing its constitutional limits for 
international military deployments through its presence in South Sudan.        
  
Furthermore, quite apart from a space in which to explore new policy approaches, this thesis will 
also examine the extent to which the East African region is emerging as a location from which Japan 
can reaffirm its ambitions as a global player.  Just as Besada has noted that “Africa has also become a 
testing ground on which to pull the EU’s foreign policy trigger”88, so too can Japan’s growing 
engagement on the continent be understood to reflect the country’s ambitions to expand its 
international prestige.  As Section 3.2.1 examines, East Africa is also emerging as a location in which 
to trial new dimensions of Sino-Japanese engagement.  Thus reflecting Martel’s observation about 
US policy towards Africa in the 1960s where he noted that “Africa had long been considered to be a 
geopolitical backwater, but the Kennedy team looked upon the mineral-rich continent as a testing 
ground for third-world diplomacy.”89 In this respect as Japanese perceptions of Africa shift, unlikely 
locations such as South Sudan become important spaces from which new strategies, approaches and 
paradigms for external engagement emerge.    
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Moreover, the notion of South Sudan as a testing ground for new policies also speaks to the 
question of how Africa generally and South Sudan specifically is perceived in Japan.  Given that 
decision-makers perceptions matter in the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this 
research, the following chapters will outline how the continent is increasingly viewed as a location 
for investment as well as a site in which new policies related to important national considerations 
such as the role of the Japanese military abroad and strategies to diversify energy supplies are 
explored.  Thus this study will seek to demonstrate that as international pressures drive Japan’s 
presence in Africa, its multifaceted engagement in South Sudan is pushing the boundaries of its 
existing norms and perceptions of the continent, and in turn, influencing Japanese foreign policy 
more broadly.     
 
1.4 Research Method  
  
In conceptualising this research project, a qualitative approach was identified as the most 
appropriate methodology to better understand Japan’s growing presence in South Sudan.  As King 
Keohane and Verba explain, qualitative research uses interviews and in-depth analysis in developing 
“a rounded or comprehensive account of some event.”90  Indeed as Klotz further describes, 
“qualitative methods are somehow linked to meaning”91 – a view supported by Berg who maintains 
that qualitative research provides a greater depth of understanding.92 Put another way, Thies 
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explains that qualitative methods are best suited when “the concepts to be studied are more 
amenable to labelling by words rather than numbers.”93   
 
This study is structured thematically as opposed to a chronological narrative.  As such, the thesis 
seeks to identify the structural factors driving change within Japan’s foreign policy approaches and 
then explore that change in the context of the particular case study of South Sudan. Thus reflecting 
King, Keohane and Verba’s explanation that qualitative research in the social sciences is often 
“linked with area or case studies where the focus is on a particular event, decision, institution or 
location.”94  
  
Moreover given the limited data available on Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, a statistical 
analysis would not have provided a sufficiently nuanced description of the changes taking place in 
Japan’s Africa policies.  For example, the significance of the proposed oil pipeline described in 
Chapter Five lies as much in the intent and the shift in approach by Japanese policymakers, as in the 
construction of the pipeline itself which is yet to happen.  Thus as Berg points out “objects, people, 
situations, and events do not in themselves possess meaning”, but rather “meaning is conferred on 
these elements by and through human interaction.”95 A qualitative methodological approach 
therefore provides the depth, context and detail necessary in seeking to understand the why and 
how of Japan’s re-engagement in Africa through particular analysis of Japanese activities in South 
Sudan.   
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In this respect the primary sources utilised for this study comprised a combination of key informant 
interviews, additional primary print resources, and supportive secondary literature – thereby 
balancing an empirical explanation of Japanese engagement in South Sudan within a neoclassical 
realist theoretical analysis.  As will be explained in Chapter Two, a neoclassical realist approach 
begins its analysis at the systemic level and examines how perceptions of relative power and 
changes in relative power are translated through the foreign policy behaviour of state actors.  Thus 
the collection of primary data sought to examine the factors driving Japan’s engagement in South 
Sudan as well as understand the nature of that engagement.    
 
1.4.1 Primary Data  
 
Key informant interviews contributed a major component of the primary data collected for this 
study, allowing for an in-depth exploration of an otherwise under-documented subject, and the 
discovery of information that might not otherwise be published in official policy documentation.  
This aspect was of particular significance for this study given the current and unfolding nature of the 
research where there is limited alternative data available.  Moreover the individuals interviewed 
shared particular insights and analysis relevant to their expertise or experience.  The interview data 
thus formed the backbone of this research project, reinforced with additional primary data, and 
contextualised against secondary sources and the theoretical framework.   
 
As outlined in Appendix One, a total of 39 interviews were conducted with individuals directly 
involved or with particular knowledge of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan or Africa more 
generally.  In this respect purposive non-probability sampling was used to identify interviewees, 
which as Tansey explains is the best approach when the goal is “to obtain information about highly 
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specific events and processes.”96  Successfully securing interviews with senior-ranking97 individuals 
was a significant achievement in undertaking this study as they contributed valuable perspectives to 
a contemporary and emerging area of research.  In addition, undertaking senior level interviews 
added particular value to this study by augmenting and solidifying official documents with interview 
data.   
 
Identifying the “right” informants and drawing general conclusions from a relatively small number of 
interviewees can be a challenge associated with this methodological approach;98 however this study 
benefitted from the detailed and rich information provided by these well-placed informants.  
Moreover as described below, the limited secondary data and relatively small number of people 
working on Japan’s Africa relations meant that securing interviews with senior well-placed and well-
informed individuals was important in developing a comprehensive data set.    
 
Interviews were conducted in Boston, Juba, London and Tokyo between January and November 
2013.  From September to November 2013 field research was conducted in Tokyo99 where the 
author conducted the majority of the interviews informing this study.  In January 2013 the author 
also travelled to South Sudan on a “Postgraduate Student Study Tour” funded by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA)100 to conduct preliminary field research with senior JICA 
officials, Japan Liaison Office representatives, Japanese contractors, Self Defence Force (SDF) 
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peacekeepers, and high-level South Sudan government officials.  The programme sought to support 
researchers working on topics in Sub-Saharan African countries where JICA operates.  In the case of 
this research project, the support of JICA London was instrumental in facilitating access to Japanese 
contractors and peacekeepers as well as JICA’s South Sudan operations.  Interviews were also 
conducted with Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) officials closely associated with key 
policymakers in the Government of South Sudan.  The conflict that broke out in South Sudan in 
December 2013 however impacted on this study in that further field research planned for February 
and March 2014 was not possible.  During the first six months of 2014 most embassies, private 
companies and non-humanitarian organisations withdrew their foreign staff due to safety concerns. 
The author was therefore unable to travel to Juba and it was impossible to conduct further field 
research in South Sudan.   
 
In undertaking the research for this study semi-structured and open-ended interviews101 were held 
with government officials, retired ambassadors, think-tank researchers, academics, journalists, and 
representative of private-sector companies.  The individuals102 interviewed were identified as having 
particular experience or knowledge relevant to the study.  For example the academics interviewed 
included experts on Japan-Africa relations, Japanese foreign policy and Japan’s peacekeeping 
operations.  Likewise government officials interviewed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Investment (METI) were identified as having particular 
responsibility for relevant aspects of the research project such as energy security or Africa policy.  In 
this respect interviews were structured around the main themes of the study or on particular 
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aspects depending on the individuals interviewed or their specific areas of expertise.  The open-
ended interview format also resulted in previously unconsidered dimensions of the study being 
explored and included in the analysis.    
 
As a number of those interviewed for this study pointed out, despite the growing importance of 
Africa in Japan’s foreign policy calculations, there remain a relatively small number of people in 
Japan researching or working on issues related to Africa.  Thus while the interviews sought to 
provide a relatively comprehensive and inclusive sample of opinions not all can be expected to be 
entirely representative of official policy.  Indeed while academics might be free from the same levels 
of scrutiny as government officials, their comments can be viewed as more subjective but arguably 
less informed.  Thus by including a balance of academic, think-tank and government sources the 
study provides a comprehensive analysis of the drivers and outcomes of Japan’s Africa policies.     
 
There is very little existing literature on Japan’s current engagement in Africa and none on its 
activities in South Sudan, it should be recognised therefore that the inferences from interviews are 
liable to the author’s own interpretation.  In this respect, while interviewees were largely 
forthcoming and willing to share opinions, the author recognises that responses from government 
officials may have been constrained by concerns of confidentiality and by keeping their answers in 
line with official guidelines.  Moreover this study also recognises the possible impact of the Japanese 
social phenomena of tatemae.  As Johnson describes, tatemae is “a statement that spells out the 
way things should be while veiling the fact that reality is otherwise.”103  By comparison honne 
designates “the underlying truth – the real intention, fact, or essence.”104  Researchers point to the 
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tendency of people in Japan to express views (tatemae) in order to fit in with society’s expectations 
or those of their employer rather than express a contrary opinion.   
 
Yet despite this social tendency individuals interviewed for this study showed a general willingness 
to discuss the issues openly – even criticising Japanese policy.  This was especially true of senior-level 
participants who spoke more openly about the motivations underlying official policy – and at times 
even overruled junior interviewees and provided a more nuanced understanding of events that did 
not appear in official documents.  Moreover, as a number of Japanese academics and officials 
explained, African issues have long been considered marginal and unimportant in elite policy circles, 
and as a result they were happy to share their views and contribute towards building awareness of 
Japanese engagement with Africa. Indeed many of those interviewed noted the failure of 
government initiatives to better publicise Japan’s growing presence in Africa and welcomed the fact 
that this research was being done. As such, respondents were in many instances explaining, 
contextualising, or identifying the priorities related to shifts in Japan’s policies towards Africa and 
were thus not inhibited in speaking openly. 
 
The first step in the analysis of interview data was the identification and elimination of bias, both on 
the part of the interviewees and the author.  In this regard the author sought to follow the advice of 
King, Keohane and Verba who point out that methodological self-awareness can yield a large 
improvement in scholarship.105  Initially the potential for biased responses was avoided through a 
research design that ensured a spread of interviewees operating in different sectors, at different 
levels and in different locations. Although subjectivity and the potential for biased responses are 
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recognised limitations of key informant interviews,106 the author sought to identify consistent 
responses to particular questions from a range of interviewees.  This was reinforced by 
crosschecking between interviewee responses and comparing responses with official documentation 
where available.  Moreover, the author sought to mitigate “sponsor bias” or tatemae by comparing 
the responses of official representatives with those of academics or private company 
representatives where relevant. Finally, all interviews – except those representatives of the 
government of South Sudan – were recorded to ensure responses were accurately transcribed.  The 
representatives of the government of South Sudan also requested not to be named following the 
outbreak of conflict.       
 
The second step in avoiding bias was related primarily to an assessment of the subjectivity of the 
author in undertaking the research.  Given that the author was both the instrument of data 
collection and analysis, it was important to be cognisant of his position relative to the subject matter 
and his own affinity with the issues, concepts and theories underpinning this research.  It is worth 
noting therefore that the author was an external observer to the subject matter – while having 
previous experience working in South Sudan, had no prior views or positions on Japanese 
engagement in the country.  In this regard the author sought to avoid leading questions, aimed for 
consistency of approach towards all interviews and allowed the findings to emerge through 
synthesis of the data.      
 
The approach used in analysing the interview data began by categorising key themes identified by 
the interviewees as driving Japan’s engagement in Africa as well the methods of this engagement.  
This was achieved by cross-checking and triangulating the responses of participants – more simply 
                                                          
106
 For example see Berry, Jeffrey, “Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing”, Political Science and 
Politics, Vol. 35, Issue 4, 2002, pp. 679–682  
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
46 
 
put, this entailed identifying similar answers to key questions and tabulating the answers.  Then 
building on the particular area of expertise of the participant such as energy policy, development 
assistance or peacekeeping,107  a more detailed understanding of the various dimensions of Japan’s 
engagement in South Sudan, and Africa more broadly was developed.  In this regard there was 
largely a consensus of opinion around the primary drivers of Japan’s growing presence in Africa, 
which are described in Chapter Three as constituting the strategic objectives of Japan’s engagement 
in South Sudan.  While the tactical approaches to engagement outlined in Figure 5 (page 75) were 
developed through cross-referencing interview data from subject-specific interviews such as those 
conducted with the Institute of Energy Economics of Japan (IEEJ), Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National 
Corporation (JOGMEC),108 Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI) and Toyota Tsusho to 
formulate an understanding of the particular tactical approaches to Japan’s energy security strategy 
that are emerging in East Africa.  The interview data was then further analysed against official 
government publications, media releases and news reports to fully develop the arguments outlined 
in the study.     
 
The interviews thus provided particular insight into the combination of internal and external factors 
that underpin Japan’s engagement in Africa, and the extent to which the country’s Africa policy can 
be seen to reflect changing priorities within the broader spectrum of Japan’s strategic policies.   
Therefore as explained in Chapter Two, it was through analysis of the primary data that emerged 
from these interviews that neoclassical realism was identified as the best-suited theoretical 
framework through which to examine the research questions underpinning this study.   
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Additional primary data used in this research included speeches and official statements from both 
the governments of Japan and South Sudan.  Furthermore, statistical information was sourced from 
official Japanese government publications, World Bank reports and organisations such as the United 
States energy Information Administration (EIA).   Given the contemporary nature of this study news 
sources also provided a significant amount of primary data – providing an important perspective on 
both current events, and in the case of Japan, a reflection of Japanese attitudes and approaches 
towards engagement with Africa.  Japanese online media sources included Asahi Shimbun, 
JapanToday.com, Kyodo News, Mainichi Shimbun, NHK World, Nikkei Shimbun and The Japan Times.  
In addition to the fact these newspapers are available online and in English, they were chosen as 
they provide a range of perspectives on Japan’s foreign policy and insights into the domestic context 
against which policy decisions are made.  For example the complex debates around Japan’s 
international security engagement or the country’s energy security policies can be monitored 
through the editorial positions of these newspapers. Current news and opinion on South Sudan was 
sourced primarily from the Paris-based Sudan Tribune, which is recognised as a reliable and up to 
date resource.  In addition, international news agencies and Africa-focused current affairs 
publications such as Reuters, All Africa, African Arguments, The Economist and Think Africa Press 
were included for analysis of South Sudan and the East African Region.         
 
1.4.2 Secondary Data  
 
This study also incorporates secondary data sources such as peer-reviewed journals, think tank 
reports, books and policy-oriented publications.   These sources were relied on primarily in providing 
theoretical substance and context to the empirical findings, as well as for deeper analysis of the 
various dimensions of Japan’s foreign policy such as development aid, energy security and 
peacekeeping.  In this respect this study is multidisciplinary in that it drew on literature from wide 
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range of fields including international relations, development studies, Japan studies and Africa 
studies.  Furthermore, the secondary literature also provided deeper analysis of particular aspects of 
Japan’s policy environment such as the country’s “pacifist” constitution and the complexities of 
relations with China, as well as its historical engagement with Africa.  And while there is limited 
literature on South Sudan as an independent country, this study relied on existing literature on the 
conflict in Sudan and the eventual cessation of South Sudan in providing an important context 
against which to frame Japan’s current engagement.         
 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis  
 
This thesis comprises seven chapters.  The introductory chapter outlined the study’s primary 
research questions and research objectives, as well as explored the contribution of this study. This 
chapter also included a short summary of historical context of South Sudan and introduced the two 
conceptual metaphors used in this thesis to conceptualise the dynamics associated with Japan’s 
renewed political and economic presence in Africa.  
 
The second chapter then outlines the research approach. In making a case for a neoclassical realist 
framework of analysis for Japan’s engagement with South Sudan, the chapter summarises the 
dominant theoretical approaches to the study of Japan’s foreign policy and outlines how neoclassical 
realism is utilised in this study.  
 
The third chapter explores the major structural considerations influencing Japanese foreign policy in 
Africa and the context in which the particular aspects of Japan’s activities in South Sudan are 
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examined.  These include a general assessment of Japan’s status on the international stage through 
examination of the growth of the G20, the rise of China, and Chinese influence in Africa.  The 
chapter then details structurally-driven factors directly linked to Japan’s presence in South Sudan, 
namely economic revitalisation, ensuring energy security and meeting international security 
commitments.    
 
The following three chapters comprise the key empirical findings at the heart of this study.  They 
explore Japan’s engagement in South Sudan in terms of the structural drivers identified in Chapter 
Three, and the diagrammatic outline of Japan’s strategic and tactical approach to Africa outlined in 
Figure 5 (page 75).  In this respect Chapter Four focuses on Japan’s aid engagement in South Sudan.  
In evaluating the evolution of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Africa and the Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the chapter explores the emergence of 
“strategic” ODA in the context of Japan’s presence in South Sudan.    
 
Chapter Five examines the proposed oil pipeline project to be undertaken by Japanese company 
Toyota Tsusho, the trading arm of the Toyota Corporation.  The chapter address the investment-
component of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and explores the context against which the 
proposed oil pipeline development is understood by this study.  Namely, Japan’s broader resource 
strategy in Africa and how this intersects with the domestic imperative of energy security which 
remains a fundamental aspect of Japanese foreign policy. 
 
Chapter Six examines Japan’s security presence in Africa through the deployment of peacekeepers in 
South Sudan and anti-piracy naval operations in the Horn of Africa.  The chapter concludes that the 
expansion of Japan’s presence on the continent to include a security dimension is significant both as 
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a reflection of the structural pressures influencing Japan’s foreign policy in Africa, and in terms of the 
complex constitutional considerations that accompany the deployment of Japan’s armed forces.   
 
Finally Chapter Seven concludes by summarising the study and exploring possible avenues for future 
research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework  
 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework used to interpret Japan’s activities in South 
Sudan.  While this study places particular emphasis on empirical evidence and analysis of an under-
researched element within Japan’s international engagement, it still recognises the importance of 
presenting research within a theoretical perspective – or systematically developing and organising 
ideas to explain phenomena.109  Indeed the approach to theory in this study also draws inspiration 
from Jackson’s argument that researchers should be “explicit about their philosophical 
commitments, so that readers can better appreciate the basis on which subsequent knowledge-
claims are being advanced.”110   As such, incorporating theory into a study frames the analysis within 
wider debates, and provides an important context for terminology or assumptions that are used in 
the thesis.  Furthermore, as Wolfers points out,  
If attention is focused exclusively on the goals and means of policy with no 
consideration for the forces that determine or influence the actors in 
choosing among these goals and means, one is left without any guide to 
anticipate future choices and without any way of affecting policy.111   
 
Theory is therefore understood in this study as an important means to systematically explain the 
empirical observations of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and neoclassical realism will be used 
as the framework of analysis.  The dominant theories of international relations offer some valuable 
perspectives through which to understand Japanese engagement in South Sudan – and more broadly 
in Africa, but as the following section will examine, they are also unable to provide a universally 
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applicable framework to interpret the multiple dynamics driving Japanese policy in Africa.  Indeed as 
Haglund and Onea point out, neoclassical realism is unique in international relations scholarship in 
that it “highlights the centrality of theorising foreign policy”112 as opposed to developing theories of 
international politics.  Consequently, neoclassical realism is understood in this study to be a more 
inclusive hybrid approach that bridges the divide between macro and micro level analysis in 
developing a descriptive understanding of the drivers of foreign policy outcomes.  This chapter will 
therefore explain the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism through which Japan’s 
engagement in South Sudan will be examined in the chapters that follow.    
 
Theory is integrated into this study as a framework through which descriptive observations are 
interpreted.  In this respect the following chapters while focused on descriptive detail, will rely on 
neoclassical realism as a vehicle for analysis and will reference the theory throughout the thesis.  It is 
important to note however that the construct of neoclassical realism emerged from the key 
informant interviews which comprise the primary data underpinning this research.   In other words 
participants identified particular systemic pressures as driving Japan’s renewed interest in Africa and 
the extent to which those policies are influenced by the perceptions of policymakers or the 
particular dynamics of Japan’s domestic political environment.  Thus given that the theoretical 
framework emerged from the key informant interviews, it did not influence the design or 
implementation of the study – nor were the findings simplified or manipulated for the sake of 
conformity to a theoretical or methodological principle.  But rather neoclassical realism emerged as 
a practical construct of understanding that balanced the empirical observations with the rigour of 
advanced critical analysis.   
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Neoclassical realism begins analysis at the systemic level but also incorporates domestic factors such 
as policymaker’s perceptions of relative power and the extent to which they are translated into state 
behaviour.  In this respect the approach broadly reflects Lebow’s “layered” approach to 
understanding societal order and international relations,113 but as this chapter will explain, 
neoclassical realism remains the best-suited model through which to interpret the changes in 
Japan’s Africa policies since 2008 as well as Japanese engagement in South Sudan.   
 
It is also necessary however to first explore some other theoretical approaches that could be used to 
explain Japan’s engagement in Africa.  The following sections will therefore examine existing 
approaches to the study of Japan’s foreign policy before outlining the role of neoclassical realism as 
a vehicle for analysis in this study.    
 
2.1 Competing Perspectives of Japanese Foreign Policy Analysis  
 
Theories of international relations rely on a variety of approaches to explain the behaviour of states 
within the international system and have consequently formulated a number of paradigms through 
which state interaction is understood.  Paradigms which can be broadly summarised to encompass 
two primary approaches to the unit of analysis or the central variable – namely analysis based on 
external factors such as the international system or analysis based on internal, domestic variables.   
In this respect the interpretation of Japan’s foreign policy also reflects this dichotomy with academic 
opinion divided on how best to understand and assess the country’s foreign relations.  This section 
will therefore examine and critique the primary theoretical approaches to the analysis of Japan.     
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Realism and neorealism have long dominated the analysis of state behaviour at the international 
level.  Realism is not however a unified theory, but rather a collection of disparate approaches to 
understanding the actions and motivations of states.  As Ashley observes, “realist scholarship is very 
far from being an internally harmonious tradition”,114 but it is based on common assumptions.  
Namely, that the international system is anarchic, in which states are the most important actors.  
Furthermore, states are understood to be unitary, rational actors whose primary concern is 
survival.115  While classical realism was not identified as a formal discipline until after the Second 
World War by theorists such as Morgenthau116 and Carr,117 it traces its lineage through the works of 
Hobbes,118 Machiavelli119 and Thucydides.120 Yet in a departure from the classical realism of 
Morgenthau, Carr and Gilpin,121 Waltz122 proposes that structural constraints determine state 
behaviour in international relations.  In outlining structural realism, or neorealism, Waltz argues that 
states have the same needs but differing capabilities for achieving them.  As such, the actions of a 
state are explained primarily by the causal systemic variable of the relative distribution of power 
capabilities among states.  Neorealism remains among the most influential contemporary 
approaches to the study of state behaviour. Yet when considering this research project, neorealism’s 
parsimonious approach and focus on structural analysis might offer some insight into the why of 
Japan’s Africa policies but does not offer enough detail or context to understand the how of Japan’s 
engagement in South Sudan.  Nor does it adequately reflect African agency as an element within 
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Japan’s interactions on the continent and the extent to which Japan’s objectives in South Sudan 
match that country’s own strategic or developmental goals.      
 
Moreover in the case of broader Japanese policy analysis, the realist approach has faced 
considerable criticism.  As Kawasaki observes “Japan is commonly regarded as an anomaly to 
realism”123, or as Yasutomo points out, “realism does not produce a uniform picture of Japan.”124 
Indeed as Yasutomo goes on list, diverse interpretations of realism related to Japan include what 
Heginbotham and Samuels refer to as pragmatic “dual hedging”125, Lind’s militarily strong “buck-
passing”126, or Green’s “reluctant realism.”127  In contrast, Pyle128 argues that Japan has always been 
characterised by classical realism, and Hughes129 and Kilman130 see Japan in recent years as once 
more exhibiting realist tendencies.   
 
The complexity inherent to the interpretation of post-war Japanese policy is due in part to the 
development path followed by Japan after the Second World War which prioritised economic 
growth while keeping a low diplomatic profile and a military strategy confined to the US-Japan 
Alliance.  Often referred to as the “Yoshida Doctrine”, the strategy was developed by Prime Minister 
Shigeru Yoshida (1946–47, 1948–54) and defined Japan’s national strategy throughout the Cold War 
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era.  As Chai explains, this policy resulted in the levels of Japan’s defence expenditure being uniquely 
low among the major industrialised countries.131  Japan therefore appeared to defy the realist 
assumption that states seek to maximise the power that their economies allow, and developed what 
Miyagi refers to as a “lopsided power profile.”132  Miyagi’s view thus reflects Calder’s analysis of 
Japan as a “reactive sate” that could or would not take international leadership.   
 
In recognising the challenge that post-war Japan offered to realist analysis Yasutomo observes that 
“Japan specialists find it necessary to adapt their conceptualisation to fit their nuanced view of 
realist Japan.”133 As a result, some scholars altered their point of analysis of Japan from cherry-
picking elements of realist theory to focusing on what had been previously overlooked.  As Johnson 
explains, 
Since realism either does not inquire into all the domestic responses to and 
constraints on foreign policies or else assumes that such responses are 
homogenous across all states facing similar international pressures, the cases of 
pre-war and post-war Japan directly challenge realist theory.134  
 
Thus in response to the apparent shortcomings of realist paradigms for analysing Japan’s foreign 
policy approaches, some scholars turned to a constructivist approach.   
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Constructivism, as Alder explains is centred on the idea that “international politics is shaped by 
persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities.”135 As such, constructivists do not 
base their analysis on structure, but rather they argue that the international system is socially 
constructed by cognitive structures which in turn give meaning to the material world.  Constructivist 
theories of international relations therefore are concerned with how ideas define international 
structure, how this structure defines the interests and identities of states, and how states and non-
state actors reproduce this structure.136 Thus by focusing on domestic unit-level variables, the 
constructivist approach to analysis of international relations places equal value on non-material 
aspects such as identity, norms and customs.   
 
In the context of Japan’s policy analysis, the emphasis placed on norms by the constructivist 
approach is particularly relevant when considering the norm of anti-militarism.  As discussed in 
Chapter Six, Japan’s constitutionally entrenched pacifism defines the context in which Japanese 
security policy is developed and implemented.  Indeed as Katzenstein has argued, the norm of anti-
militarism permeates Japanese policymaking and is a consequence of its national identity, historical 
experience and culture.137  While Berger points out that the reluctance of Japan to rearm and 
become a “normal” country “is not be found in any structural factor […] but rather is attributable to 
Japan’s post-war culture of anti-militarism.”138  A norm that Berger goes on to describe as “one of 
the most striking features of contemporary Japanese politics.”  Furthermore, the perspective of 
history and historical memories remain important factors in determining Japanese foreign policy 
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outcomes – particularly as this study maintains with regard to Sino-Japanese relations and Japanese 
perceptions of China’s rise.   
 
As Chernoff explains however, this approach fails to appreciate the influence of the international 
system, and that “constructivism has provided little in the way of substantive knowledge, or even 
hypotheses, about the behaviour of states or state systems.”139  Constructivism also treats the norms 
and culture of identity as a property concept — as an intrinsic attribute of a state.  Instead, 
Neumann maintains that identity should be treated as a relational concept, because even the way 
identity is domestically constructed typically relies on a process of differentiation between oneself 
and others.140  Furthermore as Hagström points out, the problem, for both constructivists and their 
realist critics, is that “in recent years Japan has taken a much more proactive stance in its foreign 
policy — a development which seems to be related precisely to China and North Korea, and which 
has often crystallised in its policies toward those countries.”141 Indeed for the same reason 
constructivism does not offer a suitable framework for the analysis of Japan’s engagement in Africa. 
For example, while a constructivist analysis provides important context in understanding the 
domestic dynamics associated with the deployment of Japanese military personnel to the Horn of 
Africa (as described in Chapter Six) it does not explain the factors leading to their deployment or the 
context in which they are operating.   
 
A further theoretical approach to understanding Japan in the post-war era is neo-liberalism which 
seeks to incorporate the role of economic cooperation and international institutions into the analysis 
of state behaviour.  Keohane and Nye question the realist assumption that power dictates behaviour 
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and argue instead for a model of “complex independence”, where economic relations between 
states define state interaction rather than military force and power-balancing.142  Neo-liberalism 
does however acknowledge some neo-realist conditions, for example Kegley and Wittkopf point to 
the significance of a state’s national interest and the existence of anarchy in the global system.143 
Though despite these conditions, neo-liberals take a more positive view of the international system, 
believing that sustainable cooperation is possible.  Moreover, they argue that states seek 
cooperation through trade and institutions despite the prevalence of anarchy at the global level.144  
 
Japan’s state-pacifism and active participation in multilateral institutions such as the UN can 
therefore be explained through the framework of neo-liberalism.  As Akimoto explains, Japan’s 
participation in peacekeeping operations is also compatible with neo-liberalism, because it affirms 
the utilisation of Japanese military forces for the goal of multilateral cooperation, and international 
peace and security.145  While realists might argue that Japan’s participation in multilateral forums is 
aimed at achieving great power status and a seat at the UN Security Council, for neo-liberals, Japan’s 
focus on non-militarism and trade is an example of a pragmatic interpretation of their national 
interests, and it has served the country well.  In this respect liberalism might explain Japan’s desire 
to increase investment in Africa and even the establishment of ties with a new state such as South 
Sudan, but it does not explain the changes that have occurred in Japanese policy towards Africa 
since 2008 nor the broader structural considerations influencing Japanese policymakers.      
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Thus when considering the key issues at the heart of this study it became apparent that the 
theoretical approaches described above do not provide a suitable framework in which to understand 
the complex factors influencing Japan’s re-engagement in Africa.  Indeed as Akimoto notes in the 
context of security policy “each theory of international relations is incomplete, and each provides 
only a partial explanation of Japan’s security identity.” The same could be said for theoretical 
explanations of Japan’s activities in South Sudan which reflect a number of factors driving Japanese 
policies in the region.  As Akimoto further points out, the problem for the theoretical analysis of 
Japan’s foreign policy, “lies in the lack of an eclectic and comprehensive approach in the existing 
scholarship.”146  A view shared by Katzenstein who noted that the study of Japanese foreign policy 
needs to be more eclectic, “analytical eclecticism highlights different layers and connections that 
parsimonious explanations conceal.”147  
 
Consequently, analysing the multiple dimensions of Japan’s strategy in Africa requires a more 
comprehensive theoretical framework through which empirically-driven research can be 
interpreted.  In this regard this study relies on neoclassical realism as a vehicle of analysis – a 
theoretical framework described by  Guilhot as eclectic148 and which recognises both the influence of 
the international system and the internal dynamics of states in explaining foreign policy outcomes.  
Representing a progression within the field of realist approaches, neoclassical realism extends 
Waltz’s work by incorporating intervening variables in explaining how and why states deviate from 
the balance of power logic that defines neorealism.  The sections that follow will examine the 
theoretical framework of neoclassical realism and its suitability as a mechanism for the analysis of 
Japan’s engagement in Africa.    
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2.2 Framework of Analysis: Neoclassical Realism  
 
Neoclassical realism represents a progression within the broad literature on realism, by seeking to 
incorporate aspects of Waltzian neo-realism with a constructivist critique of elite perceptions.  
Neoclassical realism therefore looks to extend Waltz’s approach by incorporating analysis of 
decision-makers’ perceptions and domestic state structures.   As Rose explains, neoclassical realists 
occupy a middle ground between pure structural theorists and constructivists.149  Thus while states 
remain the principal actors within this paradigm, greater attention is given to the forces above and 
below the state.  The international system is seen as a structure acting on the state, and intervening 
factors such as decision-makers’ perceptions influence the state from below.  The theory can 
therefore be understood as illustrative rather than demonstrative and this thesis will not seek to test 
the theory nor apply a model, but rather use the theory as a framework to explain and interpret 
Japan’s engagement in Africa.   
 
Neoclassical realism was delineated as an approach to understanding the behaviour of states by 
Rose who drew on the work of Christensen,150 Schweller,151 Wohforth152 and Zakaria153 in outlining a 
distinct school of international relations analysis.  The approach provides for a single independent 
variable: relative power in the international system, intervening variables comprising factors such as 
state structure and incentives, as well as policymakers’ perceptions of their relative power.  And 
finally, a dependent variable: the foreign policy decision.  Therefore as Roth points out, “neoclassical 
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realists reject the privileging of systemic structural variables”154 and include institutional and cultural 
factors in the analysis of state behaviour.  In this way the framework of analysis is better suited to 
explaining variations in states’ reaction to changes in the international system.  Japan’s re-
engagement in Africa is thus interpreted by this study as a response to changes at the structural 
level interpreted through the particular lens of that country’s domestic political norms and the 
perceptions of its policymakers.   
 
The construct of neoclassical realism is not however without its critics, most notably Legro and 
Moravcsik who argue that with the inclusion of domestic considerations neoclassical realism 
sacrifices the coherence of realism.  They maintain that realism is a theory with important 
explanatory power and that expanding the paradigm to discuss explanatory factors beyond the core 
realist framework effectively dilutes realism making it less determinant and distinctive.  They explain 
that these approaches “inevitably import considerations of exogenous variation in the societal and 
cultural sources of state preferences” and that the neoclassical realist scholars mentioned above are 
in fact liberals with an identity crisis.155 Legro and Moravcsik’s critique of neoclassical realism 
ultimately rests on their view that without distinctiveness and coherence it becomes difficult to 
distinguish between international relations paradigms.    
 
Yet as the sections below will demonstrate, understanding why a state chooses from the possibilities 
presented by its relative material power requires incorporating aspects of other paradigms into the 
analysis.  Indeed as Rathbun points out, neoclassical realism uses domestic politics and ideas to flesh 
out the central consideration in neorealism – namely the concept of power.  “Drawing and 
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improving on insights of classical realism, it shows how domestic politics and ideas are key elements 
in the process of self-help inherent to an anarchic system.” Rathbun further maintains that the role 
of domestic politics cannot be possessed by one paradigm, arguing they are “fair game for realism 
and neoclassical realists have taken up this mantle.”156  Nye moreover believes that international 
relations theory is “unnecessarily impoverished by exclusivist claims”, arguing that “liberal theory 
should not be seen as an antithesis to realist analysis but as a supplement to it.”157  As such, Desch 
notes that cultural theories supplement security studies by filling a gap between structural change 
and differences in state behaviour as well as explain seemingly irrational state behaviour.158  Thus as 
Rathbun explains, while neoclassical realism maintains the neorealist core assumption of the 
importance of structure it has taken “a natural and progressive next step”159 through the inclusion of 
domestic units into its analysis.   
 
Moreover as Kitchen also emphasises, neoclassical realism “is a descriptive theory, not a prescriptive 
one”160 and as such this study draws on the key informant interviews and secondary sources 
previously described to develop a picture of the factors driving Japan’s re-engagement in Africa – 
and the particular domestic considerations underpinning the Japanese presence in South Sudan.  
These strategic objectives therefore are considered in this study in conjunction with the intervening 
domestic considerations that ultimately influence Japan’s particular methods of engagement in 
Africa.  The paradigm of neoclassical realism is therefore understood in this study as a practical and 
policy-relevant approach best suited to the analysis of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan.     
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2.2.1 Relative Power in the International System   
 
Neoclassical realism as Taliaferro describes stresses the causal primacy of structural variables, 
“chiefly the relative distribution of material power and anticipated power in shaping foreign 
policies.”161 Indeed as Rose reiterates, “the scope and ambition of a country is driven first and 
foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power 
capabilities.”162 For this reason, adherents of neoclassical realism are still realists.  Yet significantly, 
Rose also goes on to point out, there is no immediate or perfect mechanism linking material 
capabilities to foreign policy behaviour.  But rather foreign policy choices are made by political 
leaders and elites so it is their “perceptions of relative power that matter not simply relative 
quantities of physical resources or forces in being.”163   
 
Perceptions of prestige within the international hierarchy are therefore also considered in the 
neoclassical realist framework.  The importance of how states perceive themselves relative to other 
states in the system influences their policy outcomes.  And states are assumed to wish to advance 
their power and status in the international system – a system which Taliaferro points out is 
competitive and provides incentives to emulate the political, military and technological practices of 
others.164  Consequently when China surpassed Japan to assume the title as the world’s second 
largest economy, it did not necessarily diminish Japan’s power in real terms – but the perceptive 
difference will influence how decisions are made.  A point made clear by Prime Minister Abe when 
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he noted that “Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-Two country.”165 A MOFA director further 
explains that “once you have been number one, you can never be satisfied to be number two”, 
Going on to point out that the prospect of being a “middle power was not an option for Japan.”166  In 
this regard neoclassical realism draws on the classical realist perspective of status rivalries as 
described by Morgenthau, “whatever the ultimate objectives of a nation’s foreign policy, its prestige 
– its reputation for power – is always an important and sometimes the decisive factor in determining 
the success or failure of its foreign policy.”167  
 
Systemic forces thus create incentives for all states to ensure their security or advance their 
positions relative to other states.   However while the anarchic environment encourages the goal of 
survival, Sterling-Folker points out, that it is a domestic process that is responsible for the ability of 
states to emulate the processes of others.  Thus it is the “domestic process that acts as the final 
arbiter for state survival within the anarchic environment.”168  In this context, the framework of 
neoclassical realism heeds the advice of Zakaria who observes that a "good account of a nation's 
foreign policy should include systemic, domestic, and other influences, specifying what aspects of 
the policy can be explained by what factors."169 
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2.2.2 The Domestic Context of Foreign Policy Formation 
 
While neoclassical realism begins its analysis of state behaviour at the systemic level it deviates from 
neorealist perspectives by including analysis of unit-level variables.  These intervening factors should 
be understood to reflect interpretations of observed realities rather than measureable facts – such 
as attitudes, perceptions and intentions.  Thus in order to understand the way states interpret and 
respond to their external environment, Rose maintains that they must analyse “how systemic 
pressures are translated through unit-level intervening variables such as decision-makers’ 
perceptions and domestic state structure.”170 In this regard, unit-level factors included in 
neoclassical realist analysis include the details of state institutions, public opinion, the media and the 
dynamics of domestic party politics.  As Dueck explains, domestic politics does not shape the 
whether but rather the when and the how of foreign intervention.171  
  
Consequently, as Schweller summarises, “complex political processes act as a transmission belt that 
channel, mediate, (re)direct policy outputs in response to external forces (primarily changes in 
relative power).”172  Yet in contrast to the approaches of constructivism and liberalism which argue 
that foreign policy is best understood as the product of a country’s internal dynamics, the 
neoclassical realist perspective views domestic considerations as intervening rather than dominant.  
In this way the environment rather than the process remains the primary factor of analysis.   
Neoclassical realism however also includes analysis of norms – a key element of constructivist 
interpretation of state behaviour.  Of particular significance to this study are the norms most 
relevant in Japan such as anti-militarism, human security, the primacy of the US Alliance, and energy 
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security.  The norm of anti-militarism for example, whilst originally externally imposed, has strong 
domestic support and continues to define Japan’s security policy response to structural dynamics – it 
is discussed in Chapter Six as an important consideration when understanding Japan’s security 
engagement in Africa.      
 
As Rose further points out, the international system only provides states with “murky signals”173 on 
how to respond to systemic pressures and changes – thereby highlighting the role of domestic elites 
and policymakers in interpreting those signals and orchestrating a state’s response.  Zakaria further 
notes that “domestic politics explanations can be most useful in explaining events, trends and 
policies that are too specific to be addressed by a grand theory of international politics.”174 
Consequently as Dueck has suggested, state responses can be measured with reference to policy 
instruments such as military deployments and spending, alliance commitments, foreign aid, and the 
willingness to commit to diplomatic initiatives. 175  As this study will explore, these policy instruments 
have all been deployed in Japan’s engagement in South Sudan and reflect strategic decision-making 
by policymakers tasked with planning and implementing Japan’s Africa policy.     
 
Thus as Schweller argues, “states respond (or not) to threats and opportunities in ways determined 
by both internal and external considerations of policy elites, who must reach consensus within an 
often decentralised and competitive political process.”176 In this way the neoclassical realist 
perspective views states as comprising divergent groups with at times competing objectives and 
influence in the development of foreign policy.  As such, as this study will demonstrate, Japanese 
engagement in South Sudan and Africa more generally reflects the evolution and diversity of opinion 
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among elites in the  formulation and implementation of key policy frameworks such as ODA, energy 
investments and peacekeeping.   
 
Neoclassical realism therefore provides a balanced and policy-relevant construct around which to 
frame this study.  As a widely accepted theoretical perspective, neoclassical realism contributes to 
the realist tradition while also being a theoretical framework well suited to empirically-driven 
research in that it combines the theoretical rigour of Waltzian neo-realism with a content-rich 
empirical analysis.   
 
2.3 How Neoclassical Realism is Used in This Study  
 
This study asks the primary question: what explains Japan’s engagement in South Sudan? It thereby 
seeks to explore the particular activities undertaken by Japan in South Sudan and frame a deeper 
analysis of the broad strategic considerations underpinning Japan’s Africa policy.  Yet to arrive at 
broader conclusions around the factors driving Japan’s engagement in Africa requires a theoretical 
framework through which to interpret the empirical findings which are at the core of this study.  In 
this respect neoclassical realism provides a practical mechanism through which to understand an 
evolving and under-researched aspect of Japan’s foreign policy.  The neoclassical realist approach is 
also best suited to an empirically-driven study that seeks to find meaning in Japanese policy in 
Africa.  As previously mentioned, the environment rather than the process remains the primary 
factor of analysis.  As such, Walt points out that “where neorealism sacrificed precision in order to 
gain parsimony and generality, neoclassical realism has given up generality and predictive power in 
an attempt to gain descriptive accuracy and policy relevance.”177 Consequently this study will 
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employ the neoclassical realist perspective as a vehicle of analysis, but will not seek to apply a model 
or contribute to the specific literature on neoclassical realism.   
 
In this context the structural factors examined in this study can be considered as “causes” 
influencing the limits and tactics of Japan’s approach to South Sudan –  and reflect the views of key 
informants interviewed for this study.  Furthermore, in line with a neoclassical realist approach, 
intervening or unit-level considerations are also included in the analysis.  This study will therefore 
include analysis of a range of domestic factors relevant to the specific elements of Japan’s activities 
in South Sudan.  These include for example the perceptions of policymakers and norms such as the 
constitutionally defined anti-militarism, adherence to human security policies, risk-averse 
investment policies, as well energy security concerns and aid policies.   
 
This study does not however undertake a detailed process-tracking methodological approach to 
examine the domestic factors influencing Japan’s foreign policy formation.  But rather examines the 
particular domestic context that explains the three primary dimensions of Japanese engagement in 
South Sudan: ODA, resource-focused investment and peacekeeping.  These activities therefore form 
the empirical basis of this research project, but are also explored in the following chapters in terms 
of their international and domestic dimensions.  In this way the empirically-driven analysis of Japan’s 
activities in South Sudan is examined in the context of both the structural factors, and the 
intervening domestic considerations that influence the manner and approach of Japan’s policies in 
South Sudan.  The diagram below (Figure 4) provides a visual framework of how this study will 
examine Japan’s engagement in South Sudan through the lens of neoclassical realism.   
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Figure 4: Neoclassical realist framework of analysis of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan   
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As this study will explore, Japan’s engagement in Africa is multifaceted and the factors underpinning 
this engagement are multidimensional and in many instances overlapping – yet there are still 
discernible broad strategic objectives that are driving Japanese engagement in Africa.  These 
objectives reflect a response to pressures and incentives at both the systemic and domestic levels.  
In turn these objectives define the tactics or methods of Japan’s engagement on the continent 
generally, as well as Japan’s particular activities in South Sudan.    
 
The following chapter will therefore briefly outline the primary structural factors shaping Japan’s 
Africa policy.  The subsequent chapters will then provide analysis of Japan’s activities in South Sudan 
as representative of the broader tactics of Japanese policy in Africa – contextualised against the 
strategic objectives driving Japan’s refocused African presence.  And as such, it will seek to 
demonstrate how Japan’s activities in South Sudan are distinct elements within Japan’s tactical 
engagement in Africa, as well as indicative of the broad strategic objectives that characterise 
Japanese policy in the period 2008–2013.    
 
As Kitchen describes in his work on neoclassical realism and grand strategy formation, grand strategy 
is the level at which “systemic and unit level factors converge”178 and that strategy emerges through 
the processes of empirical assessment and ideational competition within the state.179 And while this 
study is not focused on Japan’s overarching “Grand Strategy”, it maintains that the same principles 
can be used when referring to a particular element within the scope of a state’s strategic objectives.   
Thus just as Kitchen describes a set of policies that set out the goals of the state, and prescribe how 
a broad range of national resources should be utilised in pursuit of those goals, so this study will 
outline the objectives and methods underpinning Japan’s re-engagement in Africa.  Dueck further 
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points out that “the process of identifying national interests and then mobilising resources to pursue 
those interests is not a given […] a wide variety of domestic political factors may influence this 
process.”180  Indeed as Professor Nakanishi summarises, Africa remains a long term consideration in 
Japan’s foreign policy determinations, and while the overarching strategy might be defined, the 
tactics are still being developed.181  
 
Consequently, the strategic objectives underpinning Japan’s refocused engagement in Africa that are 
identified in this study emerged from key informant interviews undertaken with Japanese 
government officials, academics and think tank researchers.  Through these discussions interviewees 
identified a number of overlapping factors that make-up Japan’s emerging strategic objectives – and 
their corresponding tactical approaches towards engagement in Africa.   
 
The diagrammatic relationship outlined below in Figure 5 (page 75) shows how this study 
understands Japan’s strategic objectives, tactical approaches and “on the ground” activities.   These 
in turn reflect global structural pressures, interpreted via the intervening considerations of domestic 
policy imperatives – resulting in a particular policy outcome in South Sudan.  The diagram should be 
understood as a visual representation of the key findings to emerge from the interviews that 
underpin this research.  In other words Figure 5 is not a model that this research sets out to test, but 
rather an illustration of how the interview data was interpreted and how the following empirical 
chapters will be structured.     
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Thus the strategic objectives understood by this study to be driving Japanese engagement in South 
Sudan address four primary aims:  
1. Economic revitalisation and growth  
2. Ensure resource and energy security  
3. Meet Japan’s international security commitments  
4. Respond to the rise of China.  
 
A detailed examination of each of these factors will be undertaken in Chapter Three, however it 
should also be noted that while these factors reflect both the changes and the challenges that Japan 
faces at the structural level, this study only considers those strategic objectives that reflect Japan’s 
Africa policy.  For example, economic revitalisation is a central element of government policy and 
encompasses a variety of policy options encompassed by Prime Minister Abe’s “Three Arrows” 
which include fiscal stimulus, aggressive monetary easing from the Bank of Japan and structural 
reforms to boost competitiveness – only some of which can be interpreted as driving Japan’s 
renewed enthusiasm for engagement with Africa.  Furthermore, a primary strategic objective for 
Japan remains the relationship with the United States – Calder182 would even argue that the US 
relationship completely defines the parameters of Japan’s foreign policy – but the experts 
interviewed for this study did not interpret Japan’s re-engagement with Africa as a means to 
strengthen US-Japan ties.  And while the extent to which Japan’s presence in South Sudan dovetails 
with US policy in the region is explored in Chapter Six, it is not considered a primary strategic 
objective of Japan’s Africa policy.  Similarly, while the role of China in Japan’s strategic calculations is 
multifaceted, this study restricts analysis to those aspects related to Japan’s presence in Africa.   
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Thus building on the strategic objectives identified by the key informants and supporting literature, 
this study examines the corresponding tactical approaches employed in Japan’s engagement in 
Africa.  Japan’s tactical approach to Africa is evolving, and is particularly susceptible to politically-
necessitated policy changes. However there are still observable elements within the strata of 
Japanese engagement on the continent that this study summarises as three distinct methods of 
engagement – or tactics:   
1. “Strategic” ODA 
2. Resource-focused investment  
3. Security engagement through peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations  
As Figure 5 below outlines, each of these tactical approaches is in turn reflected by a particular 
activity or dimension of Japan’s presence in South Sudan, such as peacekeeping, ODA provision, or 
the proposed oil pipeline project.   
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Figure 5: Japan's strategic and tactical engagement in South Sudan 
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The methods of engagement outlined above will each be examined in detail in the following 
chapters through reference to particular aspects of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan.  In this 
respect the approaches identified above are comprehensive and cover the most significant aspects 
of Japan’s presence in Africa.   And while there are other dimensions to Japan-Africa relations such 
as lobbying political support, or funding international bodies such as the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which relate to African issues, these are relatively minor facets of Japan’s interaction on the 
continent.  Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Four, building support from African states for 
Japanese initiatives such as reform of the United Nations Security Council was established through 
the use of ODA mechanisms such as the provision of grant aid.   
 
As previously described, this study emphasises an empirical analysis of Japan’s engagement in South 
Sudan, and by examining particular Japanese activities in the country it develops a picture of the 
wider emerging Japanese engagement in Africa.   Thus when considering the nature of this study, 
neither a purely systemic theory of international outcomes, such as neorealism, nor a purely 
innenpolitik theory of foreign policy would adequately capture the nuance, impact or rationale for 
Japan’s engagement in South Sudan (as an element of Japan’s broader re-engagement in Africa).   
Neoclassical realism therefore provides a practical and policy-relevant theoretical framework 
through which Japan’s engagement in South Sudan can be examined.  In this regard the model is 
well suited to an evidence-based study analysing a particular component of Japan’s response to 
international pressures.  South Sudan also serves as an important case study of Japan’s re-
engagement in Africa as Japan’s presence in the country reflects all three of the “tactics” deployed in 
achieving the principal strategic objectives that this study believes are driving Japan’s renewed focus 
on the continent.  Furthermore, South Sudan is a deeply unstable post-conflict country that 
represents a policy “frontier” and challenges many of the existing perspectives on the nature of the 
Japanese presence in Africa.      
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3. The Structural Context: Japan’s Place in an Evolving World Order  
 
While this research is focused primarily on Japan’s engagement in South Sudan it is also important to 
consider the structural context in which this relationship is occurring and this chapter outlines some 
of the structurally-driven factors underpinning Japan’s presence in Africa.  The preceding chapters 
outlined the historical context that frames Japan’s engagement in Africa, the strategic significance of 
South Sudan as a case study and the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism through which 
the study is interpreted.  This chapter will therefore summarise the broad structural considerations 
driving Japan’s Africa policy and frame the context in which the deeper analysis of Japanese 
engagement in South Sudan is occurring.  Accordingly, the chapters that follow comprise the key 
empirical findings at the heart of this study, and as such will explore Japan’s engagement in South 
Sudan as a barometer that reflects the broader strategic objectives underpinning Japan’s re-
engagement in Africa.   
 
Given that the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this research stresses the causal primacy 
of structural conditions, this chapter will explore the impact of changes to the relative distribution of 
Japan’s material power on Japan’s Africa policy.  This element within the neoclassical realist 
interpretation draws on the neorealist view that systemic forces create incentives for all states to 
ensure their security or advance their positions relative to other states.  As Waltz maintains, “we 
know from structural theory that states strive to maintain their positions in the system.  Thus, in 
their twilight years great powers try to arrest or reverse their decline.”183  In this context there are a 
number of structural factors that could be considered to be influencing Japanese foreign policy and 
this study will focus on those factors that are pertinent to Japan’s engagement in Africa.  These 
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factors emerged from the key informant interviews previously described and are consolidated 
through the secondary literature.  Consequently, Japan’s relative loss of international relevance, 
combined with the rise of China and the imperatives of economic revitalisation and resource security 
will be considered as the primary structural drivers of Japan’s engagement with Africa. 
 
Yet these structural pressures however only provide a foundation upon which the empirical detail of 
this study will be built.  As Waltz explains, a neorealist theory of international politics can 
describe the range of likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states 
within a given system and show how the range of expectations varies as 
systems change.  It can tell us what pressures are exerted and what 
possibilities are posed by systems of different structure, but it cannot tell us 
just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to those 
pressures and possibilities.184  
The questions that Waltz raises of how and how effectively states respond to structural pressures 
are thus addressed in this study through analysis of intervening domestic considerations.  In this way 
the texture and detail missing from a purely structural interpretation of Japan’s policy in Africa is 
provided in the following empirically-driven chapters that explore the particular dimensions of 
Japan’s engagement in South Sudan and Africa more generally.   
 
Furthermore, the structural factors outlined in this chapter should also be considered in conjunction 
with what Carmody refers to as the “new scramble for Africa” where rising demand for primary 
resources combined with the emergence of new players such as China and India are changing the 
dynamics of Africa’s integration into the global economy, and creating competition around access to 
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the continents natural wealth and growing markets.185  In this regard, the continent has become of 
greater significance to Japanese policy makers – especially in terms of medium to long-term 
planning.  As Professors Nakanishi and Kataoka186 both highlight, Japan’s foreign policy is occurring 
in the context of Prime Minister Abe’s assertion that “Japan is back”187, and as a result Africa is 
becoming central to the discourse of a “revitalised Japan.”188  Indeed as Japan’s new National 
Security Strategy (NSS) recognises: “Africa is a prospective economic frontier with abundant 
strategic natural resources and sustained economic growth.  In addition Africa has been increasing 
its influence in the international community.”189  In this way the NSS formally reiterates the 
conceptual theme of the frontier in Japan’s Africa policy that runs through this study, and as this 
chapter will detail, is becoming increasingly relevant to Japanese policymakers as structural 
conditions change.   Africa is therefore both the site of significant economic potential as well as a 
space where Japan can demonstrate a new vigorous international presence – as a donor, investor, 
and peacekeeper.   
 
3.1 G20 and the Rise of the Rest  
 
This research is premised on the neoclassical realist perspective that shifting global conditions are 
driving Japan’s re-engagement with Africa.  These structural realities encompass a number of 
specific areas including economic revitalisation and expanding security responsibilities which are 
reflected in the particular aspects of Japan’s presence in South Sudan, and explored in the following 
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chapters.  Yet the rise of the G20190  is significant in that it represents a broader perspective among 
Japan’s policymakers that the country’s international prestige, and therefore relevance, is in decline.  
This section will explore the role of the G20 as an indicator of change at the structural level and the 
resultant impact on Japan’s perception of its relative power and influence on the global stage.    
 
The growing international relevance of the G20 also points to a broader geopolitical consideration, 
namely the rise of what might be termed “next generation powers” and the much debated notion of 
a transformation from a US-centred system to a multipolar global order.  Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the ensuing preponderance of the United States’ economic and military power led 
scholars such as Brooks and Wohlforth,191 and Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth,192 to define 
the global distribution of power as “unipolar.”  However this conceptualisation of global power 
dynamics changed with the growing influence of emerging nations such China and India – prompting 
scholars such as Drezner to characterise the international system as multipolar.193  And others such 
as Haass to argue that the global system is in fact “non-polar” in that there are “numerous centres of 
meaningful power.”194  These profound shifts in the structure of the global system are further 
examined by Beckley,195 Kupchan,196 Walt197and Zakaria198 who point out that by expanding the 
distribution of global power, the United States and its allies – such as Japan – have lost their ability 
to reach consensus on issues or drive the international agenda.  This has become especially apparent 
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when considering the lack of a shared set of assumptions among the states that now make up the 
G20 on fundamental questions such as the nature of the state, the role of the state in the economy 
or the rights of its citizens.  These factors therefore provide an analytical overlay through which this 
study will frame the growth of the G20 in the context of Japan’s declining global influence – and 
resultant desire to increase its presence in Africa.     
 
The emergence of the G20 presents what Rathus acknowledges is a “major challenge for Japan”199 
This is due in part to the fact that the seismic changes at the systemic level that led to the decreasing 
relevance of the G8 also coincided with the “lost decades” of Japan’s economic stagnation, but also 
because as Dobson explains, “an expanded G20 not only dilutes Japan’s presence at these summits 
but points to the broader decline in its position in the world.”200  As Rathus describes, “the G8 holds 
a special place in Japan’s international relations in general and foreign economic policy in 
particular.”201  This is due in part to the country’s inability to secure a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council and the G8 was therefore a symbol of the country’s global power – and ultimately 
its relevance.  Moreover, Japan’s presence among the global elite of the G8 provided substance to 
the popular discourse in Japan that the country was a “bridge between East and West” or as Jain and 
Lam point out,  “perceived as the only Asian actor with considerable economic clout on the world 
stage.”202  Indeed the G8 also allowed Japan to influence policies and provided a forum to manage 
key bilateral relationships – which is therefore at the heart of Japan’s fears of an expanded G20.   
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In this regard, the demise of Japan’s relative global relevance alongside the rise of the G20 highlights 
a corresponding Japanese strategic fear: abandonment by the US.  As Shinoda explains, when the 
level of dependence on an alliance is asymmetrical, there is a strong fear of abandonment on the 
part of the junior partner.203  And while US interests in Asia are undiminished – or even expanded 
given the “Asia Pivot” outlined by the Obama administration in 2012,204 Japanese policymakers 
recognise the potential for the US to be unwilling to escalate a conflict with China over an issue that 
is of limited strategic value in Washington.  Moreover as a Japanese security policy analyst explains, 
the fear in Tokyo is that the US will no longer consider Japan as its primary partner in Asia – “Japan 
fears that the US will discuss important global issues with China first.” 205   This is particularly relevant 
when considering that the East Asian region in many respects still suffers from a form of cold war 
hangover, reflecting Kupchan’s observation that “deep political cleavages still exist in East Asia.”206  
Thus in a region defined in part by neorealist state interaction, the rise of the G20 reminds Japanese 
elites of their diminished status as the leading power within the region.     
 
In addition, Japan’s participation in the G8 was also the fulcrum around which much of its 
international policy was developed – including engagement with China and championing aid to 
Africa.  Rathus describes how the G8 meeting in Tokyo in 2008 saw the “Outreach 5” process 
extended to include Chinese participation (but not membership) – “this system suited Japan as China 
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could be engaged in a way that gave Japan institutional advantage and influence.”207 Additionally, as 
Dobson describes, in 2008 Japan hosted TICAD IV and the G8 Summit which  
provided a high-profile diplomatic opportunity within both Japan’s relations 
with Africa and its summit diplomacy to shape regional and global agendas 
respectively and, to these ends, the Japanese government sought to connect 
the two international meetings.208    
 
Moreover, as Cornelissen observes, the G8 was used by Japan to signal foreign policy initiatives, of 
which activism around African development issues was a key component.  Cornelissen continues by 
explaining that Japan’s Africa diplomacy has at times converged with, and in fact reinforced, the 
country’s G8 politics.  Consequently, “by adopting certain rhetorical stances on the ‘cause’ of Africa, 
Japan has found ways to express its (now possibly dwindling) middlepowership.”209  As Cornelissen 
further notes, “questions around the future of the G8 have implications not only for Japan’s claim as 
a major power, but indeed also for the way the way in which the country seeks to operationalise 
objectives around Africa.”  In this respect the following chapters will examine the various 
mechanisms through which Japan is operationalising a new strategic approach to engagement with 
Africa.   
 
Thus a process that began with Japan’s participation in the Versailles Treaty as a great power and 
permanent member of the League Council of the League of Nations, and in the post-Second World 
War era through representation in the G8, has essentially been radically undermined by the 
emergence of the G20.  And while the rise of the G20 symbolises Japan’s decline as the leading 
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power in Asia, this process is occurring in the context of Japan’s fraught relations with Asia’s 
predominant rising power: China.  Indeed as the Economist noted in January 2014, “hardly a day 
goes by without a new flare-up in the war of diplomatic attrition being fought out by China and 
Japan.”210  Thus during the time period covered by this research Sino-Japanese relations 
deteriorated considerably and resultantly must be considered in a broader analysis of the drivers of 
Japan’s foreign policy.   
 
3.2 The Rise of China  
 
When considering Japan’s engagement in South Sudan as a barometer of its broader re-engagement 
in Africa, the “China factor” is an important consideration in understanding the forces driving 
Japanese policy in Africa.  Given the extent of China’s presence and influence on the continent, 
combined with the complex and evolving relations between the two countries, it is a theme that 
emerges throughout the various elements that make up Japan’s engagement in Africa.  From the 
establishment of a Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) base in Djibouti to a policy of ODA 
differentiation, and the political considerations around Toyota Tsusho’s pipeline bid in South Sudan, 
the “China factor” is a consideration for Japanese policymakers.  While these elements will be 
addressed in more detail in the following chapters, this section will explore the wider context of 
Sino-Japanese relations and the extent to which Japan’s refocused engagement on the continent – 
and South Sudan in particular – can be interpreted as linked to the broader dynamics underpinning 
relations between the two countries.     
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In addition, as will be explored in more detail in the coming chapters, South Sudan is a particularly 
interesting location in which to consider the evolution of China’s relations in Africa.  In many 
respects South Sudan is also an important frontier within China’s own engagement on the continent 
as the country’s independence from Sudan created a number of unprecedented scenarios for 
Beijing.  Primarily, China’s strong ties with Khartoum has meant that it has had to overcome a 
perception problem in South Sudan when compared to its engagement with most other African 
states where Beijing had been able to leverage its lack of colonial baggage in building relations.  As 
will be discussed in Chapter Five, this is particularly relevant given that South Sudan inherited most 
of Sudan’s oil reserves and the Chinese companies invested in drilling and exporting the oil.  The 
extent of these energy investments can also been seen to underpin the high levels of attention China 
accorded South Sudan since the start of the civil conflict in December 2013 – including attempts to 
mediate the conflict211 and the first deployment of Chinese combat troops to a peacekeeping 
operation.212     
 
Yet beyond the particular case of South Sudan, the rise of China has significantly shifted the 
international order and is therefore considered by this study to be among the primary structural 
factors influencing Japan’s foreign policy.  The neoclassical realist framework underpinning this 
research recognises international systemic factors as dominant in determining state behaviour.  
Indeed as Lai contends, “Japanese-Chinese relations have always been and will continue to be 
shaped by external circumstances, which define the parameters of both governments’ policy 
behaviour and responses in their mutual relations.”213  Japan’s place in a rapidly changing global 
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environment remains an important factor when considering how Tokyo views China’s growing global 
influence, thus also reflecting the neoclassical realist contention that perceptions – and possible 
misperceptions – of power weigh on the minds of Japanese policymakers.  This is further 
accentuated by Matake’s observation that as the difficulty of managing the Sino-Japanese 
relationship has intensified, so have Japan’s fears about both the capabilities and motives of 
China.214  Fears that have been heightened by deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations as well as 
elements of economic and foreign policy rivalry, such as over the construction of a trans-Siberia oil 
pipeline,215 or the use of foreign aid to secure access to strategic natural resources in Myanmar.216 
Thus as Professor Nakanishi observes, “there is still a debate in Japan around how to ‘deal’ with 
China, and how to see the future between the two countries.”217  
 
This study however pays particular attention to the role of China’s growing presence in Africa as a 
factor influencing Japan’s policies on the continent.  The literature on China’s engagement in Africa 
since the 1990s is extensive (for example, see Alden,218 Brautigam,219 Chan,220 Rotberg,221 and 
Taylor222) and reflects the evolving diversity of China’s presence in Africa.  Yet in essence much of the 
literature addresses the same underlying phenomenon: China’s rapidly expanding economic – and 
arguably political, influence in Africa.  Political influence which reflects China’s growing economic 
might as well as Beijing’s ability to leverage historic ties and its lack of colonial baggage to establish 
an influential presence on the continent.  Indeed Harman and Brown contend that China’s political 
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and economic influence in Africa provides empirical evidence for China’s increased relevance in 
international affairs.223  Yet as Japan’s presence in Africa grows, so too does the likelihood of 
competing Japanese and Chinese interests.  Especially in the context of South Sudan where the 
country’s independence effectively created the ‘space’ in a country that was previously firmly within 
China’s sphere of influence for Japan to enter with an ODA-led engagement that expanded to 
include infrastructure and potential energy projects.   
 
In this context, the role of China and its presence in Africa is both a structural causal factor in the 
determination of Japan’s strategic approach to the continent – as well as a factor determining 
Japan’s tactical approaches to African engagement.  Furthermore, it should be recognised that as 
long as Sino-Japanese relations remain characterised by tension and mutual suspicion, all diplomatic 
efforts – in Africa or elsewhere, will be coloured by the broader dynamics underpinning relations 
between the two countries 
 
3.2.1 The “China Factor” in Japan’s Africa Policy  
 
The deterioration of relations between Japan and China has coincided with a remarkable expansion 
of China’s economic and political influence in Africa.  Consequently the worsening of Sino-Japanese 
relations has focused attention on Japan and China’s mutual activities in Africa and has largely driven 
the popular discourse of Japan’s “competition” with China in Africa.   As a deputy director at METI 
observes, this in turn fuelled a discourse in Japan that “China will occupy all of Africa and we will not 
be able to get in.”224  He goes on to explain that this debate was strongest in Japan between 2005 
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and 2008, where it culminated in the reorientation of Japan’s engagement in Africa following TICAD 
IV, which is discussed in Chapter Four.  Yet as the METI representative also cautions, “government 
might be driven by the “China factor” but I’m not sure if it is true in the field.”225 By this the 
representative means that private sector Japanese investors are more motivated by their own 
objectives and incentives to engage in a particular country or location than by the presence of 
Chinese investors in that country.   
 
This section will therefore explore the notion that Japan’s rivalry and political tension with China is 
manifesting in Africa.  It will further situate the competition discourse in the broader context of the 
structural drivers of Japan’s re-engagement in Africa and the role of perception in influencing 
Japanese policy on the continent.  Given that neoclassical realist theory holds that systemic 
pressures are filtered through the perceptions of decision-makers,226 the role of China’s presence in 
Africa must be considered as a contributing factor in understanding Japan’s engagement in South 
Sudan and more broadly across the continent. 
 
As a representative from JETRO explains, when China overtook Japan in terms of its economic size, it 
coincided with a growing discourse in Japan that “China is conquering Africa”227 and that Japanese 
companies should be seeking opportunities to counter this dominance.  Indeed as the representative 
continues to point out, the perception in Japan around China’s economic and political influence in 
Africa has “created a sense of urgency” in Japan’s policy response towards Africa – an urgency that 
was then further enhanced by the election of the Abe administration.228  An administration whose 
energetic agenda has identified Africa as region to which it can expand Japan’s investments and 
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influence, but which is also notable for Prime Minister Abe’s stated intention to “stand up to 
China.”229   
 
In this regard Davies identifies a “growing strategic competition between China and Japan” in Africa, 
noting that “the trend of Japan’s anxiety over China’s engagement of Africa is already clear.”  
Furthermore, Davies also maintains that “Japan has replaced Taiwan in the Chinese policy-makers 
mind vis-à-vis its aid strategy in Africa”230, thus pointing to a distinct Chinese policy of competing 
with Japan for access and influence in Africa.   Lehman further notes with reference to Japan’s ODA 
strategy in Africa that “China’s expansion into Africa clearly worries the Japanese government since 
China challenges Japan’s previous dominance as the Asian model.”231  Yet when considering the 
factors driving Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and more broadly in Africa, it is apparent that a 
more nuanced view of the “China factor” is required in understanding the role of China in the 
determination of Japan’s Africa policy.  As Rose explains, 
While it is true to say that China’s Africa policy (in addition to the initiatives 
of other donors) contributed to Japan’s own (re)engagement with Africa, and 
a certain reinvigoration of the TICAD process, this was not the only, or key 
determinant.232  
 
Moreover, the narrative of Sino-Japanese competition should also be considered in the context of 
this observation from a deputy director at METI, “not all the people talking about China all the time 
are actually thinking about China all the time.”  Indeed as the METI representative continues to point 
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out, “the best way to get ordinary people interested in an issue is to bring in a China angle.”233  
Furthermore, the Abe administration played down media discussion of Sino-Japanese competition in 
Africa by stating during Abe’s Africa tour in January 2014, “Wherever he goes, Prime Minister Abe is 
asked if he is there to compete against China, but that's not our intention at all, as far as the African 
nations are concerned, they are important regardless of China.”234  Dr Michishita at GRIPS235 
however observes that in policy circles it is useful to use China to justify Japan’s greater commitment 
to Africa.  Consequently, he asserts that “China as a factor [in Japan’s engagement in Africa] is more 
important as a justification than a motivation.”236 
 
These perspectives are significant in that they highlight how changes at the systemic level such as 
the rise of China are interpreted and ultimately influence Japan’s foreign policy.  However when it 
comes to Japan’s strategy towards Africa, it is apparent that the term “competition” is incorrectly 
used and overly simplifies the dynamics of Sino-Japanese relations and how they are manifesting in 
Africa.  As a METI representative explains, whatever Japan’s intentions in Africa – “China does not 
think it is competing with Japan.”237  Furthermore, as the research director at JETRO clarifies, given 
the sheer scale and breadth of Chinese involvement in Africa, China is “not our rival.”238  
 
This is evidenced by the fact that Japan and China do not operate in the same areas.  As a METI 
representative notes, Japanese economic interests in Africa are currently focused on automobiles, 
power generation and the procurement of metals such as platinum, manganese and chrome.239  This 
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is compared with China’s primary mineral imports from Africa:  copper, zinc, nickel, iron ore and 
lead, paired with infrastructure development such as roads and construction.240  As another METI 
representative explains, Japan’s real competition in Africa occurs at different levels.  The highest 
level is geo-strategic engagement – developing client states or securing support for UN resolutions – 
at this level, China as well as former colonial powers such as France are well established in Africa.  
The second level comprises company to company competition, for example Hitachi might compete 
with Siemens, while the third level comprises local supermarkets and small manufacturers usually 
run by immigrants from China, Lebanon or India.241  In the opinion of the official, Japan is therefore 
best positioned to grow its presence in Africa through mid to high-end company investment and 
growing geo-political relevance through the strategic use of ODA and investment.242     
 
Thus while Japanese policy in Africa seemingly never targeted direct competition with China – it was 
still influenced by China in two significant ways.  Firstly with respect to mineral and energy 
resources, China’s remarkable economic growth effectively shifted the international structural 
environment, thereby changing the nature of resource markets by making them both more 
competitive (especially with regards oil and gas) and driving the trend towards the equity ownership 
of resources which is discussed in Chapter Five.  These changes were in turn interpreted by Japanese 
policymakers in the context of Sino-Japanese relations, and realised through a reinvigorated Africa 
strategy.   Secondly, due to the  strained nature of Sino-Japanese relations, China’s actions (in Africa 
and elsewhere) are viewed as inherently more threatening than those of other emerging powers 
with a presence in Africa such as India or Brazil.  This reflects the neoclassical realist critique of 
purely systemic explanations of foreign policy which presume accurate and objective interpretations 
of state behaviour.  Yet as a representative of JOGMEC also explains, “China’s activities are 
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influencing Japanese activity because they are so aggressive – people [policymakers] think we must 
also act decisively.”  As she goes on to admit, resources are very important to Japan’s policies, but if 
China’s demand was to decrease, so to would the interest of Japanese politicians decline.243  Thus in 
effect the “China factor” is a combination of the sheer demand for resources underpinning China’s 
rise and the fact that it is China – as opposed to another power – that is driving that demand.    
 
In 2006, the government of Japan released a New National Energy Strategy.244  The report was 
noteworthy in that unlike previous reports it emphasised energy security, as well as mentioning the 
increasing international competition for natural resources with China.  This report followed the 
displacement of Japan by China as the second largest importer of African oil after the United States 
in 2005, and despite falling total petroleum imports, Japan’s African supplies still grew by nearly 20 
per cent in 2004, while over the same period Chinese imports grew by more than 35 per cent.245  
Thus as discussed in Chapter Five, the momentum towards renewed energy security priorities in 
Japanese policy reflected the rising price of oil – but also the primary driver of high world oil prices: 
increasing demand in China.  In this regard the years leading up to the re-focusing of Japan’s Africa 
strategy in 2008 were characterised by deteriorating relations with China as well as renewed 
concerns around energy security.  It was thus against this backdrop that the discourse on Sino-
Japanese competition in Africa was focused – for example in 2006 the Asia Times reported that “the 
increasingly fierce competition between Japan and China over energy and political influence is 
spilling over into Africa.”246 
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As a number of authors such as Andrews-Speed,247 Morikawa,248 Sato,249 Taylor250 as well as 
Townsend and King251 have noted, the rush to secure access to new sources of energy remain part of 
a wider strategic programme of action, which includes, diplomacy, technological assistance, and aid.  
Indeed much has been written in recent years regarding China’s increasingly visible presence on the 
continent, the majority of which is presented in terms of aid and investment directed towards the 
single purpose of securing access to natural resources.  While Brautigam argues that this view is 
simplistic, she does recognise that China is heavily invested in resource-led initiatives in Africa.252 
Consequently the extent and nature of China’s influence in Africa was recognised in Japan, where for 
example an Asahi Shimbun report from 2006 stated that “China is outstripping Japan in the 
diplomatic race to woo Africa.”253  The article coincided with former Prime Minister Koizumi’s (2001-
2006) visit to Africa in 2006 – the last by a Japanese leader until Abe’s visit in 2014 – which was also 
presented in the Japanese press as evidence of Sino-Japanese rivalry in Africa.  The conservative 
Japan Times for example reported on “Japan and China’s great African game”, claiming that “a new 
scramble for Africa is unfolding [between China and Japan].”254  These somewhat overblown articles 
highlight a point made earlier and reiterated by the senior researcher at JETRO when he pointed out 
that there are not many people interested in Africa in Japan, but if you can tie Japan’s activities on 
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the continent to China that number increases exponentially.  “Thus if African issues are linked to 
China they become more important in Japan.”255  
 
Yet even in Africa the Sino-Japanese competition discourse is emerging.  As the following chapters 
will explore, East Africa has emerged as an especially significant region in Japan’s refocused 
attention on Africa.  However this has been recognised and interpreted in the region as reflecting 
Japan’s efforts to wrestle opportunities and influence away from China.  The Business Daily Africa 
notes that “Kenya has become the latest beneficiary of the battle heating up between Japan and 
China for control of Africa’s economic landscape.”256  The publication goes on to quote a lecturer at 
the University of Nairobi’s Institute of International Relations as saying, “there is some kind of soft 
competition emerging between China and Japan, not just in Kenya but across Africa.”257  Noting that 
“Japanese interest in Kenya is part of a wider plan to exert its influence in Africa” and on the “the 
global stage”, the publication points to a range of diplomatic and business links between Japan and 
Kenya from the extension of a soft loan of US$ 375 million to the visit by Japan’s Crown Prince 
Naruhito in 2010.258 A further article from an East African news website quotes another university 
lecturer as observing, “Japan and China are large economies and they are looking for markets where 
they can deploy their capital […] Japan wants to show China that it can also flex its muscle and 
establish its presence here.”259  These views thus emphasise the predominance of the Sino-Japanese 
competition in Africa-narrative, but as the following chapters will explore, Japan’s activities in 
response to China’s presence and influence in Africa require a more nuanced understanding.   
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Moreover, quite apart from responding to Chinese influence, there is significant strategic economic 
value for Japan of developing a strong presence in East Africa.  As will be discussed in Chapter Five, 
the prospects of linking South Sudan’s oil fields with those being developed in Uganda and Kenya is a 
significant factor underpinning Toyota Tsusho’s pipeline project.  However the Sogo Sosha260 (along 
with Japan’s Toshiba and South Korea’s Hyundai) will also develop a geothermal power generating 
complex261 and a new assembly plant for Toyota vehicles in Kenya.  Thus the company – as well as 
Japan’s policymakers are tempted by the prospects that the East African region holds.  With a 
combined population of 135 million people,262 the East African Community (EAC) which comprises 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, has a common market for goods, labour and capital 
– in addition to un-exploited oil and gas reserves.  In this regard, South Sudan’s aspirations to join 
the EAC has distinct economic advantages for South Sudan as well as investors in the region, and it is 
unsurprising that linking its infrastructure with its East African neighbours  is a priority of Japan’s 
ODA and energy strategies outlined in Chapters Four and Five.    
 
Thus despite the lack of apparent competition in the purely economic sense, Japan’s re-engagement 
in Africa also comprises a large political component which can be interpreted as a “response” to 
China’s extensive political ties on the continent.  The following chapters will further explore the 
question of a “China factor” within the particular aspects of Japan’s engagement in Africa.   Yet as 
Japan’s investment-focused economic footprint grows along with increased political interaction, 
their interests will increasingly come to compete with those of China – such as in the case of an 
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alternative oil pipeline from South Sudan.   In addition, the poor state of Sino-Japanese relations will 
likely manifest in Africa as the opportunity for mutual interaction increases.  Consequently while the 
extent to which Japan’s objectives in Africa are intended to achieve its own interests – irrespective 
of China’s presence –  is debatable, the fact remains that the state of Sino-Japanese relations impact 
on how Japan perceives China’s presence in Africa and resultantly formulates policy.  A 
representative of MOFA underlines this when he notes that “China is not popular in Japan and many 
people criticise China for what they are doing in Africa.” Thus Japan’s policies on the continent 
should not try to copy (and thereby compete) with China, but rather Japan should “polish its strong 
points” and build its own presence in Africa.263   
 
In this regard, China is again part of the consideration underlying Japan’s strategy in Africa – if not 
through competition, then at least as a point of comparison.  During his visit to Mozambique, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Ethiopia in January 2014 Prime Minister Abe used this comparison to differentiate 
Japan’s interaction in Africa from that of China – but in doing so he also reinforced the view that the 
“China factor” is an element within Japan’s strategy in Africa.  Speaking in Mozambique Abe’s 
spokesman admitted Japan is lagging behind China in terms of investment in Africa but told the BBC 
that Japan “cannot provide African leaders with beautiful houses or beautiful ministerial buildings.” 
He continued by saying that “Japan’s aid policy is to really aid the human capital of Africa.”264  These 
remarks were interpreted as directed towards China and its much debated policies (see 
Brautigam265) on the use of Chinese workers in Africa as well as perceptions that Chinese 
infrastructure projects include frivolous government prestige buildings.   
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Indeed Beijing’s response took place in the Chinese-built US$ 200 million266 new headquarters of the 
African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa, where China’s Ambassador to Ethiopia told a news conference 
that Abe was “the biggest troublemaker in Asia.”267  While Chinese workers living in Addis Ababa 
protested outside the Japanese embassy,268 the ambassador also responded to Abe’s visit to the 
Yasukuni shrine269 the previous month, by holding up graphic photos which he said showed victims 
of Japanese atrocities in World War II and said he wanted to inform Africans about Japan’s record in 
Asia.270  This incident is remarkable for not only bringing African attention to the poor state of Sino-
Japanese relations, but in demonstrating how history continues to shape mutual perceptions of 
engagement between Japan and China.  Indeed, as the Economist observes, by resorting to history 
the Chinese ambassador passed-over an opportunity to comment on the hypocrisy of Japan’s own 
foreign policy positions, and instead referenced events over seventy years old that have no 
resonance with an African audience.271  
 
Therefore when considering how the “China factor” should be considered in terms of a neoclassical 
realist analysis of Japan’s renewed engagement in Africa, it is significant in two respects.  Firstly, 
China’s remarkable economic growth in the past 30 years has fundamentally shifted structural 
power dynamics.  Secondly, the historical animosities between the two countries influence the 
perceptions of these systemic changes by Japanese policymakers.  Consequently in the context of 
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this study, China’s presence in Africa matters to Japanese policymakers because it is China.  While 
there is an emerging discourse around a “new scramble for Africa”, it is apparent that what China 
does is more significant to Japan than what India or France does.  Thus the particular context in 
which China’s activities and intentions are interpreted in Japan is important.  The following chapters 
will therefore explore the complex dynamics underpinning relations between the two states as they 
make up an important component within the intervening domestic factors such as elite perception 
driving the development of Japan’s policy in Africa. 
 
Furthermore, the role of domestic perception as an intervening consideration in the policy response 
of Japan to changes in the global structure – most notably the rise of China – explains the significant 
role that the “China Factor” continues to play in Japan’s strategy in Africa.   And although the scale 
and extent of China’s economic activities in Africa far outweigh those of Japan, increased Japanese 
engagement is going to bring increased opportunities for mutual interaction – which will in turn be 
defined by the broader dynamics of Sino-Japanese relations.  Thus China’s presence in Africa matters 
to Japanese policymakers because of the particular context in which China’s activities and intentions 
are interpreted and should be included in the broader analysis of the strategic considerations 
underlying Japan’s re-engagement in Africa.   
 
3.3 Economic Revitalisation 
 
Japan has experienced two decades of economic stagnation, and resultantly, stimulating economic 
growth has remained a central policy feature of every administration since the early 1990s (for 
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example, see works by as Garside,272 Hutchison and Westermann,273  Kojo,274 and Lincoln275).  Indeed 
the importance of regaining economic vitality is viewed in Japan as a strategic imperative that 
underpins Japan’s status in the global hierarchy.  In this regard the potential benefit of increased 
economic engagement with Africa is understood in this study to align with a key objective of 
Japanese policymakers: economic revitalisation.  This section will therefore examine the economic 
potential of Africa in the context of Japan’s strategic objective of reinvigorating its economy.  In this 
respect this study considers Japan’s economic stagnation as a structural power consideration for 
Japanese policymakers and therefore a driver of its foreign policy approaches towards Africa.     
 
The second Abe administration has promoted the concept of “Abenomics” as a policy intended to 
drive structural reforms within the Japanese economy – accompanied by fiscal stimulus and 
monetary easing.276  “Abenomics” however are significant in the context of Africa in that they 
reinforce a policy of greater investment and trade with Africa which began in 2008 during the 
administration of Yasuo Fukuda (2007-2008).  As a deputy director at JICA explains, in 2008 Prime 
Minister Fukuda “reconsidered the relationship with Africa.”277 But as Hirano also notes, “economic 
relations between Africa and Japan are, in a sense, a mirror of the dynamics of the Japanese 
economy itself.”278  Up to this point the contraction of Japan’s economy had been accompanied by a 
pulling-back of many Japanese companies from Africa as businesses decreased their operations and 
closed offices.   
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Japan’s “withdrawal” from Africa was driven by two corresponding factors.  Firstly, economic 
stagnation following the bursting of the so-called bubble economy and the resultant reduction in 
demand for Africa’s natural resources and secondly, the decline in real per capita GDP in Sub-
Saharan Africa from the 1980s to the early 2000s meant the continent was not a viable market for 
Japanese companies.  Hirano explains that “as Africa became almost negligible to the Japanese 
economy, the country’s business community lost interest in the region’s economic potential.”279  
Consequently, as the figure below indicates, trade between Japan and Africa contracted since the 
1970s and then remained skewed towards the long established market of South Africa.    
 
Figure 6: Japan's trade with Africa (percentage share of imports and exports)
 280
 
 
 
                                                          
279
 Ibid  
280
 Hirano, Katsumi “TICAD and National Interest of Japan”, Presentation: Policy advisory group seminar 
towards TICAD V, London 18-19 January 2013  
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
101 
 
Africa’s economy however started to grow at the beginning of this century, with the average growth 
rate for Sub-Saharan Africa from 2003 until the Lehman Shock in 2008 standing at 19.5 per cent, 
which was higher than China’s 18.6 per cent.281  Yet Japan was not positioned to benefit from these 
fast-growing emerging economies in Africa.  As the chief researcher at JETRO explains, “Japan’s 
economic interests were focused on Asia, and Africa only accounted for approximately one per cent 
of Japan’s economic interest.”282  
 
Furthermore, as Figures 6 and 7 indicate, Japan has been falling behind the other major economies 
in both importing from and exporting to Africa – thereby further highlighting the extent to which 
Japan is a marginal player in the region.  Quite apart from the declining trade with Africa, of further 
concern to Japan’s policymakers is the overall growth in trade with Africa from the other major 
world economies, and the inability of Japan’s economy to respond to the potential.   Therefore as a 
consequence of Japan’s poor trade relations with Africa, “Abenomics” now combines structural 
reforms within Japan’s economy with the recognition that Africa represents the last frontier of 
investment, and resource exploitation.  Indeed as Prime Minister Abe stated in his address to the UN 
General Assembly in October 2013, “Japan will also continue to extend cooperation to the countries 
of Africa, which are certain to become a growth engine this century.”283 
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Figure 7: Exports to Africa
284
 
 
 
Figure 7 indicates that there has been an overall increase in exports to Africa since the early 2000s – 
reflecting both economic growth on the continent and the emergence of consumer markets.  Indeed 
the Economist expects the average African economy to grow at an annual rate of seven per cent 
over the next twenty years.285  Therefore as a deputy director at JICA explains, for the Japanese 
government “Africa is very important.”  This economic expansion and emergence of a middle class 
has led Japan to “reconsider the African consumer market” 286 and ultimately develop methods of 
tactical engagement accordingly.  As Professor Kataoka further reiterates, the best way to 
understand Japan’s role in Africa today is necessity – “the necessity to diversify trade partners.”  This 
has resulted in the recognition of Africa as a trade partner for the first time.287  Thus while 
stimulating trade and investment is the primary policy response to the strategic objective of 
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revitalising the economy, as will be discussed in the following chapters, this is realised in Africa 
through an investment-led approach to aid policy and resource-based equity investments.    
 
Figure 8: Imports from Africa
288
 
 
 
In addition, when considering imports from Africa, as depicted in the Figure above, Japan is again 
seen to be lagging someway behind the other major economic powers.  Given that African exports 
remain predominantly resource-based, the low level of Japanese imports from Africa reflects a 
number of factors, most significantly, the growing presence of African oil producers – as much of the 
exports depicted in this graph comprise energy exports.  Diversification of supply has been an 
integral component of Japan’s energy security strategy for decades, yet the country remains 
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overwhelmingly dependent on the Middle East.  Consequently ensuring energy and resource 
security is emerging as an important strategic objective when considering Japan’s re-engagement in 
Africa.    
 
3.4 Ensure Resource and Energy Security  
 
Japan’s re-engagement with Africa is occurring under very different geopolitical and geo-economic 
conditions than during the 1960s and 1970s, yet one key driver remains the same: access to natural 
resources.  Japan today faces the challenge of maintaining its economic position and carving a space for 
political relevance in a global order increasingly influenced by brash emerging powers, against the 
backdrop of the enduring reality that is the country’s lack of natural resources.  Japan’s limited 
endowment of natural resources has been a defining factor in its strategic and economic policies since 
the Meiji era and the emergence of industrialisation.  Thus while access to mineral resources and energy 
security have been perennial factors within Japan’s strategic considerations for decades, in recent years 
these issues are once again at the forefront of Japanese policy in Africa.  As the senior researcher at 
JETRO explains, “Africa is re-emerging again as the government recognises the serious situation of the 
need for natural resource security.”289   
 
This section will therefore examine Japan’s strategic objective of ensuring energy and resource 
security in the context of the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this research.  In terms of 
this framework, the structural conditions of global energy and resource markets are interpreted and 
acted upon by Japanese policymakers and shape Japan’s engagement in Africa.  And while this study 
gives particular attention to the question of energy security and its impact on Japanese policy in 
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South Sudan, it does not however engage extensively in the literature on “energy security” but relies 
on a basic understanding of energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an 
affordable price.”290  In addition it recognises two key assumptions outlined by Sovacool that 
underpin an understanding of the concept – namely the concentration of energy fuels 
(geographically) and their rates of depletion – thus making oil importing countries vulnerable to oil 
price shocks.291  This interpretation is summarised by Wesley who points out that as more countries 
become more dependent on imported energy, they become more vulnerable to irregularities of 
supply and affordability.  In this regard he refers to the hysteresis effect of energy – where a single 
disturbance affects the course of the economy.292  Consequently, as Yergin explains, “we are living in 
a new age of energy supply anxiety” where the “starting point for energy security today, as it has 
always been, is diversification of supplies and sources.”293  
 
As the chief economist at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) explains, since the oil crisis of 
1973 “energy security has always been the number one priority for Japanese policy making.”294  Indeed 
former Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso observed that “energy security is an indispensable subject 
even in general discussions about foreign policy.”295 This is because as a MOFA official described, the 
energy crisis in 1973 effectively ended the high growth period of the Japanese economy and pushed 
energy security to the forefront of policy making until the mid-1990s when energy prices collapsed.296  
But by the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, oil prices had reached a record high, and 
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energy security was once again a preoccupation of policymakers – becoming a central feature of Japan’s 
foreign policy agenda.297   Consequently, Japan’s energy security policy in the period following the crisis 
of 1973 was focused on five key areas: energy diversification, energy import source diversification, oil 
stockpiling, energy conservation and strengthening ties with major oil and gas producers.  In many 
respects these efforts have been successful: Japan diversified its energy sources – including the use of 
nuclear power until the post-Fukushima shutdown298 – improved energy efficiency, and has large oil 
stockpiles to manage demand.  Yet the country’s reliance on imported fossil fuels remains, as well as its 
dependence on the Middle East.  Indeed as the Figure below indicates, the Middle East accounts for 
approximately 83 per cent of Japan’s crude imports – up from 70 per cent in the mid-1980s.299 
 
Figure 9: Japan's crude oil imports by source (2012)
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Thus as discussed in Chapter Five, a MOFA director admits that Japan’s policy of diversification of 
supply has been failing for the past three decades,301 but that the essential goal remains the same.  
And while the government is concerned about overreliance on a single region and the threat of a 
1973-type oil shock – domestic refiners and distributors are focused more on the cost implications of 
moving away from Middle Eastern oil for which there are established and cost-effective 
procurement systems in place.   
 
Furthermore, when considered in the context of the Figure below which shows that despite a slight 
decrease in Japanese demand for oil, the rapid growth of China and India effectively means greater 
competition on world markets and higher prices of crude oil302 – energy security is once again a 
central element within Japan’s foreign policy agenda.  Indeed as Klare points out, when China 
overtook Japan as the world’s second biggest importer of petroleum it raised the level of anxiety in 
Japan, “prompting an intensified search for foreign sources of energy – a search that will become 
more frantic with time.”303  The renewed focus on energy security for Japanese policy makers also 
emphasises the role of structural pressures on the development of foreign policy objectives.    
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Figure 10: Crude oil imports
304
 
 
 
In this context, and given that it is believed that one-third of the world's new oil discoveries since the 
year 2000 have taken place in Africa,305  the continent is emerging as a new frontier of energy diplomacy.  
Consequently, as explored in Chapter Five, a significant method of engagement by Japan in South Sudan 
and more broadly in the region is a policy of pursuing upstream equity concessions – or Hinomaru306 
Oil.307  Thus as the IEEJ explains, energy investments in Africa are largely initiated by the government, 
who then request private companies to participate later308 – and although this is not true of every 
energy investment, it does indicate a policy-driven approach to resource investment in Africa.   
Moreover in the context of neoclassical realism this policy can be understood as an example of how 
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states seek to shape the international environment so as to eliminate uncertainty.  Indeed as outlined in 
Chapter Five, Japan’s poor endowment of energy resources is perceived by policymakers as a defining 
vulnerability within the country’s material power profile.      
 
It is also important to note therefore that energy is but one component of Japan’s interest in Africa’s 
resource sectors.  For example Japan’s vice-minister of economy, trade and industry, Yoshihiko Isozaki 
revealed in February 2014 a new assistance package that would see Japan’s public and private sector 
invest US$ 32 billion in infrastructure, human and mineral resource development in Africa over the next 
five years; of which two billion dollars would come from Japanese government-affiliated agencies and go 
towards accelerating resource development projects.  Isozaki noted that Africa was the “starting point” 
of the supply chain for the minerals Japan needed to produce cars and electronic appliances.309 
 
Thus while the broad strategic objective of securing resources is defining Japan’s engagement with 
different regions in different ways, it can be clearly identified as a factor underpinning Japan’s re-
engagement in Africa – and in turn influencing its methods of engagement.  When considering the 
structural factors driving Japan’s re-engagement in Africa, it is apparent that energy security is also 
among the issues motivating Japan’s evolving assertiveness and presence on the continent.  The 
Fukushima disaster and subsequent shutdown of the country’s nuclear power plants in 2011 came after 
a prolonged period of rapidly growing demand for oil and gas in China, India, and the growing economies 
of South East Asia which had driven oil prices to an all-time high in 2008.  This in turn created an 
atmosphere of urgency in securing energy supplies among Japanese policymakers that coincided with 
efforts to increase Japan’s economic presence in Africa.  Consequently, Chapter Five will explore the 
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significance of Toyota Tsusho’s bid to develop an alternative pipeline in South Sudan in the context of 
Japan’s renewed structural-driven policy focus on resource security. 
 
3.5 Meet International Security Commitments  
 
The final structural driver considered by this study to be relevant to Japan’s engagement in Africa 
relates to the country’s complicated domestic security considerations, and its ambitions to play a 
more recognisable role in multilateral security engagements.  In this regard Japan’s deployment of 
peacekeepers to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and anti-
piracy operations in the Horn of Africa are significant.  While these deployments are discussed in 
more depth in Chapter Six, it is important to recognise the structural context in which Japan’s 
African security deployments are occurring.   
 
As Vosse, Drifte and Blechinger-Talcott observe, since the end of the Cold War “Japan’s security 
environment has changed quite significantly.”310  A view emphasised by Hemmings who points out 
that “three trends have dominated the region over the last decade: the growth of Chinese power, 
the relative decline of US power and the resulting remilitarisation of Japanese power.”311  It is in this 
context that Hughes notes that in the past 40 years Japan has incrementally raised its defence 
budget, expanded the range of its security operations, and elevated the profile of the defence 
forces.312 And while Hughes’ primary argument is that these are indicators of the country’s 
remilitarisation despite its pacifist constitution, they also reflect Japan’s response to a challenging 
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security environment in the post-Cold War era.  Thus in detailing Japan’s security policy, MOFA notes 
that in the 21st Century Japan faces a “rapidly changing global power balance” combined with a 
“security environment around Japan that has become increasingly severe.”313  As a consequence, the 
Japanese government has established a National Security Council (NSC) (operational from 4 
December 2013) and developed a National Security Strategy (NSS) (adopted 17 December 2013).   
 
The structural drivers of Japanese aspirations to play a greater role in multilateral security 
operations are outlined in the NSS which details Japan’s intention to be a “proactive contributor to 
peace” while at the same time recognising that “Japan should play an even more proactive role as a 
major global player in the international community.”314  In this regard, Japan’s international status is 
advanced through the security contributions in Africa examined in Chapter Six.  Indeed Black and 
Hwang (drawing on the work of Sunstein315) argue that participation in anti-piracy operations in the 
Gulf of Aden is evidence that Japanese policymakers “intend to transform the dominant norms of 
international society” and attain great power status.316  As they continue to point out, in the case of 
anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, Japan operates like a fully-fledged “Great Power 
contributing both materially and normatively to international society.”317  Thus while this study will 
not engage meaningfully with the literature on great powers (for example see works by Kennedy,318 
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Mearsheimer,319 or Wohlforth320) the following chapters will explore Japan’s stated intention to raise 
its profile through increased commitments to international security operations.  
 
The NSS also highlights as an objective “to improve the global security environment and build a 
peaceful, stable and prosperous international community by strengthening the international 
order.”321  In this regard the Strategy outlines a commitment by Japan to step-up its cooperation 
with UN bodies and provide further personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.  Yet 
given that Japan’s only current UN deployment is with UNMISS in South Sudan, this further 
demonstrates the relevance of African-engagement for Japan’s international security commitments.   
Furthermore, the Security Strategy points out that “when participating in PKO [Peacekeeping 
Operations], Japan will endeavour to ensure effective implementation of its operations, through 
coordination with other activities, including ODA projects.”322 Thus while the link between ODA 
engagement and peacekeeping is explored in Chapter Six, it is important to recognise the role of 
security deployments within Japan’s broader international commitments as both a donor and a 
participant in multilateral forums.   
 
Thus Japan’s strategic objective in meeting international security commitments through engagement 
in Africa recognises the structural context and goes some way towards achieving what Suzuki refers 
to as “recognition” or “legitimate status” as a great power.323 As Suzuki explains, Japan’s 
international commitments have long been derided as “chequebook diplomacy” – paying the cost of 
upholding international security but failing to make a normative contribution to international 
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society. Indeed as the Figure below indicates, Japan is the second highest funder of UN 
peacekeeping operations after the US, and along with Germany,324  the only non-permanent 
member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) among the top six funders.  Moreover, in striving for a 
“legitimate status” as a great power, Japan’s security commitments in Africa can also be viewed in 
the context of the country’s on-going bid to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC.    
 
Figure 11: Top UN peacekeeping funders (percentage of total)
325
 
 
 
While the diplomatic significance of Africa in Japan’s thus-far unsuccessful bid to reform the UNSC is 
recognised throughout this research, it must also be considered among the factors driving Japan’s 
strategic and tactical engagement in Africa today.  As Prime Minister Abe stated at the UN General 
Assembly in 2013, Japan will “spare no pains to get actively engaged in historic challenges facing 
today’s world.”  Speaking of Japan’s “regained strength and capacity” Abe again confirmed that 
                                                          
324
 The UNSC permanent members are: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States, they are 
coloured darker on the graph   
325
 Council on Foreign Relations, “The UN Security Council”, accessed 26 March 2014, available at 
http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-alliances/un-security-council/p31649  
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
114 
 
“Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member of the Council has not changed in the 
slightest.”326  Thus Abe underlined the link between Japan’s international commitments, its own 
renewed vitality, and ambitions to assume greater international relevance.  In this context, Chapter 
Six will explore the extent to which Japan is using deployments in Africa to reinvent the parameters 
of the country’s commitment to multilateral security operations.    
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
Given the neoclassical realist perspective through which this research is focused, this chapter has 
sought to outline the structural context against which to interpret Japan’s engagement in South 
Sudan.  The following empirical chapters will therefore each address a “tactic” or element of Japan’s 
engagement in South Sudan that reflects a policy response to the structural pressures driving the 
overarching objectives of Japan’s presence in Africa.    
 
As Kitchen points out, “the challenge for neoclassical realist explanations is to emphasise structural 
factors whilst allowing for their mediation through domestic political processes.”327  This chapter has 
therefore outlined the structural context against which the following empirical chapters should be 
understood.  In this regard the structural drivers outlined in this chapter broadly guide Japan’s 
strategic objectives and underpin the tactical approaches to the country’s engagement in South 
Sudan that will be explored in the following chapters.  In addition, factors such as the rise of China, 
Japan’s economic stagnation, or the emergence of the G20 are creating urgency in Japan’s foreign 
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policy approaches.   And while these factors may not objectively reduce Japan’s power in absolute 
terms, as the following chapters will explore, they do impact on the perceptions of policymakers – 
and in turn, Japanese foreign policy.  As Kitchen reiterates, “states have a choice of means with 
which they may pursue strategic goals”328 and the chapters that follow will therefore examine the 
particular aspects of Japan’s African engagement that reflect policy responses to current structural 
pressures.    
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4. Strategic Official Development Assistance (ODA)  
 
As previously outlined, there are a number of distinct strategic objectives driving Japan’s refocused 
engagement in Africa, which are in turn implemented through identifiable tactics, or methods of 
engagement.  This chapter will therefore address the most recognisable dimension of Japan’s 
presence in Africa, as well as a key component of Japanese engagement in South Sudan: Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). Beyond detailing the scope and nature of Japan’s ODA 
commitments, this chapter will specifically explore the changes that have taken place in ODA policy 
since 2008 and assess the emergence of “strategic” ODA in the context of Japan’s presence in South 
Sudan.    
 
Yet while this study reflects the growth and expansion underlying Japan’s re-engagement in Africa, it 
should be noted that in the case of ODA, the significant change relevant to this study is the approach 
and manner of ODA use within the broader spectrum of Japan’s Africa policy.  This is because 
throughout the period of Japan’s “withdrawal” from Africa, the country remained an important 
international donor, and development assistance was the primary mechanism for Japanese 
interaction on the continent.  Therefore today ODA is still the cornerstone of Japan’s Africa policy 
and is a fundamental tool in building diplomatic relationships and creating a platform for Japanese 
private sector engagement.  Indeed Professor Aoki points out that “our strategy in Africa is mostly 
ODA.”329  
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Many authors such as Hasagawa, 330 Nestor,331 Scalapino, 332 and Stirling333 argue that development 
aid was used by Japan in the post-war period to develop ties with resource-rich countries, and to 
pursue policies of economic self-interest.  Davies further maintains that ODA increases “the visibility 
of Japan in the international arena”, and he points to the link between Japanese ODA to Sub-
Saharan Africa and Japan’s strategic objectives such as seeking political support for a seat on a 
reformed UN Security Council – for which African backing is required.334  In this respect ODA is still 
used instrumentally by all donor countries – Japan included – but what this chapter will explore are 
the specific changes that have taken place in Japanese aid policy in Africa since 2008, and how these 
changes can be understood through a neoclassical realist perspective.  Furthermore, the chapter will 
locate specific Japanese ODA projects in South Sudan within the broader context of Japan’s foreign 
policy objectives outlined in the previous chapter.  Thus Japan’s aid presence in South Sudan can be 
understood to reflect Tokyo’s response to changes at the structural level, as well as being elements 
within a broader domestically-driven discourse on strengthening Japan’s international presence and 
image. Furthermore, this study will explore the extent to which South Sudan is a test-case for 
Japan’s emerging approach to an ODA-led multifaceted engagement in Africa.    
  
The overview of Japan’s ODA white paper 2013 states,  
The environment surrounding ODA has been significantly changing in recent 
years. Amid the rapid change of the political and security environment 
surrounding Japan, it is important to support countries which share 
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strategic interests and fundamental values [emphasis in original] […] 
through strategic operation of ODA.335 
Indeed Japan’s Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida reiterates that “the environment surrounding us has 
changed significantly, especially in the past ten years, [Japan’s] ODA needs to evolve too.”336  In this 
regard, the evolution of Japan’s ODA policy reflects the key changes in Japan’s Africa policy that this 
study explores.  Consequently, the focus and direction of Japan’s aid programme in South Sudan 
reflects not only the country’s acute developmental deficit, but also a response by Japanese 
policymakers to the structural changes and associated challenges outlined in Chapter Three.   
 
Additionally, ODA remains the primary tactic of Japanese engagement in Africa, but as this chapter 
will highlight, it also reflects the changes in Japan’s approach to Africa. As Professor Kataoka 
explains, previously the government saw Africa as a place for aid, or eligible voters in international 
institutions – but this view is changing and Africa is now a “genuine partner for Japan.”  And as the 
Professor continues to explain, Africa is now seen as a place for important investment and that “we 
now have a new era for Japan-Africa relations.”337 
 
4.1 JICA in South Sudan  
 
Japan’s ODA engagement in South Sudan comprises bilateral and multilateral assistance or aid.  As 
illustrated in the diagram below, bilateral assistance comprises the “Three Pillars” of grant aid, ODA 
loans, and technical cooperation.  These aspects of Japan’s ODA provisions are managed by the 
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Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Japan’s ODA channelled through multilateral 
assistance comprises contributions to United Nations Agencies operating in South Sudan.  In 
exploring the extent of Japan’s ODA presence in South Sudan, this section will focus on the role of 
JICA as an implementing agency, and briefly outline the ODA projects being undertaken in South 
Sudan.   
 
 
 
   JICA 
 
 
 
Japan’s ODA policy is formulated by MOFA “in line with its foreign policy” under the guidance of the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Council (OECC).  Chaired by the prime minister, this body “identifies 
priority issues and regions to effectively utilise its ODA resources.”338  The meetings will often 
include participation from the chief cabinet Secretary, minister of foreign affairs, minister of finance, 
and the minister of economy trade and industry – thus demonstrating that ODA policy is developed 
at the very highest levels of government.  Since the establishment of the OECC in 2006, “the 
Government of Japan has worked to reinforce the strategic nature of its international cooperation 
and enhance the effectiveness of its implementation.”339  In this respect JICA’s ODA activities in 
South Sudan directly reflect Japan’s foreign policy objectives.  Objectives, which as this thesis 
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maintains, are driven by the country’s place in the international system and are a product of its 
policymakers recognition of the need to increase Japan’s presence and profile in Africa.      
 
JICA therefore is an implementing agency that operates under MOFA and the OECC’s strategic 
guidance to manage and coordinate the operations of Japan’s bilateral support for South Sudan.  
Thus while the strategic decision to support South Sudan is driven by MOFA and the OECC, JICA is 
responsible for the development of a “regional and thematic assistance strategy” that matches 
Japan’s ODA capabilities with the particular requirements of the target country.  In the case of South 
Sudan, a JICA representative in Juba explained that Japan’s ODA is intended to align with the 
economic development objectives of South Sudan’s Development Plan (SSDP).340  In this regard, 
Japan’s bilateral grant aid projects in South Sudan that are outlined in the table below reflect the 
chronic need for infrastructure development in the country.   
 
In addition, Japan’s ODA White Paper 2013 recognises the expanding demand for infrastructure and 
states that “Japan will be engaged in the facilitation of trans-boundary transport.”341  In this way 
South Sudan’s development requirements align comfortably with Japan’s ODA focus and historic 
strength.  As Wild, Denny, Menocal and Geddes describe, the thematic focus of Japan’s ODA to 
Africa in the early 2000s reflects a predominant approach of debt relief and significant investment in 
infrastructure and basic services – “Japanese ODA in Africa has focused heavily on infrastructure and 
trade.”342  Thus while this chapter will outline the evolution of Japan’s ODA strategy after 2008 and 
the strategic significance of ODA support for South Sudan, it is worth noting that in terms of bilateral 
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grant aid Japan still relies on what Wild, Denny, Menocal and Geddes describe as its “traditional 
spheres of operation.”343 And in this respect the changes in Japan’s ODA approach towards Africa 
since 2008 can be understood as both a return to historic methods of engagement as well as 
indicative of a broader re-engagement with the continent.   Yet as this chapter will also explore, the 
inclusion of large-scale infrastructure projects within Japan’s ODA framework reflects an attempt to 
further differentiate its development approach and offerings from the main Western donors and as 
such, reflects the perception of policymakers that Japan needs to respond to Chinese methods of 
engagement in Africa.   
 
The table below lists the current grant aid projects funded by Japan in South Sudan.  The most 
significant of which is improving the Juba river port and construction of a US$ 100 million “Freedom 
Bridge” over the River Nile.344  Upgrading the river port is intended to improve transport links within 
the country as the lack of reliable road infrastructure between cities along the Nile such as Bor and 
Malakal make river transport vital to internal trade and the movement of people.  Yet it is the Nile 
river bridge that is perhaps Japan’s most noteworthy ODA project in South Sudan – not only because 
of its cost but also because of its strategic importance to South Sudan and in advancing Japan’s 
position as a valued partner in the region.  The development of a new bridge is immensely valuable 
because South Sudan is heavily dependent on trade with neighbouring countries – mainly Uganda 
and Kenya – importing foodstuffs, petroleum and almost all consumer products and building 
supplies.   
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Table 1: Japan's Bilateral Grant Aid to South Sudan 2012/13-2013/14
345
 
Project  US$ Value (millions)  
Improvement of water supply in Juba  47.8  
Construction and rehabilitation of bridges / culverts in Juba  23.1 
Improvement of facilities and equipment of Multi-Service Training Centre  13.9 
Improvement of Juba river port  32.2  
Construction of the Nile River bridge  100 
Total  217  
 
A new bridge over the Nile is of vital importance to South Sudan as the existing Juba Bridge currently 
provides the only crossing point over the Nile along the road connecting Juba and Uganda and as a 
JICA assessment concludes, “does not have sufficient structural capacity to accommodate increasing 
traffic volume and cargo.”346  Thus constructing a new bridge is a primary objective for the 
government, because quite apart from the immediate trade benefits, the bridge will form a 
significant symbolic and material indication of South Sudan’s desire to develop closer ties to its East 
African neighbours.  As LeRiche and Arnold point out, “as is the case with Kenya, Uganda will be a 
critically important logistics outlet for South Sudan, since the road linking Juba to Northern Uganda 
via Nimule is the country’s key transport route.”347  As the chief executive of the East African 
Association, an organisation that represents foreign investors in the region explains, other countries 
in East Africa are starting to see South Sudan as a strong trading partner.  Noting that South Sudan 
“is a growing market for Kenyan goods, pretty much everything you get there is imported from or 
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through Kenya.”348  Indeed South Sudan is already Kenya’s third largest market for goods after 
Uganda and Tanzania, accounting for sales of approximately US$ 200 million worth of foodstuffs, 
manufactured goods, chemicals and textiles in 2012.349 
 
As LeRiche and Arnold also note, the discovery of oil in Lake Albert in Uganda opens the possibility 
for “regional cooperation and energy schemes, including infrastructure development such as 
pipelines.”350  Consequently, as discussed in Chapter Five, Japan’s involvement in the development 
of an alternative oil pipeline form South Sudan alongside key infrastructure projects such as the Nile 
bridge highlights Japan’s important role in supporting South Sudan’s integration into the East African 
Community.  Moreover, it emphasises the significance of East Africa – and South Sudan as a frontier 
– within Japan’s broader objectives in Africa.   
 
Comprising Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, the EAC is a common market that South 
Sudan applied to join shortly after independence in 2011.  As a report by the Brookings Institute 
explains, this was motivated largely by the economic benefits from trade and commerce that it 
hopes to gain from having access to a much larger market.  “In addition, it expects to be able to take 
advantage of the community’s existing infrastructure (especially airports, railways, roads and 
seaports) to improve its access to regional and global markets.”351 Yet perhaps a far greater 
consideration for the government in Juba is the statement it sends to Khartoum by committing its 
                                                          
348
 CNN, “Can South Sudan rebuild embattled economy?”, 27 January 2014, accessed 22 April 2014, available 
at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/27/business/south-sudan-rebuild-economy/  
349
 The East African, “Somalia, South Sudan likely to join EAC this year”, 23 January 2014, accessed 22 April 
2014, available at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Somalia-and-South-Sudan-likely-to-join-EAC-this-
year/-/2558/2158728/-/13ly891/-/index.html  
350
 Ibid 
351
 Kamau, Anne, “South Sudan’s quest for regional integration”, Brookings Institute, 22 June 2012, accessed 
23 April 2014, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/6/south%20sudan/06%20regional%20integr
ation%20kamau.pdf  
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
124 
 
economic and political future to East Africa.  As was demonstrated in 2011 when Khartoum closed 
border crossings, South Sudan is susceptible to an economic blockade from Sudan.352  Resultantly, 
developing transport and trade links within the EAC is a significant strategic as well as economic 
objective of the government in Juba.  In this regard, Japan’s ODA contributions are substantial.   
 
The Nile bridge is expected to be completed at the end of 2018,353 and as JICA explains will “provide 
an alternative and more reliable access to Juba from neighbouring countries”, as well as form part of 
a ring-road that will improve traffic flow in the city.354  Thus the Nile bridge along with upgrading of 
the river port is of both strategic and developmental importance in ensuring the viability of South 
Sudan. Moreover, when combined with the infrastructure development undertaken by the 
contingent of Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) engineers deployed as peacekeepers with the UN, 
Japan’s support to South Sudan is significant. However while the provision of essential infrastructure 
through ODA grant aid is an important contribution to the economic development of South Sudan, 
Japanese corporations are also benefiting from Japan’s ODA engagement in South Sudan.     
 
For example, the river port upgrade is being managed by the Overseas Coastal Area Development 
Institute of Japan (OCDI) with the engineering work being undertaken by the Japanese engineering 
company Katahira & Engineers International (KEI).  OCDI is a non-profit organisation established in 
1976 under the authority of the Japanese government to undertake research and the development 
of ports in developing countries.355  KEI’s website explains that the company has implemented 
“numerous grant aid and technical cooperation projects under the sponsorship and supervision of 
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JICA.”  As the website goes on to outline, KEI has provided consulting engineering services to the 
Japanese government through ODA-funded transport-sector projects for over 30 years.356  Another 
Japanese engineering firm (CTI Engineering Co. Ltd.) is undertaking the upgrading of bridges and 
culverts in Juba and the construction of the Nile bridge.  Thus a significant component of Japan’s 
private sector presence in South Sudan is as a result of Japanese ODA spending.   
 
As Wild, Denny, Menocal and Geddes explain, “Japan’s aid is often tied357 to the use of Japanese 
organisations and expertise”, and in recent years the providers of this assistance have reportedly 
broadened, to “include both private sector and civil society organisations.”358  However as a JICA 
representative in South Sudan explains, within Japan’s ODA framework the Japan International 
Cooperation System (JICS) is responsible for procurement related to grant aid and technical 
cooperation.  With JICS involvement contractors are selected through international bidding while 
JICA contractors are “Japan-tied.”359  Thus in the case of South Sudan there is one Japanese 
construction contractor registered in the country and Japanese companies are undertaking all of 
Japan’s major ODA-funded infrastructure projects.  Indeed as Professor Kataoka explains, the first 
“pillar” of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan “is a typical one – ODA construction.”360  
 
Given that Japan has not extended any ODA loans to South Sudan, the final area of JICA’s 
involvement in the country is through the provision of technical assistance.   As a JICA representative 
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in Juba explains, there are a limited number of countries that can repay loans, and for that reason 
Japan tends to provide loans to “those countries most likely to make regular repayments.”361 
Technical assistance or cooperation is an all-embracing term used to describe practical support for 
the target country. As such, technical cooperation can include the deployment of JICA experts, 
capacity development for local officials, the supply of equipment or financial assistance.  Technical 
assistance projects therefore are intended to address a broad range of needs and are usually 
developed and implemented in consultation with the host government.  The table below outlines 
Japan’s technical assistance projects in South Sudan. 
 
Table 2: Japan’s Technical Assistance in South Sudan 2012/13–2013/14
362
 
Project  US$ Value (millions)  
Enhance operations and management of inland waterways  7.8  
Support management capacity of Urban Water Corporation  4.3 
Sustainable road maintenance and management in Juba  4.9 
Improve basic skills and vocational training  9.8  
Support capacity development for solid waste management in Juba  4.4 
Strengthen science and mathematics education  4.7 
Institutional capacity development of South Sudan TV and radio  7.4 
Planning and support for social economic infrastructure Malakal 13.6 
Comprehensive Agricultural Development Master Plan  9.8 
Irrigation Master Plan  9.5 
Total  76.2 
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Given that South Sudan is characterised by multiple priorities, Japan’s technical assistance is directed 
across a number of sectors: health, education, vocational training, rural development and 
infrastructure.  As JICA resource material outlines, the organisation is reviewing its aid priorities so 
as to better streamline the portfolio in terms of the SSDP and aid harmonisation initiatives of South 
Sudan’s government.363  However the technical assistance projects outlined in the table above 
reflect two of the four priority areas identified in the SSDP – namely the Economic Development 
Pillar and the Social and Human Development Pillar.   
 
The Economic Development Pillar comprises three sectors: natural resources, infrastructure and 
economic functions.364 The section focused on natural resources aims to increase agricultural 
production so as to improve food security and improve livelihoods.  JICA’s development of 
comprehensive agricultural and irrigation plans are therefore intended to align with the priorities 
identified by the SSDP.  Furthermore as previously outlined, Japan’s grant aid contributions are 
focused on strategic infrastructure, and in addition, JICA’s technical assistance is also aimed largely 
at the development of critical infrastructure such as inland waterways and the construction and 
rehabilitation of Juba’s road network.  While JICA’s programmes around the Social and Human 
Development Pillar focus on the capacity development of public service providers, with priority given 
to science and math education as well as nursing and midwifery training.365   
 
In comparison to bilateral assistance, Japan’s multilateral assistance to South Sudan is handled 
directly by MOFA, and via this mechanism provides humanitarian support through international 
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organisations and a small number of Japanese NGOs.  The Association for Aid and Relief (AAR) Japan, 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) Japan, Japan Emergency NGO (JEN), Peace Winds 
Japan, and World Vision Japan all have operations in South Sudan – though the lion’s share of 
Japanese humanitarian assistance is made through UN agencies, as the table below indicates. 
 
 Table 3: Japan’s multilateral assistance through international organisations 2012/13–2013/14
366
  
Project  Organisation  US$ Value (millions)  
Emergency intervention for vulnerable populations – 
including refugees  
UNICEF367 9 
Food assistance for conflict affected population  WFP368 9.6 
Protection and early reintegration of IDPs and returnees  UNHCR369 11 
Integration and protection for displaced groups  UNIDO370 1.5 
Rule of Law  UNDP371 2.5 
Reintegration and community security and arms control  UNDP 2.5 
Development of South Sudan education sector  UNESCO372 1 
Border control and migration management  IOM373 5.3 
Emergency aid for Sudanese refugees in South Sudan  UNHCR 2 
Total   44.4  
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While the extent of Japan’s humanitarian assistance through UN agencies reflects support for South 
Sudan, it is also a reflection of Japan’s intention to demonstrate a broader commitment to 
international engagement and support for multilateral institutions.  As Kawai and Takagi explain, 
despite Japan’s generous contributions to multilateral institutions, “many in the international 
development community criticise Japan for a heavy emphasis on bilateral loans to economic 
infrastructure-related projects and for restrained willingness to participate more openly in a 
multilateral framework.”374  Thus much like the decision to commit peacekeepers (as discussed in 
Chapter Six), South Sudan is emerging as an important location for Japan to demonstrate its support 
for multilateral international institutions and processes.  As the Figure below indicates, Japan is the 
second-highest contributor to the regular budget of the UN, yet its approach to bilateral grant 
assistance has in some respects overshadowed its contributions to multilateral institutions.   
 
Figure 13: Japan’s contribution as percentage to the regular budget of the UN 2011
375
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Undeniably, Japan makes significant contributions in multilateral aid through international 
institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional banks.  For 
example as Schriver and Mroczkowski detail, in 2010 Japan contributed US$ 3.68 billion to 
multilateral institutions, and relative to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries376 from 2005-2009, Japan made up the single largest share of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC)377 gross multilateral ODA disbursements, with 16 per cent of OECD 
contributions.378  Yet despite this, and the importance of the “visibility of Japanese aid” being 
stipulated in Japan’s ODA Charter,379 Kawai and Takagi point to Japan’s “dual position as a generous 
multilateral provider and hesitant multilateral partner.”380  As Kawai and Takagi continue to explain, 
Japan has distanced itself from attempts by other OECD DAC donors to create a “common fund” 
from pooled resources.  Noting that “for the most part, when it comes to the use of bilateral 
resources, Japan still prefers to work alone, fearing that its already low visibility will become even 
more diminished if its resources are to be pooled with other donors.”381  
 
Indeed this hesitancy to engage in multilateral donor partnerships is evidenced in South Sudan 
where Japan did not join the Joint Donor Team (JDT).  Operating from 2006 until 2013, the JDT was 
established by the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK – later joined by Denmark and Canada, 
with the primary objective of overseeing the multi-donor funds to which the joint donor partners 
had contributed.382  Japan however whilst an engaged member of the OECD DAC group of donor 
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countries maintained a separate identity for its ODA presence in Southern Sudan and then in the 
new republic after 2011.  This desire by Japan to develop an independent identity as a donor is 
explored further in Section 4.4 and it reflects a distinct policy decision to increase the profile of 
Japan’s aid engagement in Africa.  Consequently, despite significant multilateral contributions in 
South Sudan, Japan’s focus remains on bilateral engagement.  This is largely because bilateral aid is 
more useful as a tool of foreign policy, and as this study demonstrates, the shift in Japan’s aid 
priorities in Africa since 2008 reflect the systemic pressures and incentives driving Japanese ODA 
strategy.    
 
Accordingly, Japan’s grant aid and technical assistance programmes delivered in terms of its bilateral 
ODA strategy in South Sudan are integral components of its engagement in the country.  As the 
following chapters will outline, ODA ties together Japan’s peacekeeping commitment and the bid to 
develop an alternative oil pipeline by the Sogo Sosha Toyota Tsusho.  In this regard ODA became the 
primary “face” of Japan in South Sudan – underpinning its diplomatic and investment activities.  
Indeed, Japan’s ODA engagement in Sudan began in 2003 two years before the signing of the CPA 
and as such defined the trajectory of Japan’s later engagement in the country.  In underlining this 
point, a director at MOFA reiterated that “South Sudan is important, and there are various reasons 
to support this new country.”383  
 
Yet as DeWaard argues, the perceived national interests that may have informed the decision to 
establish a country’s national aid program may or may not be those that explain its continuation or 
define its current character.  In this respect DeWaard points out that “national interests are subject 
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to change”384 and with them the intent and the method of ODA engagement.  Similarly, Tokyo’s 
relationship with Juba evolved from purely humanitarian support to encompass much broader 
diplomatic, economic and security dimensions.  As the following section will examine, the complex 
conditions in Sudan following the signing of the CPA and South Sudan’s independence were 
important factors in the development of Japan’s aid priorities and approaches in Africa during this 
period.    
 
4.1.1 The Evolution of Japan’s ODA Support for South Sudan  
 
Japan’s interaction with Sudan began before the signing of the CPA when JICA reopened an office in 
Khartoum that had been shut following the escalation of the Sudanese civil war.  As a deputy 
director general at JICA explains, “MOFA had an interest in participating in the peace process and 
they were very slow to act – as usual.”  But as the JICA representative continues, “it was madam 
Ogata who strongly drove operations in South Sudan to assess their needs – this was the starting 
point of JICA’s involvement.”385  Former President of JICA Sadako Ogata is a highly respected and 
experienced development professional who served as the chairperson of the UNICEF board and as 
the high commissioner for refugees before heading-up JICA from 2003 until 2012. Under her 
leadership JICA restructured so that “peacebuilding and reconstruction assistance could be started in 
a country or area immediately after the end of conflict”386 – and Sudan was an important step in that 
evolution.  In this regard JICA conducted a field survey of the states of southern Sudan in 2005 
shortly before the signing of the final agreements of the CPA, and set about developing a 
programmatic approach focused on the “transition from humanitarian assistance to 
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reconstruction.”387  Among the first projects undertaken in this period was the initial rehabilitation 
of the Nile River port in Juba – which is now being further developed and expanded as part of 
Japan’s current grant aid projects.    
 
Thus throughout the CPA period, JICA expanded its operations in Sudan in terms of the methodology 
promoted by madam Ogata  – namely a greater focus on field presence, human security, and an 
emphasis on peacebuilding in Africa.388  During this period JICA allocated more staff to the field, 
undertook programmes outside of Khartoum and Juba, and expanded the human security approach 
that came to define JICA’s operational focus.   While discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, human 
security was founded on the concept that socially vulnerable people are protected from diverse 
threats and empowered to address those threats.  Furthermore, JICA’s focus on peacebuilding 
during that period also underpinned Japan’s engagement in Sudan during the CPA period.    
 
However despite JICA’s strong developmental approach to engagement in Sudan, politics have 
remained an important factor.  The underlying principle of the CPA was to “make unity attractive” 
and as a JICA representative describes “we tried to balance [our approach] between North and 
South – especially with regards the possible succession of the South.”389  In this regard a further 
complication for Japan was the extent to which it should align with US policy in its opposition to the 
regime in Khartoum.  But as the JICA representative continues, “Japan had no hidden agendas to 
separate the country – unlike say the US.”390  The role of Japanese support for US policy in Africa is 
explored further in Chapter Six, but it should be noted here that while the US as a leading member 
of a “Troika” comprising the United Kingdom and Norway which supported the CPA negotiations, 
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was also a key supporter of the SPLA and in the eyes of many in South Sudan ultimately delivered 
the country’s independence.391  Japan’s role however was far less conspicuous despite the 
considerable number of international actors engaged in witnessing the CPA and supporting its 
implementation.  In this respect the country had maintained its traditional low diplomatic profile 
while providing multilateral financial support.     
 
For example, Japan provided support for the implementation of several key CPA milestones 
including the elections in 2010 and the Southern Sudan referendum in 2011.  Following the 
formation of the Government of National Unity in 2005, the next significant milestone outlined by 
the CPA was legislative and executive elections to be held in April 2010.  In this regard Japan 
extended emergency multilateral grant aid of approximately US$ 10 million through UNDP to 
support the general elections.  Japan’s assistance was used for the procurement of ballot papers and 
boxes, and an awareness-raising campaign for political participation aimed specifically at women 
voters.392  
  
A further multilateral contribution made by Japan to the CPA process was through support for the 
referendum on southern Sudanese independence.  The referendum held in January 2011 was the 
final milestone outlined in the Naivasha Agreement,393 and would result in a definite determination 
of whether southern Sudan would remain part of Sudan or become an independent country.  Japan 
dispatched a 15-member Referendum Observation Mission mandated under the International Peace 
Cooperation Law.  The law stipulates the structures and procedures for Japan’s active contribution 
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to international peace, including UN peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian relief 
operations, and international election observation operations.  In addition, Japan provided through 
the UNDP a grant of US$ 8.17 million for voter education, media training and the procurement of 
voter registration and voting materials.394   
 
A third element of Japan’s multilateral support for the CPA process was by contributing funding to 
the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme.  The CPA’s Permanent 
Ceasefire and Security Arrangements agreement mandated a sustainable ceasefire and 
disengagement of armed groups followed by a DDR process for the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and 
the SPLA.  Through the UNDP Japan assisted the DDR programme from 2005 and provided a second 
tranche of US$ 10.7 million in 2011.395  Furthermore, JICA ran a technical cooperation project that 
provided training for teachers at vocational training centres intended to provide training for ex-
combatants.  In this way Japan’s support for the DDR programme operated through both multilateral 
grant aid via the UNDP and technical cooperation managed by JICA.     
 
Alongside Japan’s multilateral support for CPA implementation and JICA’s growing presence in Sudan 
during this period, the Japanese government also began considering the deployment of 
peacekeepers.  While discussed further in Chapter Six, a JICA representative explains that the 
decision to send peacekeepers to South Sudan in 2012 was the culmination of a long process, and 
that the government “had been exploring the possibility since 2008/9”396 when three GSDF 
representatives were deployed to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).  But it was only with South 
Sudan’s independence that the final decision was made, and the “second pillar” of Japan’s 
engagement in the country realised.  When viewed in the context of this study however, the process 
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of expanding Japan’s physical presence in Sudan that began in 2008 is a significant indicator of the 
country’s intention to increase its profile in Africa.  It further demonstrates the extent to which 
South Sudan became a test-case for Japan’s transition from a low profile donor to that of a fully-
engaged international actor operating in the country.    
 
Yet with South Sudan’s independence Japan’s ODA funds were effectively split between the two 
countries.  And while this study demonstrates the growing strategic and economic rationale for 
Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, from the perspective of development assistance, Japan has 
maintained a balanced approach between the two countries.  As Professor Fukushima explains “if 
you look at ODA, the two Sudans receive equal shares – and Japan is careful not to isolate one or the 
other.”397  The professor goes on to note that “Sudan is at the edge of collapse” and Japan’s policy is 
therefore very careful to not exacerbate this instability.   
 
A further dimension to understanding JICA’s continued engagement in South Sudan is the leadership 
of its current president, Professor Akihiko Tanaka and his scholarly contribution to the 
understanding of “fragile states.” The influence of Professor Tanaka in shaping a new approach for 
JICA in Africa is explored in the following section yet as a JICA representative describes, “Professor 
Tanaka is interested in political issues” and fragile states in Africa – “South Sudan, the Sahel region 
and Somalia.”398  Tanaka has observed that “the conditions of developing countries are diverse and 
the conventional dichotomy [developed versus developing countries] is insufficient.”399 In this regard 
JICA is developing a nuanced approach to addressing the complex issues that face South Sudan.   As 
previously outlined, South Sudan’s vulnerability to internal and external shocks combined with weak 
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governance and an overreliance on oil revenues presents a particular set of development challenges 
alongside the economic potential already highlighted.  Thus given JICA’s leadership priorities and the 
established peacebuilding presence in the country it is likely that South Sudan will continue to play 
an important role within Japan’s Africa strategy – both in realising its development objectives, and as 
this chapter will explore, in identifying “win-win” opportunities for Japanese investment in the 
region.     
 
Japan’s ODA policies in Sudan through the CPA period and now in independent South Sudan are 
therefore framed with a political awareness of the complexities of the region.   But they also reflect 
the changes that have taken place within Japan’s ODA policies since 2008.  As the following sections 
will outline, Japan’s ODA strategy has evolved to encompass a more investment-oriented approach 
and one that sees ODA as part of a broader Japanese private-sector engagement.   Thus South Sudan 
remains an important location for the development of Japan’s ODA policies around peacebuilding 
and operating in post-conflict countries, but also as a test-case for the evolution of those policies to 
encompass security and investment components.  In this regard ODA remains a cornerstone of 
Japan’s presence in South Sudan and has underpinned the broadening of Japan’s presence to include 
peacekeeping and potential investment in a new oil pipeline.     
 
4.2 Japan’s ODA in Africa  
 
Japanese ODA engagement in South Sudan is an important component within the broader context of 
Japan’s ODA strategy in Africa.  As this study seeks to demonstrate, Japan’s presence in South Sudan 
reflects a policy of re-engagement with the continent, and an examination of Japan’s ODA support to 
Sub-Saharan Africa underlines this growing relationship.  According to OECD aid statistics, Japan is 
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the fifth largest bilateral ODA donor to Africa.  While these figures do not include China which is not 
a member of the OECD, it lists the US, France, the UK and Germany as the leading ODA providers to 
Africa.400  Indeed as the figure below indicates, the average annual value of Japanese ODA to Africa 
in the period 2003–2007 was US$ 0.9 billion.  This doubled to US$ 1.8 billion in 2012.  Furthermore 
as the Figure also illustrates, the most significant increase in ODA to Africa happened in 2008, and 
coincided with TICAD IV.  As will be explored later in this chapter, TICAD IV was a significant turning 
point for Japanese engagement on the continent, and the growing importance of Africa in the eyes 
of Japanese policymakers is perhaps best illustrated through the marked increase in ODA flows from 
2008 onwards.   
 
Figure 14: Total ODA to Africa (2003-2011)
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Japan’s US$ 1.8 billion ODA commitment to Africa in 2012 as shown in the Figure above, does not 
include aid to multilateral donors such as the World Bank.  Moreover in the period 2003 to 2010 the 
percentage of JICA’s total budget allocated to Africa grew significantly.  For example technical 
cooperation increased from 14 Per cent of JICA’s total expenditure in 2003 to 20.9 per cent in 2010, 
while grants increased from 25.6 per cent in 2003 to 42.8 per cent in 2010.  In 2011 JICA dispatched 
2045 experts along with 513 volunteers to Africa and provided technical training for over 10,000 
people.402  Furthermore, Japanese ODA loans to Africa increased over the same period from 1.8 per 
cent in 2003 to 10.7 per cent of total loans provided in 2010.403  Thus as the Figure below indicates, 
Africa’s total share of Japan’s ODA has increased as expenditure in East Asia declines.   
 
Figure 15: Japan's ODA (2008 constant price)
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As a JICA representative explains, Africa was a low priority for the organisation from 2000 to 2008 
when Japan committed to double aid to Africa.  This decision by the Fukuda administration 
recognised the importance of investment in Africa from emerging countries such as China, India and 
Brazil which had resulted in a period of rapid economic expansion across the continent.  As a result 
Japanese politicians “were aware that Africa is the last resort for our development, and that our 
economy will need Africa in the future.”405  The spike in ODA to the Middle East in 2005 was 
intended solely for Iraq and is something of an anomaly in terms of Japan’s longer-term ODA trends.   
It is interesting to note that the region other than Africa where Japan’s ODA expenditure is growing 
is South and Central Asia. This reflects Japan’s longstanding ODA relationship with India and growing 
presence in Central Asia.  Indeed since 2003/2004 India has been the single largest recipient of 
Japanese ODA – as Hornung explains “Japan and India work together diplomatically to promote 
common interests.”  For example they share interests reforming the UN Security Council and Prime 
Minister Abe is known to be staunchly pro-India – emphasising the two countries shared values and 
overlapping security interests.406  Moreover as Rakhimov points out, Japan’s so-called “Silk Road 
Diplomacy” and ODA loans in Central Asia saw Tokyo “carve out a special diplomatic role for itself in 
Eurasia”, with a significant focus on the Central Asian republics.407  Yet alongside these regions Africa 
is a key destination for Japan’s ODA and development-led presence.   
 
Beyond the stated aims of advancing development in these regions however, the ramping-up of 
Japanese ODA in Africa as well as India and Central Asia can be seen to reflect Japan’s intention to 
increase its presence and profile in these regions.  As described in Chapter Three, the growing 
importance of emerging countries combined with perceptions of Japan’s own diminished 
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international status is driving this strategy.   Thus in terms of a neoclassical realist interpretation, this 
policy reflects Japan’s response to changing structural pressures and opportunities.  As Taliaferro, 
Lobell and Ripsman describe, “Leaders define the “national interest” and conduct foreign policy 
based upon their assessment of relative power and other states’ intentions but always subject to 
domestic constraints.”408  In this respect both the manner of the increased ODA engagement in 
Africa as well as its motivation is significant as it reflects the particular domestic dynamics and 
considerations influencing Japan’s policymakers.   
 
The defining aspect of Japan’s ODA policies in recent years is the changing focus to incorporate a 
more investment-led approach to engagement in Africa.  This evolution has been most clearly 
expressed through the changing priorities of the TICAD conferences in 2008 and 2013, but also 
reflects the role of leadership within JICA.  As the chief researcher at JETRO notes, “some would say 
that JICA is now changing.”  He goes on to explain that “under madam Ogata’s leadership JICA was 
more social-assistance oriented, but is now more business oriented.”409  A further factor to be 
considered therefore in the evolution of Japan’s ODA strategy in recent years is the influence of its 
new President Akihiko Tanaka.  Formerly the vice president of the University of Tokyo, Tanaka is a 
respected academic in the field of international relations, publishing extensively on international 
politics and Sino-Japanese relations.  Thus as Professor Samuels of MIT points out, his academic 
background gives Tanaka a particular perspective on Japan’s national interest, its place in the world, 
and relations with China when compared to Ogata’s background with international development 
organisations.410  
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Professor Tanaka’s assumption of the presidency of JICA in 2012 coincided with the re-focused 
approach to energising the Japanese economy driven by the Abe administration and the changing 
reality of the development industry.  The influence of major investments in Africa from emerging 
countries – most notably China, effectively changed the context into which aid was being delivered 
and consequently the approach of the DAC donor countries. As former British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair observed, “China’s offering to Africa is fundamentally different to ours [the British].  If China 
has changed the terms of engagement, we’re going to have to change.”411  Therefore as Professor 
Tanaka recognises, “some of the leaders [in Africa] told us that while assistance is definitely 
important, what is extremely important for developing nations is direct investment.”  Accordingly, 
JICA’s approach to engagement in Africa has evolved to facilitate investment by focusing on those 
development aspects such as improving customs processes and physical infrastructure which assist 
Japanese businesses to establish themselves in new countries.  As Professor Tanaka continues to 
outline, “if this is needed for Japanese businesses to make inroads into other countries, we are more 
than willing to facilitate such efforts.”412 
 
Consequently, as Professor Kataoka points out, the three “pillars” of Japanese engagement – ODA, 
investment and peacekeeping, are interactive and the scope of Japan’s overall presence is growing.  
Yet it is the expansion of the investment “pillar” through private sector non-ODA engagement that 
largely characterises the shifting and expanding Japanese presence in South Sudan – as well as the 
tactical approach to securing Japan’s interests.  As a representative of Toyota Tsusho details in 
Chapter Five, the company worked closely with Japanese government officials in pushing to secure a 
deal to develop an alternative oil pipeline in South Sudan.   The representative explains that before 
MOFA staff travel to Kenya or South Sudan they meet with Toyota Tsusho to identify the company’s 
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priorities, and essentially carry the message to Juba that “if you move early [with the pipeline] the 
Japanese government would like to give you ODA money for other projects.”  Moreover, as he 
reiterates, “such kind of discussion is always there with MOFA people or METI people.” 413  
 
JICA’s embrace of a more investor-led approach to ODA engagement in Africa therefore reflects the 
structural pressures driving Japan’s strategic objective of stimulating growth through overseas 
investment.  In this regard ODA policy is now intended to partly assist Japanese companies make 
investments – as the JETRO researcher explains “this is an inevitable phenomenon.  ODA is more 
limited, so we must be more efficient with our aid budget.”  Thus as Japan’s economy has stagnated, 
“and we are not as rich as we used to be, we must think about what our aid can do for Japan.”414  As 
a director at MOFA further explains, the policy framework for overseas engagement has also been 
“mobilised to secure resources.”  In this regard, visits by government officials and the more 
“strategic use of ODA” have been combined in defining Japan’s Africa strategy.415  Indeed the deputy 
director general for trade policy at METI summarises this trend by noting, “in recent years, Africa has 
come to attract the attention of Japanese companies again for one, natural resource development, 
two, infrastructure development, and three, entry in new business fields.”416   
 
In this regard ODA policy is an essential factor in facilitating access for Japanese businesses – from 
supporting infrastructure development by Japanese firms, to establishing important bilateral 
relations, and improving the business environment through targeted programmes in skills 
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development and regulatory reform. ODA therefore underpins Japan’s growing private-sector 
presence in Africa.  Indeed as Professor Tanaka explains: 
When I became president, I suggested that we should promote development 
cooperation that both revitalises the world’s developing nations as well as Japan.  
Through international cooperation Japanese businesses establish their bases in 
places that they never thought could become candidates for their business 
activities.  We believe this is among the important points.417   
Indeed in the context of South Sudan, Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline represents the very type of 
initiatives referred to by JICA’s president.  
 
Supported by Japanese diplomatic efforts and welcomed by the government of South Sudan, the 
project encapsulates the emerging “win-win” discourse of Japan’s foreign investment.  As a 
representative of Toyota Tsusho explains, the company has no history of doing “ODA business in 
Africa” and are therefore proud of their emerging reputation in Japan as “the first-mover towards 
direct investment in Africa.”418  As the chief researcher at JETRO further observes, “Toyota Tsusho is 
a newcomer as a trading company and are a little different – more risk loving.”419 In this respect the 
company has built on its well-established operations in Kenya to push for a greater regional 
presence in South Sudan, and in so doing opening the way for other investors such as Japan 
International Tobacco.420   
 
Thus in many ways the Sogo Sosha’s approach reflects Japan’s broader policy in the region in that 
while South Sudan is still unstable, it remains on the frontier of Japanese interests in East Africa and 
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offers significant future investment potential as part of an expanded EAC.  Indeed as the Figure 
below indicates, the East African region has been the focus of Japan’s ODA presence in Africa since 
the 1970s, and remains central to Japan’s plans for future engagement on the continent.    
 
Figure 16: Japan's ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa by region
421
 
 
 
As a deputy director at METI explains, the East African region offers “opportunities for Japan”422 as it 
is an area in which the country has established strong relations and is geographically the best 
location for trade with Japan.  Indeed the importance of the region as a frontier within Japan’s 
broader Africa strategy is apparent when considering the extent and manner of development 
assistance being undertaken in East Africa.  For example, Japan currently supports the creation of a 
common customs infrastructure within the EAC423 – which enhances regional trade as well as builds 
a larger market for Japanese companies operating in the region.   Japan’s support for the EAC was 
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also included in the deliberations of TICAD V (2013) where a number of key regional infrastructure 
projects were identified.  These projects include the Rusumo Bridge linking Rwanda424 and 
Tanzania,425 piers and ports on Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika as well as power grid connections 
between Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia.426 In addition, Japan supports the EAC Disaster Risk 
Management Strategy, rehabilitation and upgrading of Climate Observing Stations, implementation 
of the Ten-Year Strategy for Biodiversity, and promotion of Low carbon Emissions Development in 
the EAC.427   
 
JICA’s activities in the East African region to enhance trade linkages and critical infrastructure 
therefore support development within the EAC as well as the conditions for Japanese private sector 
investors.  In this context South Sudan is a significant frontier location as it seeks to join the EAC and 
is both resource-rich and infrastructure poor. Thus given the extent of Japanese ODA in East Africa, 
supporting South Sudan’s ability to integrate economically into the EAC, while at the same time 
enhancing Japan’s presence through peacekeeping and high profile projects such as the proposed oil 
pipeline, is significant in establishing Japan’s presence in the region, refining its methodology of 
engagement and ultimately facilitating opportunities for future economic expansion.        
 
JICA’s activities in Africa can therefore be seen to reflect a neoclassical realist ODA policy framework 
developed in Tokyo in response to structural pressures and defined by domestic imperatives and 
debates.  In this regard Japan’s ODA strategy in Africa also reflects a merging of global development 
trends with Japan’s own economic and diplomatic priorities.  These complex factors have therefore 
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largely defined the evolution of the TICAD process and remain relevant in understanding the political 
context in which Japan’s Africa policies are formulated.      
 
4.3 The Evolution of TICAD 
 
The TICAD process has since the first conference in 1993, served as the primary forum for 
engagement between Japan and Africa – while also serving as a barometer of the political and 
economic objectives underlying Japan’s presence in Africa.  Moreover in the broader context of this 
study, the evolution of the TICAD process should also be considered in terms of Rose’s observation 
that “understanding the links between power and policy requires a close examination of the 
contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented.”428 In this respect this 
section will plot the evolution of the TICAD process, paying particular attention to the changes that 
happened since 2008 and contextualised against the structural drivers underpinning the changing 
priorities of Japan’s Africa policies.    
 
Raposo explains that “TICAD can be seen both as an agenda of the Japanese Government and a 
comprehensive approach to Japanese foreign policy for Africa.”429  Professor Kataoka reiterates this 
by pointing out that “TICAD is a good way to measure Japan’s policy in Africa.”430  A deputy director 
at JICA explains that the initial conference was a response to the international donor environment as 
well as a reflection of Japan’s diplomatic ambitions.  In the immediate post-Cold War era during the 
early 1990s there was an increase of ODA to the former Eastern Bloc countries, and “aid fatigue” 
from the major Western donors resulted in decreasing attention on Africa.  Consequently as the JICA 
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representative notes, “through the TICAD initiative there was a chance for Japan to take the lead” 
and galvanise attention and support from the international community towards the development of 
Africa.”  However as the representative also goes on to point out, “the hidden agenda was reform of 
the UN Security Council – to get a permanent seat for Japan.”431 
 
Thus as the first TICAD conference demonstrated, Japan developed a policy response to the rapidly 
changing global environment that identified a real need – development support to Africa, but could 
also be matched with its own strategic objectives.  And while the first TICAD was a relatively small 
conference, drawing only six African leaders, it laid the infrastructure for Japan’s ODA-led 
engagement in Africa for the next 20 years.  It is also important to recognise that the TICAD meeting 
of 1993 took place during a time of withdrawal by Japanese businesses from Africa.  As Hirano 
describes, “Japan in fact had little interest in the region.  This accounts for the initial lack of interest 
in TICAD from the Japanese business community and media.”432  Furthermore, due to the country’s 
persistent economic recession and budgetary restrictions, the expansion of Japan’s ODA decreased 
after 1998 (around the time of TICAD II).  And as Hirano notes “the signs that Japan was losing the 
opportunity to lead in the international discourse on development were becoming evident by 
then.”433  
 
A former Japanese ambassador to Kenya however also points out that from the perspective of those 
developing Japan’s aid strategies “TICAD I was very genuine.  There was a concern about African 
ownership.”  But as the ambassador goes on to explain, the OECD DAC guidelines dictated Japan’s 
aid programme and there was no real implementation of TICAD’s good intentions.434  Moreover, 
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with the proposal to reform the UN Security Council running out of steam and little apparent 
support for the proposal from Africa countries – themselves divided on which countries should 
represent Africa in an enlarged Security Council – the TICAD process itself seemed to be losing 
support in Tokyo.   
 
Yet as described in Chapter Three, a significant change started to be seen in Africa around the turn 
of the century – the continent’s economy started to grow.  As Hirano explains, “the accelerated 
growth in the region was not attributable to endogenous factors, nothing particularly striking 
happened in the region to ignite economic growth.”435  Consequently the growth appeared to be 
driven by external factors, most notably a rise in the price of mineral resources and oil, this in turn 
attracted investors in Africa’s energy and resource sectors – most significantly China.  China’s 
aggressive pursuit of mineral resources and its influence on Japan’s policies in Africa was discussed 
in Chapter Three, but it is significant to note the changing environment in Africa at the time of TICAD 
III in 2003.  As the Figure below indicates, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) towards Africa started 
growing at the end of the 1990s and experienced rapid increases after 2004. And while this reality 
would shift the focus and approach of Japan’s Africa strategy at TICAD IV in 2008, TICAD III focused 
on peacebuilding and human-centred development.  As Professor Kataoka points out, “2003 was the 
first TICAD where the economic conditions in Africa has started to change, but the Japanese 
government was timid – taking a wait and see attitude.”436 
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Figure 17: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Africa (1990-2009)
437
 
 
 
Yet while TICAD III did not necessarily respond to the shifting economic conditions in Africa, the 
focus on peacebuilding saw JICA begin its engagement in southern Sudan.  Indeed JICA publications 
on the TICAD process highlight engagement in southern Sudan as a key outcome of Japan’s 
commitments and approaches at TICAD III.438  But in the years immediately after the third TICAD 
conference there was a growing criticism of the effectiveness of the TICAD initiatives to make a 
meaningful difference to development in Africa – or advance Japan’s own interests when 
considering the rapidly growing Chinese presence in Africa.  For example see Horiuchi439 and 
Morikawa,440 and as Cornelissen observes, “one major deficiency of the TICAD process is that its 
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rallying calls to promote ownership and partnership in Africa’s development had little impact on 
Japan’s longer term relationship with the continent.”441 
 
However as Professor Kataoka explains, “2008 was the turning point”442 where the focus of the 
TICAD initiative – and Japan’s African policy more broadly, evolved to encompass greater private 
sector engagement in Africa by bolstering trade and investment on the continent.  These changes 
were in fact recognition of the economic growth that had been taking place in Africa during the 
preceding decade, and China’s “model” of investment-led interaction on the continent.  In other 
words, the structural conditions were changing and Japanese policymakers were re-interpreting 
their country’s ability to exert influence and extract value from their development engagement in 
Africa.   As Hirano contends, the conditions were now in place for Japan to reassess the attitude that 
persistently identified Africa merely as a target for ODA, “and to look to the region more proactively 
as a repository of potential economic gains and therefore as lucrative for various types of 
investment.”443   
 
As a deputy director at METI who participated in TICAD IV describes, “at the time the first priority in 
Africa was diplomatic – particularly UN Security Council reform, and secondly compete with China on 
the UN Security Council issue.  But then Japanese companies started to see Africa as a business 
opportunity, we noticed this because China’s influence started growing in the region.”444  Thus as 
Watanabe describes, TICAD IV effectively signalled a shift in Japan’s approach to Africa as well as a 
ramping-up of activity or re-engagement following the withdrawal of Japanese businesses and 
                                                          
441
 Cornelissen, Scarlett, “TICAD’s directives for Southern Africa: promises and pitfalls”, Japanese Studies, Vol. 
32, No. 2, September 2012 
442
 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013 
443
 Hirano, Katsumi “TICAD and National Interest of Japan”, Japanese Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2012, pp. 183-199 
444 Author’s interview with deputy director, METI, Tokyo 16 October 2013 
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
152 
 
declining ODA since its peak in 1998.445  Cornelissen also points out that the ramifications of the 
changes evident at TICAD IV should be read against the broader changes in the Japanese aid setting 
and shifts in the country’s foreign policy interests.  “These include, from the perspective of Japan, a 
desire to balance dwindling aid resources and domestic and international pressures for greater aid 
accountability, with the need to deepen the country’s involvement in sectors – particularly resource-
based ones – deemed of strategic signiﬁcance.”446 
 
Moreover, TICAD IV in 2008 was notable for a marked increase in high-level political engagement 
alongside the discussions on investment and aid strategies.  As Professor Kataoka describes, for the 
first time Sudanese President Omar al Bashir was invited, “indicating an important turning point for 
Japan’s Sudan relationship.”447  Indeed only the year before had responsibility for Sudan been 
transferred from the MOFA Middle East Division to its Africa Division One, and with Japan now a 
major buyer of Sudanese oil and with a growing JICA presence in the country, Japan was entrenching 
bilateral relations between the two countries.  In addition, as previously noted, Japan committed 
significant funds towards supporting the implementation of the key milestones of the CPA.   
 
Thus while the trajectory of Japan’s engagement with Africa clearly shifted with TICAD IV in 2008, 
this was solidified and accentuated by TICAD V in 2013.  Prime Minister Abe stated in his opening 
address that “what Africa needs now is private sector investment” – and went on to commit US$ 32 
billion in ODA and US$ 16 billion in “other public and private resources.”448  As a deputy director 
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general at JICA explains, Abe’s statement underlined the sea-change in Japan’s engagement with 
Africa by underlining that “ODA is now intended to support the private sector, whereas before it was 
to address development issues like poverty reduction or achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals [MDGs].”449  
  
Indeed as Professor Kataoka reiterates, “2013 confirmed the trend that Africa is a business partner, 
with natural resources and a market – a continent in which we have to invest.”450  Moreover as a 
deputy director at MOFA describes, in 2013 there was a sense that “Japan’s economy was regaining 
self-confidence” and therefore trying to “re-open doors with Africa.”  As the MOFA representative 
continues to explain, the reason for the evolution of the TICAD initiative is multifaceted, but can be 
summarised as a request from African countries for trade and investment alongside aid – and the 
increasing appeal of Africa as a market and a location from which to build economic growth for 
Japan.451  Indeed the neoclassical realist framework of interpreting this evolution is reinforced by 
Hirano who recognises that Japan is facing a multifaceted crisis: 20 years of economic stagnation, an 
aging population, fierce pressure from the ever-expanding power of China, and the after-effects of 
the 2011 earthquake and tsunami.  Thus given the circumstances it is no surprise that the new TICAD 
initiatives “were designed with the crisis facing Japan in mind.  Understandably Japan’s new 
engagement with Africa should include a self-driven attempt to find a way out of its own impending 
problems.”452    
 
Consequently as a JICA representative summarises, “TICAD is a package: ODA, private investments 
and political agreements.”  But when asked whether Japan has identified priority countries in Africa 
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for ODA-led investment, the representative points out that the government would never admit to 
having priority countries – but the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party ]453 at a political level has been 
more forthright in recognising that “Africa is huge and some countries will bring benefit to Japan and 
some will not.”  So while the government’s official policy is that it has no priority countries, the “LDP 
has pushed the idea that the ODA budget is limited so we now need to prioritise which countries to 
operate in.”454  Indeed as a JETRO representative points out “Mozambique was the hidden main 
agenda at TICAD [V]” and establishing ties with the country remains Japan’s first priority in Africa.455  
As the representative continues to explain, Mozambique’s large reserves of coal and gas are hugely 
attractive and when combined with the potential of Uganda and Kenya to become oil producing 
states – it reaffirms Japan’s strategic emphasis on East Africa.   
 
As Professor Aoki points out, TICAD V also reflected the decision by the Japanese government to 
“promote cooperation between business and politics.”456  In this regard it is notable that bilateral 
agreements were developed or signed at TICAD V with Mozambique457 and Kenya.458  Moreover, the 
announcement that Toyota Tsusho would develop an alternative oil pipeline from South Sudan was 
made following a meeting with South Sudan’s President Kiir on the side-lines of TICAD V in 
Yokohama.459 In addition, Abe also held a brief summit meeting with Kiir who “expressed his 
profound gratitude to Japan for its support to the independence of South Sudan.”  Prime Minister 
Abe also referenced Japan’s ODA-funded infrastructure projects, the UNMISS peacekeeping 
                                                          
453
 The LDP was in power in Japan from 1955 to 2009 (with the exception of an 11-month period between 1993 
and 1994). In the 2012 election however it regained control of government, holding majorities in both houses 
of Japan’s bicameral National Diet 
454
 Author’s interview with deputy directorGeneral, JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013 
455
 Author’s interview with director, JETRO, London, 9 September 2013  
456
 Author’s interview with Professor Kazutoshi Aoki, Nihon University, Tokyo, 7 November 2013 
457
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-Mozambique Summit meeting”, 31 May 2013, accessed 27 May 2014, 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page1e_000015.html  
458
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting between Prime Minister Abe and Deputy President Ruto of the 
Republic of Kenya”, 2 June 2013, accessed 27 May 2014, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page3e_000044.html   
459
 Sudan Tribune, “South Sudan says Japan to construct alternative oil pipeline”, 2 June 2013, accessed 27 
May 2014,  http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46786  
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
155 
 
deployment and noted that he “expects Japanese companies to expand their business to South 
Sudan.” 460  
 
The TICAD process therefore is an important reflection of the evolution of Japan’s Africa strategy in 
the past twenty years and points to future policy priorities in Japan-Africa relations.  Moreover the 
evolution of the TICAD initiative reflects Japan’s response to changing global dynamics and the role 
of ODA as a method of engagement in pursuing the country’s strategic objectives.  In this regard 
Japan’s instrumental use of ODA is not a new phenomenon, but rather it reflects the particular 
challenges that Japan faces today, combined with the economic and diplomatic opportunities that 
strengthening ties with Africa offers.  As Professor Morikawa explains, “there is an element of 
‘scramble for Africa’ occurring now”, and Japan is attempting to regain its market in Africa.461  In this 
respect the expansion of TICAD since 2008 reflects a response by Japanese policymakers to the 
growing presence of new external players in Africa – which in turn is indicative of structural change 
and the rising political and economic influence of emerging powers.  In this regard Mawdsley and 
McCann,462 Stolte463 and Harte464 detail the growing presence in Africa of India, Brazil and Turkey 
respectively.  Yet as described in Chapter Three there is a further significant element to consider 
when assessing Japan’s ODA strategy over the past twenty years: namely the rise of China and its 
growing influence in Africa.  As a JICA representative observes about Japan’s emerging investment-
centred approach to Africa, the “win-win notion came from China – they never had a distinction 
between ODA and investment.”465  And in this regard, Japan’s relations with, and perceptions of, 
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China are factors in understanding Japanese ODA strategy both in South Sudan and more broadly 
across Africa.   
  
4.3.1 FOCAC and the “China Factor”  
 
The role of China in the development of Japan’s presence in South Sudan is a theme that emerges 
throughout this study, and this section will address the “China factor” in the particular context of 
Japan’s ODA policies in Africa.  Because as Hirano explains, “China’s initiatives and development are 
always matters of top priority to the Japanese public, its expanding interests in Africa attracted 
much media coverage in the period leading to TICAD IV.”466  In this regard, the increased discussion 
around China’s presence and approach in Africa coincided with Japan’s own shift in approach to ODA 
engagement that began around 2008.  Consequently, China’s influence on the method and manner 
of Japan’s aid engagement in South Sudan is worth considering.   
 
As outlined above, Japan is currently engaged in developing key infrastructure projects in South 
Sudan – including roads, a river port, and a strategically and symbolically important new bridge over 
the Nile.  In this way, Japan’s bilateral ODA engagement in the country is not unlike its activities in 
Africa in the 1970s where infrastructure construction was undertaken by Japanese companies in 
resource-rich countries deemed strategically valuable.  In this context the evolution of Japan’s ODA 
approach since TICAD IV in 2008 is not only a response to structural economic imperatives and the 
success of China in recent years, but a return to ODA methodology that Japan had relied on in the 
past.  As King points out, “China’s intensely bilateral engagement with 48 of Africa’s 53467 countries 
today is reminiscent of an earlier era in the cooperation activities of many donors, including 
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Japan.”468 In addition however Japan’s ODA strategy today is built around the concept of 
differentiation and identifying a formula for Japan’s development assistance that charts its own path 
distinct from that of China and the major Western donors.    
 
China’s economic presence and political influence in Africa is extensive, and Beijing strongly 
promotes the discourse that it is itself a developing country, and that as a result, its relations in 
Africa reflect a partnership of two-way cooperation.  Thus in pursuing greater trade and investment 
on the continent, China has largely avoided the language of “donor” and “aid-recipient” that 
characterises the DAC aid discourse.  And the political and diplomatic mechanism that has come to 
underpin Beijing’s relations with Africa is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).  The 
conference has been held every three years since 2000 and as Professor Kataoka argues, “is an 
imitation of TICAD.”  Albeit with some significant differences: UN agencies, the AU and World Bank 
all participate in TICAD meetings, whereas as the professor explains “FOCAC is a restricted meeting – 
a pledging conference.”469  But the FOCAC process aside, it is the extent and the success of China’s 
economic and diplomatic interactions on the continent that are focusing the attention of 
policymakers in Tokyo.   
 
China’s extensive presence in Africa emerged largely during the period of Japan’s economic 
“withdrawal” from the continent.  As a result during this time Japan’s primary method of 
engagement was through JICA – and the DAC norms of donor-led engagement. Thus the largely 
Western discourse on Africa with its focus on capacity development, poverty reduction and the need 
for good governance contrasted with the China’s self-proclaimed “win-win” approach to Africa 
which focused on bilateral economic cooperation and trade.   Japan is the only substantial non-
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Western member of the OECD DAC, and as King describes, has been obliged over several decades – 
somewhat reluctantly – to come into line with what the West deemed an appropriate approach to 
the development of Africa.470 Consequently as King continues to explain, Japan faced the dilemma: 
“join the chorus of DAC donors criticising China for undermining the West’s carefully constructed 
agenda for the development of Africa.”471 Or pursue its own preferences and articulate a model that 
in effect tries to balance between the two.     
 
In this regard Professor Hughes explains that Japan’s interests in Africa are largely driven by market 
forces, and that as a result TICAD has come to offer a particular model for Africa’s development.  A 
model that “highlights quality infrastructure – as opposed to China’s, with the developmental 
aspirations that incorporate concepts such as good governance.”472  As the professor continues to 
point out, Japan’s development model therefore increasingly accentuates its unique characteristics 
when compared to the OECD DAC or Chinese approaches to development engagement in Africa.  
Professor Kataoka reiterates this view by noting that Japan’s strategy is to “defend and differentiate 
our policy – by focusing on the good values.”473  A strategy which appears to be working in South 
Sudan – as an SPLM representative explains, the widely-held perception of China is that “they are 
just here to make money, while Japan is here for our development.”474 
 
Thus Japan’s ODA policies in Africa, as well as the TICAD initiative have evolved to reflect changes in 
the global environment – including the rise of China – as well as the economic imperatives driving 
Japan’s businesses into African markets. As a result Japan is trying to establish a development 
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approach in Africa that balances ODA solely for its own reward, with the DAC best practices that 
have guided Japan’s ODA policies for the past twenty years.   
 
4.4 Differentiation and the Politics of Identity  
 
It is becoming apparent that a central element within Japan’s ODA strategy in Africa is a policy of 
differentiation and focusing on Japan’s particular competitive advantages as an aid and investment 
partner. And while part of this process is aimed at creating a unique identity for Japanese 
engagement outside of the DAC framework, it is also apparent that this approach is framed in 
comparison to China.  This is occurring for two separate reasons: on the one hand a realisation 
within Japan that China’s approach to investment in Africa is largely supported by African 
governments – and is seen by them to be less prescriptive and patronising than the DAC aid model.  
For example Ampiah contrasts Japan’s donor-recipient African engagement with China’s and 
concludes that it provided “much needed momentum” in terms of emphasis on trade and 
investment.475  While on the other hand, Japan recognises that the “Chinese model” is often 
criticised for enabling corrupt or authoritarian regimes, or for supporting poor labour and 
environmental practices – for example, Tull concludes that the economic consequences of increased 
Chinese involvement in Africa are “mixed at best, while the political consequences are bound to 
prove deleterious.”476  Consequently as a MOFA official puts it, “while we have something that we 
can learn from China, we must also improve our strong points and deliver them to Africa.”477   
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This is especially true of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan.  While Japanese contractors working in 
Juba emphasised the need to highlight the quality of Japanese infrastructure as compared to that of 
China,478 at a political level the incentive to strengthen ties in South Sudan is that much greater given 
China’s complicated relations with Juba. Japan’s support for the CPA implementation and JICA 
engagement in southern Sudan before independence is appreciated in Juba.  Indeed as an SPLM 
official points out, the feeling in South Sudan is that “when the oil is finished, China will go – but 
Japan will be here much longer.”479  Thus in pursuing extensive ODA projects such as the Nile bridge 
and road building alongside important strategic investments such as the pipeline bid, Japan is well-
placed to emphasise the particular values underpinning its engagement in South Sudan. Though 
promoting Japan’s particular “brand” of infrastructure development and investment over China’s is 
easier in South Sudan where as a SPLM official points out – apart from the oil industry, “China has no 
major investments in South Sudan, and is now scrambling.”480  
 
It should be noted however that during the 1990s in particular there were considerable areas of 
convergence between Japanese and Chinese engagement with Africa.  As Cornelissen and Taylor 
explain, both countries sought to “further the integration of Africa into the global economy under a 
particular framework relating to the organisation of domestic production.”481 While Raposo482 
outlines a number of similarities between Japan and China’s aid policies in Africa, including their 
preference for “self-help” approaches, emphasising loans over grants – in particular infrastructure 
loans – and support for African-led initiatives such as the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD).   In this context Japan’s emerging differentiation strategy for the country’s aid policies can 
be understood as an evolving element within the country’s international identity.   
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Japan’s ODA strategy can therefore be understood to reflect Neumann’s critique of the 
constructivist view of norms and culture as being a “property” of identity, but rather a relational 
concept.483  Japan is thus restructuring its aid priorities in direct comparison to those of the Western 
donors and, perhaps most notably, China.  As explained in Chapter Three, China’s actions in Africa 
matter to Japanese policymakers because it is China, while the neoclassical realist framework 
underpinning this research further emphasises the importance of policymakers’ perceptions of 
relative power and influence at the systemic level.   In this respect the complexities of Sino-Japanese 
relations are also manifesting in Japan’s ODA policies and reflect Jervis’ assessment that perceptions 
influence decision-makers – and ultimately foreign policy outcomes.484  Thus without engaging too 
deeply with the literature on identity, this study will limit its understanding of Japan’s “ODA identity” 
as being specific to its relationships with China and the Western donors, and is correspondingly 
defined by those interactions.  Additionally as Hagström explains, the discursive process of 
differentiation between Japan and China or the US is different now compared to the process in the 
1990s and reflects the changing nature of Japan’s foreign policy approaches. Hagström further 
argues that despite Katzenstein485 and Berger’s486 view that Japan’s identity is biased towards 
stability and hence foreign policy continuity, evidence suggests that Japan is demonstrating a 
“distinctly more assertive and proactive foreign policy.”487  Indeed as Berenskoetter explains, 
“identity formation is an active/on-going process” and identities are therefore contingent 
constructs.488  Consequently, Japan’s emerging identity as an international donor in comparison to 
China and the DAC countries reflects a more self-assured foreign policy.   A view reiterated by 
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Lehman who points out that by carving out a unique developmental niche “Japan also hopes to 
highlight its global strategic position by exerting greater influence in Africa and other developing 
regions.”489 
  
Japan’s more visible foreign policy therefore mirrors the Abe administration’s promotion of a 
“revitalised Japan.”  Indeed the “Japan is back”490 discourse combines economic revitalisation 
policies with those that directly challenge key aspects of Japan’s international identity such as state-
pacifism.  And while these dynamics are explored in more detail in Chapter Six it is worth considering 
Rozman’s view that Abe is “unabashed in his commitment to transform [Japan’s] national 
identity”491 and consequently the differentiation of Japan’s approach to ODA in Africa is a less-
debated component within a much broader dynamic within Japan’s foreign policy agenda.    
 
In this respect Japan’s emerging “aid identity” in Africa reflects Duara’s argument that national 
identity formation is inseparable from the interplay of actors’ other political identities and 
agendas,492 and reinforces Jepperson and Wendt’s view that identity functions as a “crucial link 
between environmental structures and interests.”493  Therefore when considering the neoclassical 
realist framework underpinning this study, the role of Japan’s emerging “ODA identity” will be 
considered among the intervening considerations driving Japan’s aid policy in Africa, and influencing 
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the growing sentiment among Japanese policymakers that ODA must be used more strategically to 
advance Japan’s interests.      
 
4.5 Strategic ODA in a Changing Global Environment  
 
This study seeks to demonstrate that Japan’s policies of renewed interest and attention towards 
Africa in the years since 2008 are in response to changes in the international system – changes which 
are in turn understood in the context of Japan’s domestic perceptions and objectives.  In this regard, 
the deployment and use of ODA is one of the three primary tactics or methods of engagement used 
in pursuing Japan’s interests in Africa – and this section will explore the role of aid as a strategic tool 
in Japanese official engagement with Africa.     
 
As Kitchen explains, the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this study allows aid to be 
viewed as a normative suggestion translated into policy, this is because it can be considered by a 
state’s policymakers as “the right thing to do.”494  In expanding this interpretation Kitchen maintains 
that ideas and interests are viewed as conceptually distinct phenomena, and in this regard 
development aid can be understood as an “intentional idea” that seeks to establish the goals of 
foreign policy.  Ideas thus understood articulate in the realm of foreign policy what the nation 
should seek to do, such as advance human rights or fight poverty.  This perspective of international 
development aid is advocated by Lumsdaine who argues that “foreign aid cannot be accounted for 
on the basis of the economic and political interests of the donor countries alone”495 but rather in the 
humanitarian and egalitarian principles of donor countries.  And while this chapter has 
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demonstrated that Japan’s ODA policies do contain elements of normative ethical approaches, and 
that JICA is staffed by dedicated development professionals,496 it is also apparent that Japanese aid 
to Africa is aligned with the country’s political and economic objectives.      
 
This view is supported by a number of studies.  For example Gounder,497  Schraeder, Hook and 
Taylor,498 Maizels and Nissanke,499 and Alesina and Dollar who find “considerable evidence that the 
pattern of aid giving is dictated by political and strategic considerations.”500  Thus despite some 
discrepancy around how to measure “strategic interests” and the variations between the “strategic 
objectives” of donor countries – as well as the need to recognise the particular dynamics of Cold War 
aid flows, there is an extensive literature essentially supporting the view that donors target their aid 
in a largely self-benefiting manner.  In this respect, this study’s primary contention related to Japan’s 
ODA expenditure in Africa is that while Japan’s development aid continues to provide genuine 
assistance to countries and communities in need, the emerging trend towards the “strategic” use of 
ODA is rather a reflection on where the aid is spent.  As Professor Fukushima explains, “from the 
ODA side not much is changing in terms of how they’re working, but because of budget decline there 
is a greater strategic focus.”  But as the professor also points out, the Japanese government needs to 
be accountable to the electorate as to how they spend ODA funds, and consequently they are 
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referring more frequently to “strategic ODA.”  In this sense it is not always clear how best “to 
integrate everything to maximise Japan’s interests.”501      
 
Moreover,  beyond the more general objectives that ODA serves in pursuing Japan’s national 
interests, there are also specific instances of ODA that quite clearly advance Japan’s political and 
economic objectives in Africa.  As explored in Chapter Six, Japan’s anti-piracy operations in the Horn 
of Africa are of considerable strategic value in advancing its presence in international multilateral 
security operations, as well as pushing the boundaries of its security legislation.  It is therefore not 
surprising to note that Japan’s grant assistance to Djibouti increased from US$ 2.24 million in 2008 
to US$ 34.42 million in 2010.502 Indeed as Japan’s ODA White Paper 2012 states:  
Maritime assistance for developing countries through ODA has thus far been 
conducted in various countries.  However in recent years, ODA has been used more 
strategically from the viewpoint of ensuring the safety of Sea Lanes of 
Communication linking directly to Japan’s national interest.  This is conducted in the 
form of countermeasures against terrorism and piracy.503 
 
In this regard ODA support for anti-piracy measures in East Africa eventually led to the 
establishment of a permanent MSDF facility in Djibouti in 2011.  As Styan notes in a Chatham House 
report on Djibouti, the MSDF facility has led to an “expansion of Japan’s civilian aid programme in 
Djibouti, which has also become a hub for wider development activities in the Horn by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency.”504  
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Another factor to consider when assessing the strategic nature of Japan’s ODA engagement in Africa 
is Japan’s perennial ambitions to reform the UN Security Council.  While previously mentioned as a 
key factor defining Japan’s engagement in Africa at the time of TICAD I, it is important to consider 
that UN Security Council reform remains an important objective of Japan’s foreign policy.  As Prime 
Minister Abe confirmed when addressing the UN General Assembly in 2013, “the Security Council 
must be reformed without delay.  Japan’s aspiration to become a permanent member of the Council 
has not changed in the slightest.”505  As Davies explains, seeking support for a seat on a reformed 
Security Council will still require African backing.  Thus much “in the same manner which China 
courted Africa to secure its UN Security Council seat, Japan’s efforts are not too dissimilar, although 
far less obvious to the African observer.”506  Thus as Professor Morikawa observes, Japan’s approach 
to Africa has actually remained largely unchanged in that Tokyo has followed a policy of “select and 
concentrate” when engaging in ODA-led diplomacy on the continent.  The professor believes that 
“right from the beginning ODA was a tool for national interest, and remains an effective tool to 
materialise our national interest.”507 
 
Yet beyond the political dynamics of Japan’s ODA engagement in Africa, there is also an economic 
dimension to the strategic targeting of specific regions and countries for Japanese donor aid.  As already 
outlined, Japan’s economic and strategic focus in Africa – apart from the long established ties with South 
Africa – can be envisaged as an arc extending from Djibouti to Mozambique.  These two countries 
therefore are critical sites along the frontier of Japan’s engagement in Africa.  As Chapter Six will 
examine, Djibouti is an important location from which Japan is expanding its international security 
engagement, while Mozambique is emerging as a key focus of Japan’s energy security strategy after 
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Mitsui purchased an equity stake in the country’s promising gas field.  Again it is worth noting that 
Japan’s total ODA disbursements to Mozambique increased from US$ 23.72 million in 2008 to US$ 70.30 
million in 2012508 – emphasising the role that ODA plays in building and cementing Japanese 
engagement on the continent. 
   
Furthermore, the political and economic drivers underpinning the targeting of aid to particular countries 
in Africa can be understood in terms of what Hook and Zhang have referred to as the “METI discourse” 
and the “MOFA discourse” in the implementation of Japan’s ODA policies.  Hook and Zhang argue that 
the “METI discourse” essentially advocates the use of aid to support Japan’s own economic interests 
while the MOFA discourse advocates using aid in support of Japan’s international diplomacy.509  Yet as 
discussed in Chapter Three, both economic imperatives and perceptions of Japan’s relative lack of 
international power are sustaining Japanese re-engagement in Africa.  Thus when considering Japan’s 
ODA engagement in Africa today, it is apparent that there are elements of both political and economic 
considerations driving Japan’s growing presence on the continent.  Indeed as Hirano summarises, 
Japan’s aid “policy towards Africa is now going to be formulated on the basis of Japan’s national 
interest.”510 
 
In this respect it is apparent that ODA will remain an important tactic in Japan’s broader strategic 
engagement in Africa.  And while ODA-led diplomacy is not new, it is currently being harnessed in a new 
direction by Japanese policymakers to reflect systemic challenges and the economic opportunities of re-
engagement in Africa.  Since TICAD IV in 2008, the total amount of ODA to Africa has increased, and it 
has largely been refocused to support opportunities for Japanese trade and investment on the content.  
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But in addition to providing much-needed infrastructure and skills, Japan’s ODA is also being deployed to 
establish and shore-up diplomatic relations, and to open avenues for strategic resource-based 
investments.  Against this backdrop therefore, South Sudan remains an important element of Japan’s 
engagement in Africa.  As the following chapters will illustrate, Japan’s presence in South Sudan 
combines political, economic, and security dimensions – all of which  are underpinned by significant ODA 
projects.   
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
In many respects ODA has been the most visible and effective element of Japan’s foreign policy in 
the post-war era.  The “International Cooperation Initiative” launched by former Prime Minister 
Noboru Takeshita (1987-1989) in 1988511 effectively made ODA a central component of Japan’s 
foreign policy – leading  Yasutomo to argue that Japan was thus an “aid great power.”512  Thus while 
Japan’s constitution limited the development of the military and its participation in multilateral 
international security operations, ODA and financial support for international organisations became 
the most prominent facet of Japan’s international engagement.  Yet as Yasutomo further observed, 
Japan’s aid policy consequently became more complex as it “merged with the overall objectives of 
Japan’s foreign policy”513, and has thus evolved to meet shifting priorities of Japan’s foreign policy 
following the end of the Cold War and the bursting of the asset price “bubble.”  This chapter has 
therefore sought to understand the role of ODA projects in South Sudan in terms of Japan’s broader 
Africa policies – and the factors influencing those policies.   
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Japan’s ODA support for South Sudan is a critical component within a broader engagement that 
includes resource-based investments and the deployment of peacekeepers.  However it is ODA that 
ties together the various elements of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and it remains the 
primary means of Japanese interaction across the region.  Moreover, Japan’s ODA projects in South 
Sudan reflect the country’s position on the frontier of Japan’s Africa strategy, and the East African 
region.  Fragile and high-risk, South Sudan also offers the potential of integration into the East 
African Community, and as the following chapter will discuss, as a significant supplier of energy 
resources.   
 
Yet as this chapter has also explored, Japan’s aid relationship with Africa is evolving and reflects 
changes at the systemic level and an emerging discourse in Japan around the role of ODA within 
Japan’s foreign policy framework.  Consequently, Japan’s role as a donor country is changing both in 
response to international structural pressures, and domestic debates around how the country 
should balance budget constraints with economic advantage.514  In differentiating itself from China 
and the Western donor countries operating in Africa, Japan’s ODA approach therefore reflects not 
only a refocused aid relationship with the continent, but also its broader ambition of developing a 
more prominent and distinguishable international presence.      
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5. Resource Focused Investment   
 
 As outlined in the previous chapter, Japan’s engagement in Africa since 2008 is characterised by an 
increasing focus on investment and linking ODA priorities with investment opportunities.  This 
chapter will therefore address the investment-component of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, 
and in particular explore the wider context against which the proposed oil pipeline development 
discussed here must be understood.  Namely, Japan’s broader resource strategy in Africa and how 
this intersects with the domestic imperative of energy security515 which remains a fundamental 
aspect of Japanese foreign policy.  In this regard, this chapter combines two of the strategic 
objectives identified in Chapter Three – economic revitalisation through overseas investment and 
ensuring energy security – both of which are encapsulated in the case study of Toyota Tsusho’s 
proposed pipeline in South Sudan.  
 
Moreover, the proposed pipeline is emblematic of a bolder Japanese investment strategy: one which 
is willing to take on greater risks, and as such reflects the evolution of the Japanese perspective of 
the international environment, as well as the ever-present consideration of energy security.  This 
chapter will therefore explore concepts of opportunity and risk, and consider how the pipeline 
expands both the physical frontier of Japan’s engagement in Africa as well as the boundary of its 
established methods and attitudes.  The proposed development of a new oil pipeline by Sogo Sosha 
Toyota Tsusho from South Sudan to the Kenyan port of Lamu516 (or the less likely route to Djibouti 
through Ethiopia) has the potential to radically alter the political and economic dynamics in the 
region – consequently placing Japan’s foreign policy in Africa in sharp focus.  
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As this chapter will explore, the prospect of securing an alternative means to export oil remains a 
central objective of South Sudan’s strategic planning as it would break the dependence on the 
current oil export route through Sudan.  Thus, the realisation of a new oil pipeline would impact 
Sudan, major investors in the existing pipeline such as China, and potential regional partners such as 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. In this regard the project has a major political dimension that 
overshadows the business and logistical considerations of merely building an oil pipeline.  As such 
the pipeline represents an important dimension of Japan’s new approach and objectives in the 
region – and is understood by this study as both a test-case for Japan’s evolving approach to energy 
investment and a physical manifestation of the outer edge of Japan’s arc of engagement in East 
Africa.  
 
It should also be noted at the outset that the proposed pipeline is currently far from realisation, at 
the end of the research period it lacked financing, and there were innumerable political obstacles 
still to be surmounted.  Yet it is important and worthy of analysis.  As this chapter will explore, 
despite South Sudan’s relatively small oil reserves (by global standards) the pipeline holds immense 
economic potential and political ramifications for South Sudan and the region.  Furthermore, the 
potential involvement of a Japanese company – and accompanying Japanese diplomatic support, in 
such a complicated and politically sensitive project is a significant example of the evolution of 
Japan’s engagement in Africa.  The proposed pipeline is therefore particularly noteworthy in that it 
combines two important dimensions of Japan’s emerging presence in Africa: energy security and 
increased investment, resulting in the private sector-led pursuit of Hinomaru Oil.  This high-risk 
project also aligns Japan’s strategic objectives in the region with those of South Sudan, and 
accordingly has far-reaching consequences for the political and economic outlook of the region.   
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In bridging new frontiers the proposed pipeline demonstrates a shift in Japan’s policy approach to 
ensuring energy security, which as Rose explains, reflects perceived shifts in the distribution of 
power at the structural level.517  Thus in line with the neoclassical realist approach framing this 
research, this chapter will build on the structural context of Japan’s energy security outlined in 
Chapter Three through specific analysis of Japan’s involvement in the complicated oil politics of 
South Sudan.  As such, this chapter will begin by examining Japan’s energy policy responses to 
shifting structural conditions in world energy markets.  It will then outline the context of South 
Sudan’s oil industry and the importance of the proposed pipeline to its strategic considerations. The 
chapter will then explore the multiple layers of risk and opportunity that the project holds for Japan 
as well as the domestic dynamics that define its policy responses.   
       
5.1 Energy Security and Japan’s Search for Hinomaru Oil 
 
Japan’s energy policy in East Africa is an element within the country’s broader re-engagement in 
Africa – comprising a re-oriented approach to targeted ODA-led investments, accessing the 
continents growing markets, and as a site to expand the margins of its international security 
commitments.  Yet access to natural resources is integral to Japan’s economic model, and as such 
ensuring the security of energy supply is a critical concern for Japanese policy makers.  As outlined in 
Chapter Three, resource and energy security remains a key structural driver of Japan’s foreign policy, 
as the country ranks second-last among the 34 countries of the OECD in energy self-sufficiency.518  In 
addition, energy security is a contentious domestic issue as it involves debates around the country’s 
reliance on nuclear power and the national ownership of energy resources.  This section will 
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therefore explore this imperative in the context of recent changes in Japanese resource strategy in 
Africa since 2008.   
 
Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS) notes that the stable supply of energy is essential to a 
vibrant Japanese economy “and thus constitutes a challenge to national security.”  While METI’s 
Strategic Energy Plan (2014) also recognises that “it would be difficult for the country to secure 
[energy] resources autonomously if an energy supply problem should occur abroad.”519  In further  
recognising the emerging challenge of resource nationalism, and growing demand, especially in 
emerging economies, for energy (and mineral resources), the NSS goes on to note that “Japan will 
actively utilise diplomatic tools” to ensure access to these resources.520 Japan’s NSS therefore 
recognises the systemic or structural factors outlined in Chapter Three that are once again pushing 
energy security to the forefront of Japan’s policy priorities. These factors, combined with Japan’s 
post-Fukushima energy environment is also driving policymakers to reconsider the country’s reliance 
on energy markets and encourage the exploration and development of oil resources by Japanese 
companies – known as Hinomaru Oil.   
 
In addition, Japan’s National Energy Strategy includes provision to further expand the ratio of 
Hinomaru Oil within Japan’s energy mix to around 40 per cent by 2030.521  As a deputy director at 
METI explains, the change of policies towards the national ownership of oil in Japan started in 2008 
when the oil price increased to US$ 145 a barrel – “before that even METI people said we don’t need 
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concessions, we can just buy commodities on the market.”522  It is also worth noting that the oil price 
peak in 2008 coincided with TICAD IV, which as described in the previous chapter, signalled the 
beginning of Japan’s refocused engagement with Africa by encouraging private-sector investment 
alongside increased ODA commitments.   Moreover as the METI representative continues to point 
out, the second turning point was the earthquake and tsunami in 2011.  Before that, Japan’s energy 
policy was focused on diversifying the sources of supply, and to reduce dependency on the Middle 
East.  But following the nuclear shutdown, Japan’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil and gas is even 
greater – giving renewed emphasis and urgency to the policy of securing energy concessions in new 
locations outside the Middle East.    
 
The example of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan thus demonstrates that while energy and 
resource security have dominated Japanese strategic outlook for many years, the tactical approach 
to securing these resources is changing – and is in turn changing the nature of Japan’s engagement 
with Africa.  Japan’s energy policies however are particularly significant elements within the 
country’s broader policy discourse.  As Katzenstein and Okawara point out, Japan’s near complete 
dependence on imported energy sources is a defining element in the norms that make up Japan’s 
perception of national security – in particular, Japan’s energy vulnerability.  In this regard they argue 
that Japan’s energy imperatives effectively creates a policy consensus that “facilitates flexibility” in 
developing policy responses to securing economic or energy objectives.523  Yet while Katzenstein and 
Okawara’s constructivist analysis maintains that “international structures do not determine Japan’s 
foreign policy choices”524, this chapter will demonstrate that changing global realities are changing 
Japan’s energy policies.  Yet in line with a neoclassical realist framework of analysis, shifting 
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structural conditions are still framed by the country’s longstanding domestic perceptions of energy 
vulnerability and the importance of energy security within the country’s foreign policy priorities.      
 
 As demonstrated in Chapter Three, Japanese perceptions of shifts in global energy conditions have 
brought the imperative of energy security once more to the forefront of the country’s policy 
framework.  Indeed the view that Japan’s energy and resource policy is changing to reflect global 
dynamics is reiterated by a manager at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) who notes 
that “things have changed”, oil markets are changing and emerging countries like China, India and 
South Korea are aggressively seeking equity resources.525  In response, “the Japanese government is 
more willing to provide support and push private Japanese companies abroad to acquire equity.”526 
Consequently, as he further explains, the role of Africa in Japan’s energy security strategy is 
becoming increasingly important, because with undeveloped hydrocarbon resources – “it is a natural 
area for Japan’s attention.”527  Thus while the concept of energy security has largely remained 
central to Japanese policy making, it is now evolving to include the exploration of opportunities in 
Africa – and with South Sudan at the frontier of its long term ambitions that are increasingly focused  
on equity investments.   
 
Indeed, the tactics of ensuring resource security that are emerging in Japanese policies today reflect 
changing approaches to an ever-present perception of risk.  As the chief senior researcher at JETRO 
observes, “Japan needs to think about natural resource security, and we must acquire our own 
shares in world resource markets.”  This view is reflected in Japan’s renewed engagement in Africa 
and particularly in Toyota Tsusho’s pipeline bid in South Sudan.  As the JETRO official continues, 
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“Japan must become a partner and stakeholder in the global resource business.”528 As such the 
growing significance of Africa in Japan’s energy resource strategy is reiterated by a representative of 
Toyota Tsusho who notes that “collaboration with the Japanese government is essential, and 
without doing some resource business we don’t have a chance to talk to METI.”529  He goes on to 
point out that in this sense the resource business itself is very important as a “purchase right” for oil 
is included in the proposed pipeline agreement and thus building and operating the pipeline is 
merely a means to an end.530  Thus despite always being understood as a paragon of pragmatism 
when it comes to economic matters, in recent years the pursuit of equity energy concessions and 
Hinomaru Oil have defined Japan’s long term energy strategy.  As a METI official from the Petroleum 
and Natural Gas Division observes about Japan’s energy strategy in Africa, “my division and the 
Japanese government are only interested in upstream concessions – equity shares.  This is 
government policy, this is Hinomaru Oil.”531  
 
Consequently, in realising this objective the role of the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National 
Corporation (JOGMEC) was reviewed by the Japanese government.  As the IEEJ chief economist 
explains, particular attention was paid to the influence of National Oil Companies (NOCs) – especially 
the big resource holders in producing countries such as Saudi Aramco, and Gazprom in Russia, as 
well as the NOCs from consumer countries such as China’s CNPC, Sinopec532 and CNOOC.533  Thus as 
the IEEJ chief economist continues, it was becoming apparent that these NOCs were getting involved 
in the global oil market to ensure security of supply for their countries, “so the government felt 
                                                          
528
 Author’s interview with chief senior researcher JETRO, Tokyo, 27 September 2013 
529
 Authors interview with representative of Toyota Tsusho, Tokyo 23 October 2013 
530
 Ibid 
531
 Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo, 16 October 2013 
532
 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation or Sinopec Limited is the world's fifth biggest company by 
revenue.  Sinopec's business includes oil and gas exploration, refining, and marketing; production and sales 
of petrochemicals, and other chemical products; storage and pipeline transportation of crude oil and natural 
gas; import, export of crude oil and natural gas 
533
 China National Offshore Oil Corporation or CNOOC Group is the third-largest national oil company in 
the People's Republic of China, after CNPC and China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation.  The CNOOC Group 
focuses on the exploitation, exploration and development of crude oil and natural gas in offshore China. 
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
177 
 
there was a need to enhance the support to JOGMEC.”534  Resultantly, the Japanese government 
took on a greater role in protecting oil and resource security through upstream development 
assistance, while continuing to pursue the ever-present goal of diversification of supply for energy 
resources.     
 
Recognising that the emerging trend towards national ownership of energy resources is being driven 
by Asian countries, MOFA acknowledges that Japan’s economy is structured in such a way that the 
government can play certain roles – but that essentially private companies are driven by the market.  
As such, Japan’s search for equity energy resources while being “a bit half-hearted” is growing and it 
is significant to note that the budget and portfolio of JOGMEC increases every year.535  Indeed, Japan 
has not followed the other OECD countries in recent years by privatising NOCs.  Andrews-Speed 
comments that “a resurgence of fears over security of supply in Japan triggered the creation of 
JOGMEC and the founding of a new international company, INPEX” (19 per cent owned by METI), 
and the continuation of JAPEX (34 per cent owned by the government).  By 2010, INPEX alone had 71 
projects in 26 countries.536  As the chief senior researcher at JETRO confirms, “JOGMEC is now a very 
important agency” which works closely with JETRO in determining which countries offer the best 
investment opportunities for Japanese businesses.537  
 
The role of JOGMEC in stimulating Japanese energy investments forms a central component of the 
policy debate in Japan around the real value of equity oil in ensuring Japanese energy security and 
economic wellbeing.  And while the chief economist at IEEJ recognises that government interest in 
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the concept of Hinomaru Oil has fluctuated over the years, current market conditions are propelling 
greater government involvement in ensuring energy security. As he continues to point out, when 
world oil prices reached record highs in 2008, the key question facing policy makers in Tokyo was: 
“what caused this? And is it a structural thing?”538  Despite the record oil price being followed shortly 
thereafter by the collapse of Lehman Brothers and a global recession that led to a significant 
decrease in global demand for oil, the structural dynamics underpinning high oil prices were clear.  
As described in Chapter Three, the analysis pointed to changes in the market driven by strong 
demand from China, India, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, and 
instability in the Middle East.  Consequently, unlike the oil crisis of 1973 which was the result of a 
political decision by Arab members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to 
cut production, in 2008 systemic factors were clearly responsible for the high oil prices.  Thus the 
increasing presence of Japanese energy interests in Africa from 2008 can be seen to reflect a policy 
response to shifting systemic conditions – and the proposed pipeline in South Sudan as the most 
complex and risky project to date.     
 
5.2 The Context: Sudan and South Sudan’s Oil Industry  
 
The secession of South Sudan radically altered the political dynamics of oil extraction and access in 
the region, yet until an alternative oil export route is developed, the logistics of oil exploitation 
continues to tie the two countries together.  Most of Sudan's and South Sudan's proved reserves of 
crude oil and natural gas are located in the Muglad and Melut basins, which extend into both 
countries – yet approximately 75 per cent539 of the oil reserves are believed to lie within the territory 
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of South Sudan and effectively changed ownership with the secession.  Given that Sudan’s oil 
industry was largely developed during the civil war, oil exploration was for the most part limited to 
the south-central regions of the then unified Sudan.  Moreover as will be discussed later, significant 
fields such as Block B were surveyed but exploration never took place.  As depicted on the Figure 
below, the Muglad Basin includes Blocks 1, 2, 4 and 5A, while the Melut Basin comprises Blocks 3 
and 7.  Currently, oil produced from Blocks 2 and 4 is counted as Sudan's production, while oil from 
Blocks 1, 3, 5A, and 7 belongs to South Sudan.540  
 
Figure 18: Oil blocks in South Sudan
541
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As depicted in the map below, Sudan currently has two export pipelines extending northwards to a 
Marine Terminal south of Port Sudan on the Red Sea.  The Unity State field’s pipeline is operated by 
the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), and Petrodar operates the pipeline from 
the oil fields of Upper Nile State.   
 
Figure 19: Current and proposed oil pipelines in Sudan and South Sudan
542
 
 
 
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the majority shareholder in both companies (40 
and 41 per cent respectively), along with Malaysia’s Petronas, and India's Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation Videsh Ltd (OVL).   In addition to the large Asian national oil companies, the Sudan 
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National Petroleum Corporation (Sudapet) and its counterpart in South Sudan, the Nile Petroleum 
Corporation (Nilepet) are also minority shareholders in the operating companies.543  The Petrodar 
pipeline transports the Dar Blend, a heavy, sweet crude544 from Blocks 3 and 7 in South Sudan’s 
Upper Nile state.  The pipeline stretches 850 miles and includes several heating units along its length 
because of the waxy, acidic nature of the crude.  Dar Blend is also heavily discounted due to its 
highly acidic content – though it can be used for fuel oil blending, and is purchased by both China 
and Japan.  The other existing pipeline is operated by GNPOC and transports Nile Blend crude, a low-
sulphur waxy crude oil, 1,000 miles from the Heglig processing facilities to the Bashayer Marine 
Terminal at Port Sudan.  The Nile Blend is sourced from Blocks 2 (Heglig and Bamboo fields) and 4 
(Diffra and Neem fields) in Sudan and Blocks 1 (Unity field) and 5A (Mala and Thar Jath fields) in 
South Sudan.545  
 
Given that oil is believed to account for 98546 per cent of South Sudan’s government revenue, it will 
remain for the time being the fulcrum around which any economic growth and development will 
emerge – as well as by far the most important strategic consideration for South Sudan’s 
policymakers.  Yet as this chapter will explore, South Sudan’s oil also holds opportunities for Japan to 
consolidate its ODA contributions with a major private sector investment that links Japan’s energy 
security objectives with South Sudan’s primary strategic ambition of breaking free from Sudan’s oil 
export infrastructure.    
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5.2.1 South Sudan’s Strategic Lifeline  
 
The development of an alternative pipeline is the focal point of South Sudan’s strategic vision.  
Although the intuitive and economic logic dictates that the country rely on the existing oil 
infrastructure, the depth of mistrust and animosity that remains between Juba and Khartoum 
combined with both countries’ overwhelming reliance on oil revenues means that so long as both 
countries are tied together by pipelines, oil will remain a tool for leverage, and a potential catalyst 
for conflict.  Indeed as an SPLM official observed, “the international community prefers that both 
countries are viable and that the oil passes through Sudan.”547 Yet as the official continues to point 
out, the list of unresolved issues between the two states and Khartoum’s apparent objective of 
undermining the SPLM-led government is evidence enough for South Sudan that it cannot have its 
economic lifeline dependent on good relations with Sudan.     
 
Consequently, the concept of developing an alternative oil pipeline emerged during the period of 
autonomy following the signing of the CPA when the government in Juba realised that despite 
owning the lion’s share of Sudan’s oil reserves, an independent South Sudan would remain 
dependent on Sudan’s midstream oil infrastructure.    Under the terms of the CPA, the SPLM was to 
share power with the National Congress Party (NCP) in a Government of National Unity from 2005 
up to the referendum on South Sudan’s independence in 2011.  Despite the provision of autonomy 
for the south, and the formation of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) which was allocated 
half of the revenues generated by southern production, Patey notes that “intense jockeying for 
power occurred between the NCP and SPLM, particularly over oil.”548  The tensions were focused on 
a number of issues that ranged from un-demarcated borders – thus not allowing for the division of 
the oil fields between north and south – to the SPLM not being given access to any of the 
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information relating to oil production and existing contracts.549  The atmosphere of mistrust 
between the SPLM and their NCP partners in the unity government were further heightened by a 
report by the advocacy group Global Witness which stated that “the oil figures published by the 
Khartoum government do not match those from other sources.”550 The report claimed that the 
government had reported smaller volumes of oil produced in the southern oil blocks, than the 
operating company CNPC reported for the same blocks.  In addition it highlighted discrepancies in 
the prices received for oil sold by the government in Khartoum, and that in fact GOSS did not receive 
their half of Sudan’s oil revenues due to it.551   
 
Thus while GOSS itself lacked oversight and was frequently guilty of what Patey terms “glaring 
examples of fiscal mismanagement and corruption”552, the overriding sentiment in Juba to emerge 
from that period was that Khartoum could not be trusted, and that only through realising an 
alternative means of exporting its oil would an independent South Sudan control its own economic 
destiny.  And while Toyota Tsusho would not reveal exactly when they first became involved in the 
discussions around an alternative pipeline, a representative of the company did emphasise that they 
“got information at a very early stage.”553  The representative explained that through Toyota 
Tsusho’s close ties with a former Kenyan Ambassador to Japan – now the director of Toyota East 
Africa, the company was able to make contact with the SPLM when the notion of developing a new 
pipeline was first emerging.  Moreover, a representative of the Japan Liaison Office in Juba 
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confirmed that the initial feasibility study for an alternative pipeline had been conducted by an 
energy research institute funded by the Japanese government.554  
 
The option of developing an alternative pipeline gained further impetus following South Sudan’s 
independence in July 2011.  Despite the fact that negotiations with Sudan on a number of issues 
including transit fees for the use of Sudan’s oil pipelines were unresolved, the oil continued to flow.  
Indeed Juba estimated revenue of US$ 3.2billion from oil sales in the final six months of 2011.555  
Then in December 2011 claiming non-payment of transit fees, Khartoum seized US$  850 million556 in 
oil revenue and began diverting South Sudanese oil to its own refineries.  South Sudan responded in 
February 2012 by shutting down all of the country’s oil wells and effectively stopping oil exports.  
Significantly, concurrent with the oil shutdown resolution, a second cabinet resolution was adopted 
in Juba to seek an alternative pipeline route.557  Thus as tension between the two sides increased, 
the dynamics that had for so long defined inter-Sudanese relations returned, and conflict broke out 
along the new, and in places, undefined border.   
 
In Aril 2012, South Sudan’s President Kiir visited Beijing – primarily to request Chinese financing for a 
new pipeline to be built by Toyota Tsusho.  As Patey describes, “Kiir had shut down his country’s oil 
production in January, and in the process had brought a multi-billion Chinese led oil project to a 
standstill.”  But President Kiir was still hoping that China’s President Hu Jintao would offer South 
Sudan financial support to build a new pipeline.  Yet as Patey continues to explain, “Hu was 
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welcoming, but was not ready to give Kiir what he wanted most.”558  Indeed President Kiir abruptly 
cut short his official to visit to China to return to South Sudan – ostensibly to deal with the on-going 
crisis with Khartoum, but media reports implied his decision was linked to Beijing’s reluctance to 
finance an alternative pipeline.559  As the Paris-based Sudan Tribune reported, Beijing “found itself 
forced to tread carefully so as not to alienate either side.”560  Thus the military confrontation and 
fifteen months without oil revenue that resulted from the transit-fee disagreement with Khartoum 
further invigorated South Sudan’s desire to develop an alternative pipeline.  Indeed the inflation, 
currency devaluation, and severe austerity measures that accompanied the shutdown demonstrated 
that without an alternative pipeline, South Sudan’s near total dependence on oil revenues combined 
with on-going poor relations with Sudan effectively constituted an existential threat to the country’s 
viability.    
 
As a result of both the urgency with which an alternative pipeline was seen in Juba and the 
preferences and interests competing for attention across the region, a number of alternative options 
were sought.  These included a plan to integrate a new pipeline as part of the Lamu Port and Lamu 
South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project which will include railways, refineries, 
ports and airports.  In addition, the South Sudan pipeline was envisaged to connect with new oil 
fields being developed in Kenya and Uganda.  Yet as the Economist points out “the new oil states of 
East Africa cannot agree where to build their pipeline”561, and South Sudan has further confused 
matters by holding talks with Ethiopia about building a pipeline to Djibouti rather than Lamu, cutting 
out Kenya.  As the Economist continues to explain, this would cement South Sudan’s friendship with 
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the strong military power of Ethiopia – thereby reinforcing its position against Sudan, despite the 
fact that this route is considerably more difficult to build and would resultantly cost more.   Thus as 
Open Briefing notes, in the period since January 2012 South Sudan has negotiated multiple 
memorandums of understanding and intergovernmental agreements with Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Djibouti to progress pipeline feasibility studies and broader economic integration issues.  In addition, 
President Kiir “initiated a programme of financier outreach, seeking project finance from Asian and 
Gulf State countries and international finance institutions.”562  The Economist expects investors 
“mostly from Japan”563 to finance the pipeline from South Sudan – whichever route it follows.   
 
5.2.2 Asian Buyers of Sudanese Crude  
 
When considering Sudan and South Sudan’s oil industry, one of its primary characteristics is the fact 
that oil exports are bought almost entirely by Asian countries.  This is due in part to a US trade 
embargo and sanctions regime against Sudan which explicitly prohibits transactions “relating to the 
petroleum or petrochemical industries.”564  And while the sanctions do not apply to South Sudan’s 
oil industry, interpretation of the sanctions regulations are complicated given the fact that the 
country’s oil still passes through Sudan’s pipelines and refineries.  Yet Sudan’s oil exports also point 
to the changing characteristics of the global oil market.  As discussed in Chapter Three the growing 
economies of the G20 countries are shifting power dynamics at the structural level as well as driving 
global demand for oil.  In this context the dynamics associated with the historical development of 
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Sudan’s oil industry reflect the need by rapidly growing economies to identify new suppliers of oil 
and gas – and reflect an important shift in structural conditions.   
 
As will be explored in more detail later in this chapter, Sudan’s oil industry was essentially realised 
through Chinese (along with Malaysian and Indian) investment, and thus the market for Sudanese oil 
exports was established under a unified Sudan.  As the figure below shows, at the time of South 
Sudan’s independence China was the single biggest buyer of oil from Sudan/South Sudan.  China 
purchased 260,000 bbl/d565 or around two thirds of Sudan/South Sudan’s exports, which accounted 
for five per cent of China’s oil imports.566   
 
Figure 20: Sudan and South Sudan crude exports by destination 2011
567
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Despite purchasing considerably less, Japan was the second largest buyer of Sudanese crude in 2011 
followed by the other major investors in Sudan’s industry: India and Indonesia.568  This was in part 
due to Japan buying more of the heavy sweet grades of Sudanese oil for power production. 
Following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster in March 2011 and the subsequent closure or 
halting of activity at almost all of the country’s nuclear power plants, Japan’s demand for fuel oil 
increased significantly – importing 1.75 million kilolitres or about 369,000 bbl/d for power 
generation in February 2012, more than four times as much as the previous year.569  Indeed the 
share of oil in Japan’s power generation mix increased from nine per cent in 2010 to an estimated 18 
per cent in 2012.  Sudanese Low Sulphur Fuel Oil (LSFO) is of particular value in Japan as it can be 
used by the country’s oil-fired generators, and significantly, Sudan is the second largest supplier of 
LSFO to Japan.  Consequently during the suspension of oil production in South Sudan in 2012 Japan’s 
power utilities were paying a premium to access LSFO from other sources.  Thus despite a METI 
official pointing out that LSFO is a short term solution as it is too expensive to continue indefinitely, 
and that Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and coal would replace LSFO in the longer term;570 the fact 
remains that unless there is a political decision to restart Japan’s nuclear power stations,571 the 
country will be buying increased volumes of Sudanese fuel oil.    
 
The divergence of Japanese interests from the existing key players in Sudan/South Sudan’s oil sector, 
combined with increased demand for Sudanese crude, therefore presents an opportunity for Japan 
to not only become a regional player in the energy sector but tie this involvement into their broader 
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strategic objectives in the region.  Building on the base of ODA-led investment, and strengthened 
regional presence through peacekeeping, the pipeline bid essentially reflects private-sector 
investment realising the objectives of Japan’s energy diversification strategy.   
 
5.3  Investing in the Unknown    
 
The proposed oil pipeline discussed in this chapter encompasses multiple layers of risk.  As this 
section will outline, the implications of developing the pipeline are multifaceted and reflect the 
complex political and historical dynamics upon which South Sudan’s oil industry was built.  As such it 
will examine the wider political implications for the region and the deeply unstable relations 
between Sudan and South Sudan.  Yet primarily his section will explore the business and diplomatic 
risks faced by Toyota Tsusho in building the pipeline and the Japanese government in supporting and 
driving the project.  Moreover it will examine how this project is evidence of new Japanese attitudes 
towards risk and how this change can be interpreted through a neoclassical realist framework of 
analysis.   
 
The political and financial risk associated with Japan’s involvement in the pipeline project should also 
be considered in terms of Japan’s dominant business culture of kiken kaihi, or “uncertainty 
avoidance” which tends to influence strategic thinking.  According to Geert Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions theory which describes the effects of a society’s culture on the values of its members 
and how these values relate to behaviour, “Japan is one of the most uncertainty avoiding countries 
on earth.”572 Thus in line with a neoclassical realist framework of analysis, kiken kaihi can be 
understood as a particular societal norm that influences the perceptions of Japanese policymakers.  
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In this respect the decision by Toyota Tsusho to pursue the project reflects both a higher tolerance 
for risk by a Japanese company and emphasises South Sudan as a location in which new Japanese 
approaches are tested in pursuit of the country’s interests in Africa.   
 
At the end of this research period, the route for an alternative pipeline from South Sudan was still 
undecided.  Yet Toyota Tsusho confirmed that the company would build whichever pipeline route 
was decided on by the regional governments, including an option through Ethiopia to Djibouti.  But 
as a representative of the company explained, if Juba were to decide on developing a pipeline to 
Djibouti via Addis Ababa, this would require pumping and heating stations to get the oil over the 
Ethiopian highlands – making the construction project considerably more costly and take longer to 
build.573  Moreover, revenues would likely be shared with both Ethiopia and Djibouti, and Ethiopia’s 
ambition is to feed its expanding domestic fuel market would leave less crude available for export.   
 
Yet while the Djibouti option is more logistically challenging, a risk analyst explains that the route 
does offer South Sudan an enhanced economic and political partnership with Ethiopia whose 
regional influence and powerful military “will help to tip the balance of force in its favour compared 
with Sudan.”574  This route could also be strategically appealing for Japan as it would enhance 
Japanese ties with Ethiopia through a major investment as well as consolidate Japan’s presence in 
Djibouti.  Japan provided US$ 108 million in ODA to Ethiopia in 2012,575 and the pipeline investment 
would underpin Japan’s commitment to a country with a large potential market and an economy 
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which has averaged ten per cent growth over the past decade.576  Moreover, the pipeline would 
enhance the strategic value of their engagement in Djibouti, where Japan’s MSDF have established a 
base for anti-piracy operations and to patrol the vital sea lanes through which much of its oil imports 
travel from the Persian Gulf.  Yet the most likely alternative route remains the proposed pipeline to 
Lamu in Kenya and this section will focus on that option.   
 
Toyota Tsusho is facing a number of risks in undertaking to develop the pipeline, not least of which is 
whether there are sufficient oil reserves in South Sudan to justify a new pipeline.  According to BP's 
2013 Statistical Review, South Sudan’s oil reserves are 3.5 billion barrels – which comprises 0.2 per 
cent of the world’s total reserves.577  Yet the concern for investors is that output levels of the high 
quality Nile Blend fell from a peak of nearly 287,988 bbl/d on average in 2004 to 124,766 bbl/d by 
June 2011 – effectively the time of South Sudan’s independence.  Moreover, since going on-stream 
in April 2006 production from Blocks 3 and 7 in Upper Nile of the lower quality Dar Blend 
compensated for the loss, but as Patey explains, the fields passed their output peak in 2010 and 
were expected to drop sharply in the coming years.  “A lack of new discoveries was shortening the 
oil industry’s lifespan.” 578 
 
South Sudan’s Energy Minister Stephen Dhieu Dau however has claimed that South Sudan has seven 
billion barrels579 in proven oil reserves.  Yet a few months before, Deputy Minister Elizabeth James 
Bol’s presentation at an oil investor conference only stated reserves of 1.5 billion barrels – 
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predominantly Dar Blend in Blocks 3 and 7.580  Thus as Open Briefing, which has produced a 
comprehensive report on an alternative pipeline from South Sudan points out, “without any new 
discoveries, South Sudan oil production is likely to decline by 50 per cent over the next ten years.  At 
historical production rates, existing fields will be depleted in 20-30 years.”581  The report goes on to 
note that industry analyst consensus leans towards there being insufficient oil reserves to justify a 
new pipeline.  Yet as Copnall also explains, “whether new reserves are found or not, for at least the 
first decade after independence oil is likely to represent South Sudan’s greatest, indeed almost only, 
source of income.”582 
 
While the possibility of new discoveries and linking with oil fields in Kenya and Uganda mitigate this 
risk somewhat, a key impediment of financing the project remains: “the highly politicised nature of 
supporting an alternative pipeline with concessional finance has kept the international financial 
institutions such as the African Development Bank and International Finance Corporation at bay.” 583 
Speaking in 2012, South Sudan’s finance minister stated that the project would cost three billion 
dollars and that “we don't need to have the money right now, we have the reserves […] South Sudan 
will definitely have equity in the pipeline.”584  Alternatively, the Open Briefing report also suggests 
that a “Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT)585 structured arrangement with Japan’s Toyota Tsusho 
corporation remains a possibility for financing the project.”  Furthermore, the report notes that 
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“Kiir’s May 2013 visit to Japan to explore investment opportunities for Japanese companies may 
indicate Shinzo Abe’s government is open to exploring pipeline financing options.”586   
 
A further risk consideration for Toyota Tsusho – or other project financiers – is the issue of security 
along the pipeline and the extent to which this can hamper construction, future oil exports, and 
inflate project costs due to insurance coverage.  The development of Sudan’s oil industry was in 
many respects defined by the civil war587 and arguably so too will South Sudan’s oil future be defined 
by conflict.  South Sudan is a deeply unstable country.  Quite apart from the violence that erupted in 
December 2013, armed insurgencies and inter-communal conflict are widespread – especially in 
Jonglei State through which the proposed pipeline would be constructed.  Moreover, the outcome of 
the current conflict to the development and operation of the pipeline – and accompanying oil drilling 
operations – while beyond the timeframe of this study, will no doubt radically impact the confidence 
of investors in South Sudan’s undeveloped oil fields.  Indeed, much of the conflict in December 2013 
and January 2014 was focused around the oil producing areas of Unity and Upper Nile States, and 
resulted in oil output dropping by 20 per cent.588   
 
In addition, the logistical challenge facing Toyota Tsusho is immense.  While the existing GNPOC and 
Petrodar pipelines from the Upper Nile and Unity oil fields measure approximately 1,500589 and 
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1,370590 kilometres respectively, it is estimated that the new pipeline will be around 2,000 
kilometres depending on the route.  As Patey also explains, “unlike the largely flat desert over which 
Sudan’s existing pipelines run, South Sudan’s pipeline may have to travel over diverse terrain 
through Kenya to its final destination at Lamu.”  Moreover, due to the inclines and declines of the 
topography, more pumping and heating stations than the six stations along the existing pipelines’ 
route would be necessary in order to keep the highly-acidic and congealing Sudanese Dar Blend 
crude moving.591 
 
Yet beyond the logistical and business risks faced by Toyota Tsusho, the Japanese government faces 
a number of significant strategic considerations and political risks associated with supporting the 
development of an alternative pipeline from South Sudan.  These include negatively impacting 
Japan’s relations with Sudan and directly challenging China’s established interests in the existing oil 
pipelines.  Thus while South Sudan’s desire to develop a new pipeline essentially reflects its poor 
relations with Sudan, the realisation of an alternative oil export route will no doubt further weaken 
those relations – and consequently could also affect Japan’s relations with Khartoum if the project is 
undertaken by a Japanese company.  Officially, as a MOFA director clarifies, “Japan’s objective in the 
region is the peaceful coexistence of the two Sudans.”  He goes on to note that Japan appreciated 
that it was a tough decision for Sudan to accept independence of the south, but now that there are 
two separate countries, the priority is to ensure the viability of both.592  
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Nonetheless a METI official has confided that “the pipeline is diplomatically difficult” and that the 
Japanese government will find it hard to choose sides between the two countries.593 This view is 
supported by Professor Kataoka of Waseda University who observes that the pipeline “can 
undermine Japan’s relations with Sudan.”594  Further, a director general at JICA echoes this 
sentiment by observing that “if the pipeline is built, it could impact negatively on Japan’s relations 
with Sudan – we also depend on Sudan for some natural resources, so the basic idea is to balance 
good relations with both countries.”595  For this reason, MOFA maintains an official policy that the 
proposed pipeline is a “private sector issue” and that private companies can pursue their own 
strategies and tactics of investment in Africa.596  But as Toyota Tsusho maintain, the political 
dimensions of the pipeline are handled by the Japanese government and that before government 
delegations visit the region they meet with Toyota Tsusho to identify the company’s priorities in 
pushing the deal forward.  As a representative of the Sogo Sosha points out, “the government 
supports the project, because when it comes to resource business the government is always in the 
background.”597  
 
Yet when considering the proposed pipeline through the lens of neoclassical realism, the factors 
propelling Japan’s involvement in such a risky project can also be interpreted in terms of Taliaferro’s 
argument that perceived loss in relative power or perceptions of prestige drive leaders to pursue 
risky diplomatic or military interventions in peripheral regions.598  Consequently, perceptions of 
Japan’s declining global relevance combined with energy security concerns can be understood to be 
changing Japan’s attitude towards operating in frontier regions characterised by higher levels of risk.  
Furthermore, as small players trying to enter the energy sector, it could be argued that the only 
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options available to Japanese companies such as Toyota Tsusho are those on the margins – and that 
such investments are by definition more complex and risky.   
 
The proposed pipeline thus aligns Japan’s emerging investment and energy objectives in Africa with 
the primary strategic aims of South Sudan.  As such it should be considered an important element 
bridging the frontier of Japan’s East African interests and tying South Sudan’s future towards East 
Africa.  Yet the realisation of the pipeline will also impact the delicate political dynamics of the 
region – most obviously relations between Sudan and South Sudan – and further emphasises the 
significance of the pipeline beyond merely a conduit for oil.  
    
5.3.1 Implications of a New Oil Pipeline for Inter-Sudanese Relations   
 
The failure of cooperation between Khartoum and Juba has created a particular set of complex 
diplomatic dynamics for South Sudan to manoeuvre as it tries to convince donors and investors of 
the need to develop a new oil pipeline.  These calculations include the possibility of further 
worsened relations with Sudan, antagonising China and complex regional dynamics linked to the 
possible pipeline scenarios believed to be considered (through Kenya to Lamu, or via Ethiopia to 
Djibouti, or via Uganda to Mombasa).   
 
While Juba’s national interests are essentially focused around securing a stable means to export its 
oil while at the same time loosening its dependence on Sudan, pursuing an alternative pipeline may 
have considerable implications.  Not least of which is a further deterioration of relations with Sudan.  
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
197 
 
It is telling that a threat by Khartoum to block oil transfers from South Sudan599 came only days after 
the official announcement of the new pipeline deal with Toyota Tsusho and President Kiir’s meeting 
with company executives in Tokyo at the end of May 2013.  Yet the reason given by Khartoum for 
threatening South Sudan’s oil exports was Juba’s apparent support for the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement – North (SPLM-N).600  Thus in making this threat Sudanese President Al Bashir in effect 
deployed a tactic by which economic pressure is used against South Sudan to achieve domestic 
political objectives.  While in Juba it served to reinforce the strongly held perception that Sudan’s 
primary objective is to see the collapse of the regime in South Sudan – a view confirmed by a 
representative of the SPLM.601 
 
Furthermore, the deeply unstable southern states of Sudan that stretch from Darfur in the West to 
Blue Nile in the East hold the potential to deteriorate even further if Khartoum and Juba no longer 
have the mutual incentive of ensuring enough stability to keep the oil flowing.  Indeed despite the 
forced marriage between the two states held together by the existing pipeline there is ample 
evidence to suggest Khartoum would move to actively undermine the construction and utilisation of 
an alternative pipeline.  As LeRiche and Arnold observe, “while Khartoum publicly supported a stable 
South, it nonetheless continued a policy of destabilisation by using proxy militias during the CPA’s 
Interim Period.”602  In addition there appears to be evidence that this practice continued in the post-
independence era – especially regarding the provision of weapons to the rebel group led by David 
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Yau Yau.603 As well as previous support for earlier rebellions led by former SPLA generals such as 
George Athor and Peter Gadet,604 who formed the short-lived South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) 
that was described by SPLA spokesman Philip Aguer as “northern mercenaries.”605  
 
However while these rebellions were as much reflections of internal political and power dynamics 
within the SPLA/M, as well as what LeRiche and Arnold refer to as the “ethnic overtones”606 of the 
insurgencies – they all impacted the oil industry.  The SSLA launched major attacks in Unity state, 
while George Athor’s insurgency destabilised Upper Nile and Joglei state until his death in 2011.  Yet 
until the outbreak of violence across the country in December 2013, it was the Yau Yau-led 
insurgency by his militia known as the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDA) that was the biggest 
single threat607 to the realisation of an alternative pipeline.608    
 
All of the complicated and delicately-balanced components of the relationship between the two 
Sudans are therefore susceptible to the consequences of South Sudan securing a new oil pipeline.  
And although the view of the South Sudanese government is that a new pipeline would remove 
Khartoum’s ability to use the threat of seizing or blocking oil exports in future negotiations around 
the many issues unresolved following South Sudan’s secession, the pipeline could also remove any 
incentive for future cooperation from Khartoum.  Indeed as former Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq 
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Al-Mahdi observed “North Sudan has the power to resolve or complicate the problems of South 
Sudan and both of them have the ability to turn themselves into failed states.”609  
 
In addition, the proposed pipeline would serve as a significant symbolic and material indication of 
South Sudan’s desire to push its integration in the EAC.  And despite the lack of agreement between 
the countries in the region on a route for the pipeline, and the lure of strengthening ties with 
Ethiopia at the expense of a Kenyan pipeline, South Sudan has the potential to be a major player in 
driving the development of an integrated hydrocarbon industry in East Africa.  Thus South Sudan and 
the potential pipeline, is of particular interest to Japan.  Indeed, as a METI official observes, the 
entire region of East Africa from Djibouti to Mozambique holds huge potential for Japan – because 
unlike more established African oil and gas producers such as Nigeria or Angola, East Africa has less 
established energy development and resultantly offers “more opportunities for Japan.”610     
 
The development of an alternate pipeline from South Sudan is therefore a project characterised by 
great uncertainty and potential rewards.  As South Sudan strives to realise its own economic agency 
by breaking free of Sudanese influence, the country faces a delicate balance between its own 
objectives and the competing interests of external players.  Not least of which is Japan – for whom 
the proposed pipeline is a product of the political and economic dynamics occurring within the 
country that are driving the policy of developing a more robust and extensive footprint in Africa.  Yet 
on the other hand an alternative pipeline will have considerable repercussions for Sudan’s biggest 
investor China, whose diplomatic and economic ties with Sudan have been underwritten by oil 
investments.  
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5.3.2 The “China Factor” and the Complex History of Sudan’s Oil Industry   
 
As previously mentioned, the role of China in influencing the thinking of Japanese policymakers is a 
significant consideration that includes structural pressures as well as the particular dynamics of 
Japanese elite perceptions.  Indeed while the rise of China was explored in Chapter Three as a critical 
component of the structural context driving the urgency of Japan’s re-aligned Africa policy, the role 
of China is of particular importance in understanding the dynamics of South Sudan’s oil industry.  
This section will therefore explore the particular context in which China’s presence in Sudan 
continues to influence inter-Sudanese relations and the background against which Toyota Tsusho’s 
proposed pipeline and Japan’s expanding African engagement should be understood.  Furthermore, 
the realisation of an alternative oil pipeline bypassing China’s extensive investments in Sudan is a 
further consideration for Japanese policymakers given the complexities of Sino-Japanese relations.    
 
CNPC’s arrival in Sudan in the early 1990s effectively realised Khartoum’s long-held dreams of oil 
exports, and announced China’s presence as a major investor in Africa.  As Large and Patey611 and 
Patey612 have noted, through CNPC’s majority stake in GNPOC and Petrodar, driving the construction 
of Sudan’s oil pipelines, refineries and terminal port, China became Sudan’s most important external 
partner.  Furthermore, as Patey describes, “Sudan was more than just another investment on the 
company’s portfolio: it was a venture of crucial strategic importance for CNPC’s international 
expansion.”613  And significantly for future relations with Juba, CNPC inserted itself into a civil war to 
build Sudan’s oil industry.  Thus as Open Briefing notes, China’s preference for maintaining the 
existing pipeline is “likely based on a combination of avoiding a Sudan-South Sudan zero sum game, 
                                                          
611
 Large, Daniel and Patey, Luke (eds), Sudan looks East, China, India and the politics of Asian alternatives, 
Woodbridge: James Currey, 2011 
612
 Patey, Luke, The New Kings of Crude 
613
 Ibid, p. 111 
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
201 
 
securing operations for upstream refineries, and resuming oil exports.”614 Consequently, an 
alternative pipeline would radically diminish CNPC’s income as well as fundamentally undermine the 
value of the political and financial investment China has poured into Sudan since the mid-1990s.    
 
As Burr and Collins,615 Johnson,616 and Patey617 describe, the civil war in Sudan was intimately tied-in 
with the development of the oil industry, and China (through CNPC) only became engaged in Sudan 
following the withdrawal of US oil major Chevron and the breakdown of relations between the US 
and Sudan.  When the second civil war broke out in 1983, the oil fields became targets and following 
an attack at a Chevron facility that killed three expatriate workers in 1984, Chevron suspended its 
operations in Sudan.618 As the conflict within Sudan grew, the importance of the oil fields to the 
Sudanese government became increasingly significant – resulting in the forced displacement of 
communities from the oil producing regions, and the use of proxy armies to defend the oil facilities.  
As Patey describes,  
Oil alone was not responsible for the outbreak of the second civil war, 
but the Sudanese government’s plans to exploit the resources for its 
own narrow purposes reinforced the wider grievance of regional 
marginalisation in Southern Sudan.  During the fighting oil fields became 
hotly contested areas of strategic control and the sites of horrendous 
human rights violations against southern Sudanese communities by the 
Sudanese army and its militias.619 
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Thus as the brutal conflict of Sudan’s second civil war washed over the oil fields, a number of smaller 
oil companies continued to operate in Sudan, though none had the investment capital and 
experience to develop Sudan’s oil infrastructure – until the arrival of CNPC along with Malaysia’s 
PETRONAS and Indian National Oil Company OVL in the early 1990s.  Yet developing Sudan’s oil 
industry in the midst of a civil war would also effectively mean taking sides in that war – the 
consequences of which impact on China’s relations with South Sudan today.  LeRiche and Arnold 
observe that “lingering resentment exists in the South over the violence that unfolded in the late 
1990s around the oilfields; many communities were brutally driven away in order to allow Chinese 
corporations to begin pumping.”620 Consequently as Large describes, for many in the south – not 
only those directly affected by the oil development, “the link between China and the oil wars of the 
late 1990s remains predominantly negative and [a] very present, vivid and automatic association.”621   
 
Chinese commitment to Sudan was extensive, as Patey describes, a former Chevron oilman 
commented after the company left Sudan that the infrastructure needed for Sudan’s oil fields 
required a “virtual re-colonisation of Sudan”, and “CNPC was prepared to go the distance to provide 
Sudan with the necessary infrastructure.”622 The creation of the GNPOC pipeline in 1999 and a 
refinery in 2000 eliminated the need to import fuel for domestic use, and Sudan becoming a major 
oil exporter to China: providing on average five per cent of China’s total oil imports between 1999 
and 2011.623  Moreover as Patey points out, “Sudan was proof that Chinese national oil companies 
could compete in the international oil industry.  It also became the centrepiece in China’s growing 
engagement in Africa.”624    
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Thus with the signing of the CPA and the realisation that South Sudan might separate from Sudan, 
taking with it nearly three quarters of Sudan’s oil, China began exploring relations with the SPLA.   As 
Large points out, the Chinese government had cultivated effective close political relations with 
Sudan’s ruling elite625– which made meaningful engagement with the SPLA difficult.  Indeed as an 
SPLA commander stated in 2004, “the suffering of the people is on the hands of the Chinese.  The 
agreements for the Chinese company may be terminated.”626  Consequently Beijing undertook 
concerted efforts to develop ties with Juba – described by Patey as a “diplomatic offensive to win 
over the SPLA.”627  An offensive that was largely successful in that despite South Sudan achieving 
independence, they did not cancel the CNPC contracts and have taken a largely pragmatic position 
with regards engagement with China.  As former Secretary-General of the SPLM Pagan Amun noted, 
“During the struggle of the people of South Sudan, China took the side of the government in 
Khartoum.  But that is history, a troubled history, and we will not allow ourselves to be hostages of 
the past.”628  However it should also be noted that without an alternative oil pipeline South Sudan 
has no choice and is dependent on CNPC for almost all of its revenue.   
 
Thus relations between Beijing and Juba remained uneasy. As a researcher working on China’s 
engagement in South Sudan points out, while the elite in Juba are more pragmatic, “the general 
population in South Sudan has not moved on from negative perceptions of China’s past relations 
with Khartoum.”629 Consequently, the on-going political instability in South Sudan and continued 
tension between Juba and Khartoum means that an air of lingering wariness characterises relations 
between China and South Sudan.  And while the imperative of oil revenues and the lure of Chinese 
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infrastructure investments and loans will likely still induce pragmatic mutual engagement, a new 
route to export its oil remains a cornerstone of South Sudan’s strategic vision.  Moreover as an SPLM 
representative in Amun’s office also confided, “do not expect to see Chinese companies winning any 
new oil concessions in South Sudan – we will look for more friendly players.”630 
 
Thus Toyota Tsusho’s pursuit of the project despite the inherit risks – both political and economic – 
is indicative of a new approach by Japanese businesses operating overseas.  An approach 
characterised as moving away from risk aversion, to one that is beginning to place greater emphasis 
on potential economic and political gain for Japan when considered alongside the immediate risks of 
the particular project.   
 
Indeed as this chapter will further explore, expanding Japan’s presence beyond ODA-investments 
and peacekeeping to include private-sector energy investment, advances the country’s interests and 
offers a number of strategic opportunities such as diversifying oil supplies, acquiring equity oil and 
even undermining China’s influence in South Sudan.  As such the pipeline project reflects a response 
to shifting structural conditions and can be understood to bridge both geographical and cultural 
frontiers in advancing Japan’s interests in the region.   
 
5.4 The Frontier of Opportunity  
 
As previously noted, the proposed pipeline is a complex venture characterised by multiple layers of 
risk, yet the project also holds distinct opportunities to advance Japan’s emerging energy objectives 
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in the region.  In contrast to the other major buyers of Sudan/South Sudan’s oil such as China, 
Malaysia, and India, Japan is not invested in the success of Sudan’s pipelines or refineries.   Thus this 
divergence of Japanese interests from the existing key players in Sudan/South Sudan’s oil sector 
presents an opportunity for Japan to not only become a regional player in the energy sector but tie 
this involvement into their broader strategic energy objectives in the region.  This section will 
explore the strategic and economic potential that investment in South Sudan’s oil pipeline holds for 
Japan and contextualise that potential in a broader analysis of Japan’s energy policies.   
 
As described in Chapter Three, energy security is a critical component of Japan’s strategic planning 
and METI recognises that the proposed pipeline is the key to unlocking further potential from South 
Sudan’s oil fields.  A METI official notes that although the fields currently under exploration have 
reached peak production and probably do not justify the development of a new pipeline – there 
remains huge potential in the currently undeveloped Block B, and that if development of this block 
were to advance then Toyota Tsusho’s pipeline would be extremely valuable.  As a JETRO official 
reiterates, “if it is found to have good oil reserves it could change the conditions for the new 
pipeline.”631   
 
The 120,000 square kilometre Block B in Jonglei and Lakes state is roughly the size of Eritrea and has 
been owned by France’s Total since 1980, but was abandoned in 1985 due to the civil war.  As 
LeRiche and Arnold explain, great hope has been placed in the development of the block as “studies 
suggest that substantial oil reserves are likely to exist underground, but the full nature and quality of 
the reserves are unclear.”632  METI’s interest however is linked to the decision by the government in 
Juba to split the huge concession into separate parts and invite new investors to develop the field.  
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The petroleum bill passed after South Sudan seceded said its new government was not bound by 
past agreements and had the right to review and split blocks.  While it signed new agreements with 
the Chinese, Malaysian and Indian companies already operating in South Sudan, the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mining indicated that one share of Block B would be offered to Total and the others 
would be offered for tender.633  Indeed oil minister Stephen Dhieu Dau noted that "Definitely Block B 
will not be any longer continuing as Block B, it will be blocks of Block Bs, it will be many Bs”, he said, 
declining to specify how many.634  Open Briefing concludes that “the proposed carving up of Total’s 
exploration licence in Block B was not only aimed at generating revenue and bringing US oil and gas 
interests back into South Sudan, but also at spurring competitive exploration activity.”  Similarly, 
attempts were made to generate government income during the shutdown by offering new 
exploration licences to a range of private and state-owned NOCs.635  Thus when asked if Toyota 
Tsusho is following the discussions around the opportunities linked to Block B, a company 
representative confirmed that “yes we are involved, but the discussion is still at the government 
level.”636  A METI official also reiterated that “if a Japanese company could get involved in the 
development of Block B then the Japanese government would fully support the pipeline.”637    
 
Beyond the potential of Block B however, oil fields in Uganda offer even more opportunities, and 
METI recognises that they expect to begin oil production in 2018 – and will need a pipeline.   The 
official continues by noting that his department encourages Japanese companies to become 
involved in developing oil fields in South Sudan and across East Africa, “the Japanese government is 
only interested in upstream concessions, and the pipeline is a means to get involved in upstream 
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concessions.”638 Thus highlighting not only the significance of equity energy investments within the 
broader conception of Japan’s Africa policy, but also the role that the pipeline plays in securing a 
place for Japan within the development of East Africa’s energy sector.   
 
The pipeline is therefore also a potential framework around which to develop an integrated energy 
sector in East Africa.  Upstream investment in the region is expected to reach US$ 7 billion by 2018 
as East Africa is believed to contain 130 trillion cubic feet of gas and around two billion barrels of oil, 
with the same again in still-to-be-proven potential.639  In a report on oil and gas in East Africa, 
Control Risks points out that while the lack of infrastructure to support the industry in the region 
could be seen as an impediment it also offers “considerable commercial opportunities and is likely to 
be a major growth area of the next two decades.”640  In this context South Sudan sits at the very 
frontier of Japan’s Africa strategy – enticing bold investors such as Toyota Tsusho with the promise 
of reward and integration into the more established and stable countries of East Africa.  Yet as a 
MOFA director explains, “commercial conventional ways of securing resources are not abundant so 
we need to go to the frontiers – those markets that are difficult to enter.”641  And when it comes to 
frontiers in Africa, such as Mozambique, Uganda, and Kenya, MOFA believes that Japan’s energy 
strategy should focus on mobilising policies to secure resources.  For example, using visits by the 
Prime Minister and other senior officials to build relations, and to use ODA more strategically in 
advancing Japan’s energy ambitions in the region.    
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Yet while Jonglei remains unstable, Block B unexplored, and the government of South Sudan and 
others in the region are still to finalise a route, the pipeline remains a high-risk project far from 
realisation.  Indeed as a representative of Toyota Tsusho pointed out, until the route is decided, the 
final cost assessment cannot be completed, and without the final costs determined it is difficult to 
secure financing.  The representative goes on to explain that the final decision on the route is made 
by the government in Juba – in agreement with others in the region – and it is out of Toyota Tsusho’s 
control.  “That’s why that sort of coordination [with the governments in the region] should be done 
by the Japanese government and why we collaborate closely with our government on this 
project.”642   
 
Beyond providing diplomatic support to private sector companies, the Japanese government has two 
primary policy tools in pursuing its energy polices: JOGMEC and the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC).  JOGMEC provides financial assistance to private companies from Japan, as well 
as technical assistance and stockpiling of oil and rare metals.  As a representative from the company 
points out, “banks rarely finance oil and gas exploration, so we take the risk.”643  By studying the 
project risk and providing 75 per cent of the funding, JOGMEC supports Japanese companies, and 
effectively allows them to compete against more established international energy companies.  For 
example, 75 per cent of Mitsui’s equity investment in the Anadarko-owned gas field in Mozambique 
was provided by JOGMEC.644  Significantly, there is a condition attached to JOGMEC’s financial 
support for Japanese companies, and that is that while oil and gas would be normally sold to the 
market, “if there is an emergency situation they must give their share of oil and gas to Japan.”  As a 
JOGMEC representative explains, the purpose of the corporation is safeguarding Japan’s energy 
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security, and the financing was after all provided by public funds.645  Indeed as METI acknowledges, 
often the interests of the government and private companies are the same – but in the event that 
they are not, this requirement will ensure that valuable energy resources are returned to Japan.646  
 
Thus while the prospects for African oil production is limited compared with the Middle East there 
are however some distinct advantages for Japan to pursue investment in the continent’s energy 
sector.  As a representative of JOGMEC describes, “Africa is a more open market than the Middle 
East or Russia.”647 In these regions investment opportunities for foreign companies are rare, or 
restricted to “the majors” or NOCs.  Africa by comparison is unusual in that there are many smaller 
resource companies operating – these minor companies explore and exploit resources which they 
then sell to a major resource company. These conditions therefore offer opportunities for smaller 
Japanese companies to enter the energy market, secure equity concessions, and thereby diversify 
Japan’s energy supplies. In this regard, JOGMEC currently supports oil and gas investments by 
Japanese companies in the Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, 
Mozambique and Namibia.648  In addition, JOGMEC is conducting geological surveys with the Kenyan 
National Oil company and has an office and remote sensing centre in Botswana.   
 
As a JOGMEC representative goes on to explain, despite the fact that Africa is not a priority for many 
Japanese companies, it offers a variety of opportunities to develop technical proficiencies, and 
expand market access. Furthermore, as JOGMEC reiterates, “Mitsui’s big gas investment in 
Mozambique is making other companies see Africa’s potential.”649  Indeed, Mitsui’s 20 per cent650 
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stake in the Anadarko owned gas field in Mozambique remains Japan’s highest profile equity 
investment in Africa and in some respects establishes Japan’s intentions on the continent – and 
Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline should be understood as a component within Japan’s expanding 
energy strategy in Africa.  An energy strategy which increasingly is focused on the potential for 
equity energy investments.   
 
5.4.1 Toyota Tsusho and Equity Oil in the Pipeline? 
 
The announcement that Toyota Tsusho would develop the pipeline was made following an official 
visit to Japan by South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir in June 2013 – where he also attended TICAD V.  
President Kiir met with representatives of the company and finalised a deal that has been in 
discussion since 2010. For the Japanese government, the announcement added an important 
symbolic and material dimension to the underlying message of TICAD V – namely that Japan’s 
engagement on the continent had evolved to encompass much more than just aid, and that it is a 
serious investor.  In a separate meeting between Prime Minister Abe and President Kiir, both leaders 
referenced the extent of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan from ODA projects such as the Nile 
bridge and the deployment of Japanese peacekeepers, emphasising their mutual wishes that private 
Japanese companies increase their presence in South Sudan.651  This view is reinforced by a 
representative of the Japan Liaison Office in South Sudan,652 who noted that Japan’s ODA-focused 
cooperation with South Sudan was “the start of a relationship that would hopefully grow to include 
a business-level.”653  
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Thus coming alongside Japan’s flagship TICAD conference, the announcement of Toyota Tsusho’s 
involvement in the pipeline project was significant in that it tied together two of Japan’s strategic 
objectives in Africa: economic revitalisation through increased overseas investment, and efforts to 
ensure energy security.  Furthermore, as this chapter has explored, the pipeline project reflects not 
only the systemic drivers underpinning Japan’s re-engagement in Africa but also points to an 
evolution in the country’s investment-led approach to engagement in Africa, and an increasing focus 
on obtaining equity oil investments.  In this regard the proposed Toyota Tsusho project is an 
opportunity to advance Japanese emerging policy framework for ensuring energy security through 
equity investments. 
 
Yet Toyota Tsusho’s role in the complex political environment of South Sudan is also an interesting 
indicator of Japan’s broader objectives in the region and willingness to engage in high risk 
investments.  As such, it is a reflection of the extent to which Japan’s engagement in South Sudan 
represents both a bridgehead and a test-case for expanding Japanese energy investment in Africa. 
As a representative of the company points out, Toyota Tsusho is the only Japanese company to 
invest directly in Kenya, and in doing so the organisation has developed strong regional business 
networks and personal relationships at the highest political levels.  It was through these 
relationships that the company became aware at a very early stage that South Sudan was seeking to 
develop an alternative pipeline for its oil exports.654  Therefore despite lacking experience in this sort 
of project the company was able to move early in developing a strategy and carrying out feasibility 
studies for the proposed pipeline – in effect leveraging advance knowledge of the project and 
relationships in the region to overcome the company’s lack of a track record in securing an 
agreement with the government in Juba.   
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As a representative of Toyota Tsusho points out, “while we have no experience in building a pipeline 
we can coordinate a project successfully”655 – that is, coordinate with various component specialists 
such as pipe manufacturers and oil infrastructure companies.  Yet an underlying question remains: 
why would the company undertake such a risky, politically sensitive project in a field in which it has 
no experience? The Toyota Tsusho representative goes some way to answering this as well as 
intimating a broader strategy for Japan in the region when he observes that the pipeline is not in 
itself “a very interesting business” as it merely consists of connecting the pipes and exporting the oil.  
However purchasing oil “is good business” – to have rights to purchase oil is “good for our company 
and also for Japanese energy management.”656 As the representative goes on to explain, their 
strategy would be that the existing operating companies can continue to drill the oil, but that Toyota 
Tsusho would then buy oil from them – which would then become Hinomaru Oil.      
 
It is for this reason Toyota Tsusho continues to pursue a project that up to the end of this research 
period has neither financing nor a confirmed route.  The company confirms that before securing 
finance the route will have to be decided, but that they will build any of the options.  Indeed as a 
representative of Toyota Tsusho notes, “deciding the route is a political decision which is out of our 
control – and that is why coordination should be done by the Japanese government.”657  In this 
regard the company collaborates closely with the Japanese government, and encourages discussion 
between METI officials and government officials in South Sudan and Kenya.     
 
Yet the paradox that surrounds Japan’s current approach to energy security by increasing the ratio 
of Hinomaru Oil within Japan’s energy mix is the commonly-held assumption that owning foreign or 
equity oil adds to the security of energy supply for that country.  In this regard Fesharaki remains the 
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most significant opponent of this view, and argues that “energy security can be achieved through 
the efficient operation of market forces.”658  Fesharaki’s primary position is that energy markets 
have mitigated energy rivalries and all but eliminated traditional security threats – where market 
presence and position, and the ability to secure contracts rather than territorial access ensures 
energy security.659  Indeed Manning suggests that “insofar as oil is a globalised commodity, a 
disruption anywhere is a price spike everywhere. Thus mere geopolitical access to strategic 
resources will not yield the accessing party the best price.  What matters, rather, is who gets what 
long term contract.”660  Further, Powell notes when questioning the logic of India’s extensive equity 
oil investments that equity oil is still sold to the global oil market, and despite the presumption, does 
not insulate the economy from higher world oil prices.661   
 
Indeed the global energy market in recent years has been characterised by increasing transparency 
and globalisation where prices are no longer determined by deals between producers and 
distributors, but rather by futures contracts negotiated openly and competitively.662  Furthermore as 
May points out, an open worldwide spot market has largely replaced the exclusive long-term 
arrangements of the past, and has thus reduced the political element in oil supply.663   
 
The argument holds therefore that the increasingly free international energy markets provide 
security for importing countries in a number of ways. Wesley points to the fact that markets 
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diversify risks and provide the capacity to absorb disruptions through the price effect – given that oil 
is considered a fungible commodity: under market conditions all consumers absorb an equal part of 
a supply disruption through paying the same increased price.  Additionally, there is a convergence of 
interests between producers and consumers in maintaining affordability and stability in global 
energy markets.664  Underlying these views are basic assumptions on the logic of cooperation as a 
consequence of increasing global economic interdependence, and that the growth of energy 
markets will inevitably break down security-driven energy policies.     
 
Yet despite the apparent historical trend toward the “anti-geopolitics” of the market, Wesley points 
out that it is also clear that major energy consumers such as China, Japan, Russia and India are 
developing alternative energy security policies – policies that “represent a statist quest for direct 
control over energy sources and supply routes, the opposite logic to a fuller integration into the 
market.”665  Wesley goes on to observe that in effect two competing geopolitical logics are asserting 
themselves in the energy sector.   Further, as a MOFA director points out, “the energy market is 
actually not a very market based mechanism – especially with regards fossil fuels.”  Consequently 
there is a big consolidation of wealth in fossil fuel industries and more International Oil Companies 
(IOCs) are retreating because of the strength and influence of governments and NOCs.   He continues 
by noting that “the energy market itself is not what it was some time ago – and it is more and more 
difficult for companies to rely on market forces.”666 As a result governments are pushing NOCs and 
trying to attach certain conditions to concessions for foreign companies. 
 
As the MOFA official also points out, NOCs ultimately benefit from being affiliated with government 
because they can then access unlimited financial resources, and when combined with the realisation 
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that, unlike some years ago, competition within the energy markets is not really market based – 
“more government investment is probably necessary.  And this has broad support within the 
leadership and parliament in Japan.”667  Indeed as a manager at IEEJ further notes, “in my view 
equity oil is very important.”668  He goes on to point out the value of developing expertise in the oil 
and gas sector, and given Japan’s total dependence on imported oil and gas the country needs to 
develop expertise in the entire value chain.  Without this expertise, “our negotiating power against 
competitors is weakened.”669 
 
Moreover, as Andrews-Speed observes, while oil prices have risen over the last ten years, the level of 
international investment by Asian NOCs has soared.  Chinese companies lead the way, but NOCs from 
Japan, South Korea, India and Malaysia are also active.670  Thus the acquisition of equity oil through 
investment by China’s CNPC and the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) has become a much-
analysed aspect of China’s energy operations across the world – driven by the “going abroad” policy to 
acquire oil through exploration and corporate mergers.671  While Herberg672 maintains that the 
expansion of Asia’s NOCs has been driven by both energy security concerns and the commercial drive to 
exploit new opportunities, policymakers in Japan are responding to the changing oil market and are now 
more willing to provide support and push private Japanese companies abroad to secure equity stakes in 
energy.   Thus the significance of securing energy supplies is such that governments effectively choose to 
hedge against the presumed infallibility of the energy market by securing equity oil investments. 
                                                          
667
 Ibid 
668
 Author’s interview with Manager at IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013 
669
 Ibid 
670
 Andrews-Speed, Philip, “Do overseas investments by National Oil Companies enhance energy security at 
home? A view from Asia”, in National Bureau of Asian Research, Oil and Gas for Asia – Geopolitical implications 
of Asia’s growing demand, Special Report no.  41, September 2012 
671
 James Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, “The Rise of China and its Energy Implications”, 
December 2011, accessed 1 June 2014, available at: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-
RiseOfChina-ExecutiveSummary-120211-WEB.pdf  
672
 Herberg, Mikkal, “Asia’s National Oil Companies and the competitive landscape of the international oil 
industry”, in National Bureau of Asian Research, Asia’s Rising Energy and Resource Nationalism , Special Report 
no. 31, September 2011 
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
216 
 
Moreover, these policies are in line with broader strategic approaches to policy development, as 
Samuels has noted about Japan, given the country’s geographical location and late development, “it is 
no surprise that hedging has long been an arrow in Tokyo’s strategic quiver.”673  A manager at IEEJ 
reiterates this point by noting that “downstream and upstream capabilities are a natural hedge against 
the fluctuation of oil and gas prices.”674 
 
The IEEJ representative continues by noting that “the norm or pattern of resource acquisition has 
changed because of Asian NOCs”675 – consequently the role of government has become more 
prominent due to the emergence of Asian NOCs in the upstream market.  Klare further points out 
that national leaders are assuming a greater role in the management of their energy polices, “driven 
not only by hard-headed calculations about global energy supplies, but also by what can only be 
viewed as a degree of hysteria over the future adequacy of reserves and outsize fears about the 
possibility of losing out to more aggressive procurement tactics by rivals.”676 In other words, 
Japanese policymakers are interpreting structural pressures through the particular perspective of 
Japan’s energy vulnerability – a vulnerability that has in itself become a norm and an important 
domestic consideration in a neoclassical realist interpretation of Japan’s energy policy formation.  
Consequently the discourse in Japan about Hinomaru Oil should also be understood as an identity 
issue – one that resultantly resonates deeply with policymakers and does not always reflect a purely 
objective assessment of Japan’s energy requirements.  Indeed as Japanese foreign policy is 
increasingly accompanied by a national discourse of revitalisation and Abe’s assertion that he “will 
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bring back a strong Japan”677, the pursuit of Hinomaru Oil is a further example of a particular 
domestic interpretation and response to structural conditions by Japanese policymakers.     
 
It is also worth considering that while the value of equity oil is repeatedly discussed in Japanese 
policy circles, a manager at IEEJ also explains that investing in a foreign country’s oil and gas sectors 
also provides insights into the political dynamics in those countries.678  Indeed with reference to 
Africa, this is especially relevant in drawing Japan into increasingly more entangled and multi-
faceted relationships on the continent as it seeks to secure energy from new sources.  Not least of 
which in South Sudan where Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline draws Japan into the complex 
political undercurrents swirling across the region.  Increased engagement in Africa however also 
challenges the established approaches and perceptions within Japan’s domestic energy industries to 
accommodate the shifting policies of Japanese government elites.  This is a relevant dimension of 
this study given that a neoclassical realist perspective requires analysis of international structural 
conditions as well as domestic institutions and political considerations.    
 
5.5 The Domestic Dynamics of Japan’s Energy Policy in Africa  
 
Despite the fact that diversification of oil supplies remains a central element within Japanese energy 
policy, a director at MOFA concedes that “the strategy has been failing for the past three 
decades”679, and Japan remains overwhelmingly dependent on Middle Eastern supply.  Thus 
soliciting the question why has the policy of diversification of oil supply in Japan not been achieved?  
                                                          
677 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan is Back”, address by PM Abe at the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS”), 22 Feb 2013, accessed 15 May 2014, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130222en.html
 
678
 Author’s interview with Manager at IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013  
679
 Author’s interview with director, MOFA, 30 October 2013 
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
218 
 
Notwithstanding the centrality of energy security within Japan’s policy framework, there appears to 
be a number of domestic constraints within Japan that result in a divergence between official 
government policy and the private energy sector.  In terms of the theoretical framework of 
neoclassical realism underpinning this study, domestic considerations are an important factor in 
understanding foreign policy outcomes and this section will therefore briefly outline some of the 
domestic factors that are also influencing Japan’s energy strategy in Africa.    
 
Despite diversification of supply being an objective of Japanese policy since the 1973 oil crisis, 
Japanese refineries are built for Middle Eastern crude, and Japan’s refining companies are reluctant 
to make the investment in changing their infrastructure in a shrinking market.680  As the IEEJ points 
out, Japanese companies have even been reluctant to purchase Russian crude for a variety of 
technical reasons – and essentially do not want to alter the most cost-effective procurement 
methods.  Thus while China and India are building refineries to accommodate oil from South 
America and Africa, “Japanese companies are unwilling to invest in development of new refineries” – 
thereby ensuring that “Japan’s dependence on Middle Eastern supplies will remain.”681 As a MOFA 
representative explains, if left to market forces the Middle East will continue to dominate the oil 
export market, and while the country’s gas imports are quite diverse, Japan is struggling to find 
alternatives to the Middle East for oil.682  
 
This situation highlights a challenge for the Japanese government in realising its strategic objectives 
to diversify its oil supply by encouraging more aggressive and internationally-focused investments 
from Japanese companies.  It also adds to the complexity of its pursuit of Hinomaru Oil concessions 
in Africa.  Because while the government is concerned about structural changes to energy markets, 
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overreliance on a single region and the threat of a 1973-type oil shock,  domestic refiners and 
distributors are focused more on the cost implications of moving away from Middle Eastern oil for 
which there are established and cost-effective procurement systems in place.  As a MOFA director 
further explains, “there is no easy way out of this situation” and that when it comes to oil supply and 
price, essentially consumer countries are not winning and this could mean Africa becomes an option 
for Japan.683 
 
Consequently, Japanese policymakers are encouraging and supporting the private sector to invest in 
equity energy projects in Africa.  As the IEEJ further explains, energy investments in Africa are largely 
initiated by the government, who then request private companies to participate later684 – and 
although this is not true of every energy investment, it does indicate an elite-level policy-driven 
approach to engagement in Africa.   This was further demonstrated by the Japan Sustainable Mining, 
Investment and Technology Business Forum (J-SUMIT) hosted by METI in conjunction with TICAD V 
in 2013. At the summit Japan pledged to invest two billion dollars in African energy and mineral 
projects, and METI Minister Toshimitsu Motegi stated that the “conference put in place the building 
blocks to encourage investment from Japanese companies and to help create Africa’s sustainable 
growth.”685 
 
 Thus while Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline in South Sudan is evidence of an emerging appetite 
within Japan’s private sector to pursue investment opportunities on the continent, this chapter has 
also demonstrated that it has benefitted from concerted government support in realising Japan’s 
energy strategy in East Africa.  A strategy which as a deputy director at METI points out is in part an 
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effort to diversify sources of supply – albeit as “a long term policy.”686  This view is reiterated by a 
representative of JOGMEC who explains that while Africa is not the first priority for Japanese oil and 
gas companies, diversification of supply is always important, so for this reason they will seek 
opportunities where possible.687    
 
In this context and when considering  overarching systemic conditions driving high oil prices in 2008, 
an examination of Japan’s response to the 1973 oil crisis provides a telling indication of how oil 
concerns impacted on Japanese elite perceptions and foreign policy, as well as provides a useful 
base for understanding Japan’s responses to present energy concerns.  Indeed the events of 1973 
effectively created the norms of energy vulnerability that underpin Japan’s energy policies – and tie 
those policies into the framework of the country’s external interactions.  There is an extensive 
literature on norms and ideas as motivators for state behaviour, for example Kratochwil,688  
Goldstein and Keohane,689 and Wendt,690 but in terms of the neoclassical realist framework of this 
study their significance is determined by how they are perceived and acted upon by policymakers.  
Moreover, as with the case of Japan’s energy vulnerability, when the norm is supported by structural 
realities they embolden and reinforce elite decision-making.  Consequently a brief analysis of Japan’s 
experience of the 1973 oil crisis provides an explanatory context to understand the policy decisions 
underlying the prioritisation of equity oil investments and ultimately Toyota Tsusho’s proposed 
pipeline in South Sudan.     
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5.5.1 Policy Lessons from the 1973 Oil Crisis  
 
As Yorke describes, following the decision by OPEC to cut production by 25 per cent and classify 
Japan as an “unfriendly state” in 1973, Japan engaged in a damage limitation program through the 
formulation of bilateral relations with oil at their core.  Yorke continues by noting that, 
Tokyo was thrown into a state of panic.  In order to restore interrupted supplies, 
Japan proceeded to abandon the principle on which its post-war external 
relations had been based: the separation of economic and political matters.691    
Indeed as a MOFA official points out, energy security has not always been on the agenda of Japan’s 
(post-World War II) foreign policy priorities692 – however the energy crisis in 1973 changed that.  The 
oil shock effectively ended the high growth period of the Japanese economy and pushed energy 
security to the forefront of policy making until the mid-1990s when energy prices collapsed. Thus 
reassuring Japanese elites that energy resources – though still of critical importance, could be 
secured on the world’s energy markets.    
 
The 1973 oil crisis therefore had considerable repercussions in Japan, both in terms of the economic 
costs of reduced growth and in terms of the diplomatic response to the threat to energy supplies. 
Throughout the 1960s, Japan experienced double-digit growth yet between 1974 and 1978 the Japanese 
economy grew at only 3.7 per cent,693 thereby demonstrating the continued economic damage caused 
by the oil disruptions and increased price of oil.   As Eguchi points out, there has always been a very close 
link in the Japanese economy between energy consumption and the growth rate, as well as a link 
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between growth and the price of oil.694  Basically, higher energy prices compel the government to pursue 
restrained monetary and fiscal policies so as to avoid the inflationary pressures associated with higher oil 
prices.  Yet the most significant long-term outcome of the crisis was the absorption of energy security 
priorities within all aspects of policymaking.   
 
As outlined in Chapter Three, the resultant energy security policy rested on five core pillars: energy 
source diversification, energy import source diversification, strengthening ties with major oil and gas 
producers, oil stockpiling and energy conservation.695  In many respects the concerted efforts of the 
government were realised in achieving these objectives, with the share of oil in total energy 
consumption declining from around 72 per cent in 1979 to 40 per cent in 2010.696  Although still heavily 
dependent on imported fossil fuels, the country also become a world leader in energy saving technology 
and steadily introduced nuclear power into the power generation mix – from three per cent in 1973 to 
30 per cent in 2010 and this was expected to grow to 50 per cent in 2030.697  Consequently, as the chief 
economist of the IEEJ points out, despite significant strides in the past 40 years to reduce dependence 
on oil, “the fact remains that we are still very dependent on fossil fuel.”  He continues by noting that 
since Fukushima and the nuclear shutdown, the gap in energy supply is largely being made up by LNG-
fired power plants, with more LNG coming from Qatar – “therefore dependence on the Middle East is 
increasing again.”698  
 
The meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi plant has had a number of significant repercussions for the 
country’s energy planning and polices, quite beyond the human and ecological disaster that is still 
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unfolding.  Energy security is again at the forefront of the attention of Japanese policy makers and 
the public, and as Vivodo points out, unlike in the 1970s, when the focus was on affordability and 
security of oil supplies, the current challenge is multidimensional.699  Japan remains a leading player 
in the field of nuclear power generation and the debate currently raging about whether to abandon 
nuclear power altogether will impact on the country’s ability to export nuclear technology and skills, 
as well as the longer-term planning around making up the nuclear shortfall with increased imports of 
fossil fuels. Indeed, such was the extent of the shock caused by the nuclear shutdown on Japan’s 
economy that in 2011 Japan recorded its first trade deficit since the second crisis of 1979, with the 
trade deficit mainly caused by an increase of 25 per cent in fossil fuel imports – adding up to one 
third of Japan’s import spending in 2011.700  
 
A further significant element of the 1973 oil crisis to consider is Japan’s foreign policy response.  OPEC’s 
embargo led to Japan’s first break with American foreign policy when Japan called for Israel’s withdrawal 
from all the territories occupied in 1967 and reiterated Japan’s support concerning the Palestinians’ right 
to self-determination, and hinted at a reconsideration of its policy towards Israel.  Yorke refers to this 
process as Japan’s departure into “resource diplomacy.”701  Thus the events of 1973 highlighted not only 
Japan’s severe dependence on imported oil  – made worse by the fact that at that time Japan had no 
emergency oil stockpiles, but also stressed the need to diversify its sources of supply.   Furthermore, the 
1973 oil crisis, and to a slightly lesser extent, the oil disruptions following the Iranian revolution in 1979, 
highlighted the extent to which energy concerns had become the central issue for Japan’s foreign policy 
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in the Middle East – resulting in bilateral diplomacy with the oil producing states, centred around 
investment aid and trade.702   
 
Consequently Japan’s energy vulnerability norms, developed in response to the crises of the 1970s, 
are again in sharp focus and exacerbated by the loss of 30 per cent of power generating capacity 
following the post-Fukushima nuclear shutdown.  So despite the growing significance of LNG in the 
country’s power mix, the heavy reliance on oil in the transport sector remains.  As Vivodo points out, 
the lessons that Japan has learnt from the 1970s oil crises attest to the dangers of increased reliance 
on imported fossil fuels, and are today “exacerbated by the increased imports of oil to fuel thermal 
plants, zero-sum competition for oil with China, India and South Korea, and US pressure to reduce oil 
imports from Iran.”703  In essence, these structural pressures are once again affirming the perception 
among Japanese elites of the country’s energy vulnerability, and energy security is becoming a 
central feature of Japan’s foreign policy agenda.  
 
The realisation of Japan’s long-term energy security strategy in the context of its African 
engagements is therefore dependent not only on elite-level policymakers, but also on the dynamics 
of Japan’s private sector.  This section has emphasised the neoclassical realist position that domestic 
considerations build on structural pressures and affect the timing and manner of government 
policies.  Yet despite these challenges Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline in South Sudan also 
highlights Japan’s refocused attention on Africa as a location to pursue the country’s future energy 
diversification, as well as places Japanese energy investments into the context of a broader 
engagement with Africa that includes ODA and security engagement.    
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5.6 Conclusion  
 
Despite the markedly different global conditions under which Japan’s current engagement in South 
Sudan is occurring when compared with Japan’s presence in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s, one 
key driver remains the same: access to natural resources.  Japan today faces the systemic challenges 
of maintaining its economic position and carving a space of political relevance in a global order 
increasingly influenced by emerging powers – against the backdrop of the enduring perception of 
the country’s energy vulnerability.  In the decades since Japan’s first resource-led engagement in 
Africa during the 1960s and 1970s the world has changed fundamentally, and Japan’s current 
economic and political imperatives reflect these changes.  During the 1960s as the so-called 
“Japanese miracle” of post war reconstruction was unfolding, the country’s rapid growth was 
dependent on imported resources, while today Japan faces the challenge to re-invigorate a rich but 
stagnant economic model.  As such, the lure of Africa’s energy and mineral resources must be 
contextualised against the changes that have taken place in Japan, and across the rest of the world.   
Changes that have seen Japan’s economic status overtaken by a rising China and a growing 
realisation that Japan needs to reconsider the risk aversion that has characterised its political and 
economic direction in recent years 
 
Consequently, the Toyota Tsusho bid to develop an alternative oil pipeline in South Sudan should be 
understood as part of a broader initiative to drive Japanese energy-based investment in Africa.  
While South Sudan inhabits a high-risk frontier position within East Africa’s investment space, it 
offers a significant opportunity for one of the newest and smallest Sogo Sosha to play a key part in 
the development of infrastructure that will underpin the region’s oil and gas industry – while also 
offering the potential to purchase Hinomaru oil.  Put another way, the pipeline is also an important 
opportunity to expand the frontiers of Japan’s presence and thereby its interests in the region.  
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Thus when considered in terms of Japan’s overall engagement in South Sudan, the pipeline bid best 
illustrates a willingness to engage in more risky, politically sensitive investments that are driven as 
much by existing imperatives such as energy security as by a desire to demonstrate Japan’s status as 
a committed contributor and investor in Africa’s development.  Moreover, growing interest in East 
Africa’s energy potential is a significant backdrop to Japan’s corresponding interests in establishing a 
presence in South Sudan through high-profile ODA projects and a peacekeeping contribution.  Thus 
the high level of Japanese engagement in South Sudan, combined with the sensitivity of the pipeline 
project, and Japan’s renewed energy security considerations reflect a neoclassical realist analysis of 
the Japanese government’s response to changes in the global environment. Indeed this chapter 
expanded upon the causal effects of the systemic pressures discussed in Chapter Three with analysis 
of Japan’s domestic energy considerations to arrive at an explanation for the foreign policy 
motivations supporting Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline in South Sudan.  A policy response that is 
interpreted through the particular prism of Japan’s domestic experience of dependence on imported 
energy, and which is now manifesting in Japan’s refocused engagement in Africa.   
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6. Security Engagement   
 
The previous chapters explored Japan’s ODA and resource-led investment strategy in South Sudan as 
a barometer of broader engagement and intent underlying Japan’s re-engagement in Africa.  In this 
regard, the previous chapters reflect a tactical response by Japan to the strategic objectives of 
economic growth and ensuring energy security as described in Chapter Three.  This Chapter will 
therefore outline the third key tactic or method of engagement underpinning Japan’s commitments 
on the continent – namely security engagement.  Comprising UN peacekeepers in South Sudan and a 
multilateral anti-piracy operation in the Horn of Africa, the expansion of Japan’s presence on the 
continent to include a security dimension is significant both as a reflection of the growing 
importance of Africa within Japan’s foreign policy objectives, and in terms of the complex 
constitutional considerations that accompany the deployment of Japan’s armed forces.   
 
Thus in line with neoclassical realist analysis, this chapter will also explore the steadily increasing 
role and profile of the Self Defence Forces (SDF) in the context of domestic debates around the 
interpretation of Japan’s constitutional restrictions such as the right to collective self-defence.  In 
this respect this chapter will further outline the structural pressures underpinning Japan’s expanding 
international security role and the extent to which its African security engagements can be 
understood as important test-cases that create precedents and advance the boundaries of Japan’s 
constitutional debate in locations far from the public consciousness.   
 
It is important at this juncture to also clarify how the term security is understood in this section, and 
more broadly throughout the study.  With the exception of specific reference to Japan’s policy of 
human security discussed below, security is understood in its most basic interpretation as those 
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factors related to the armed forces of Japan and the policies related to their deployment.  Security 
engagement therefore refers to those aspects of Japan’s interaction in Africa undertaken by its 
armed forces.  In this context, this study does not engage with the extensive literature on security 
studies or securitisation in international relations (for example see works by Baldwin,704 Booth705 or 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde706) – but rather recognises the challenge of terminology when referring 
to the military in Japan.  As Smith describes, the particular complexities of Japan’s constitution has 
resulted in sensitivity among policymakers around the use of specific terminology related to 
defence, national security or the military.707  For this reason this study only refers to the armed 
forces by their official titles and uses a single term, security, to identify all matters pertaining to the 
military and the operational deployment of the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) and Maritime Self 
Defence Force (MSDF).    
 
Perhaps the single biggest change in the evolution of Japan’s engagement with Africa is the inclusion 
of a security element within the relationship.  In other words, while many foreign actors such as the 
US, Britain or France have long combined their business and aid engagement in Africa with a military 
dimension – such as training or basing military personnel in the country – the presence of the 
Japanese military in South Sudan and Djibouti is a significant evolution in Japan’s presence on the 
continent.  Thus despite the fact that Japan did deploy Self Defence Force (SDF) personnel to the 
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) between 1993 and 1995,708 the extent and 
scale of the deployment to South Sudan combined with the naval operations in the Horn of Africa 
makes the current operations far more significant.  Indeed as this chapter will describe, the current 
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operations are noteworthy both in terms of the diversity of Japan’s presence in Africa and in terms 
of the evolution of the debate in Japan around the role of the military in Japanese foreign policy.  
 
The inclusion of Japan’s Africa policy within the discourse of a revitalised Japanese foreign policy 
finds expression in Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS).  The NSS calls for Japan to take the 
lead in “setting the international agenda” and to “proactively advance its national interests, without 
being confined to a reactionary position to events and incidents after they have already occurred.”709 
The NSS is thus effectively outlining a sea-change in Japan’s international engagement and reflects 
Japan’s response to evolving dynamics in the international environment.  It also seeks to promote an 
image of focused security priorities after a period of seven years characterised by the rapid turnover 
of political leaders – five different prime ministers between Abe’s first administration (which only 
lasted a year) in 2006 and his second which began in late 2012.   
 
Yet despite the shifting priorities of different administrations, there has been continuity regarding 
Japan steadily increasing security engagement in Africa since 2008 – as well as a link between this 
engagement and a broader recognition within Japan of the country’s international responsibilities.   
As Singh710 observes, a consequence of Japan’s experience in the US-led “war on terror” was that the 
conception of national security was widened to incorporate an international or global dimension.  In 
conceptually and logistically formulating Japan’s support for the US invasion of Afghanistan, the 
Koizumi administration (2001-2006) expanded the concept of national security from a narrow, 
geographically-defined conception to a global one.  This broad principle has been carried through 
subsequent LDP and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administrations from the first tentative 
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commitment to UN operations in Sudan in 2008 to the deployment in South Sudan and 
establishment of the Djibouti facility.  In this way Japan’s security engagement in Africa reflects not 
only the country’s ambition to expand its influence and security footprint, but also a realisation that 
what happens internationally matters in Japan too.    
 
Singh continues by outlining the evolution of this discourse in terms of Japan’s support for the “war 
on terror”, and how the government tied events such as the Bali bombings in 2002 and the 
perceived threat of “weapons of mass destruction” to Japan’s own domestic vulnerabilities.  
Consequently, “Japan’s participation in the US-led “war on terror” significantly strengthened the 
international dimension in its security policy and its international-state security identity, as the SDF 
was authorised to operate in activities outside the areas surrounding Japan.”711  Despite 
McCormack712 arguing that Japan will be obliged eventually to apply the same levels of cooperation 
to bilateral security operations with the US in other regional and global crises, internationalisation 
has nonetheless become a permanent feature of Japan’s security profile with the establishment of 
the MSDF facility in Djibouti.  This chapter will therefore explore these dynamics through the 
theoretical framework of neoclassical realism by identifying the structural drivers of Japan’s 
expanding security presence in Africa and contextualising that presence in terms of the intervening 
considerations of Japan’s particular constitutional restraints and popular conceptions of national 
pacifism. 
 
When considering Japanese engagement in South Sudan in the broader context of Japan’s Africa 
policy, South Sudan is significant as it is the only country to which Japan has currently deployed 
peacekeeping troops.  Japan’s commitment to contribute forces to the United Nations Mission in the 
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Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)713 constitutes the third key strand of engagement in South Sudan 
and introduces an important security dimension to the relationship – tying together development 
assistance and investment with the complexity of Japan’s security policies.  Policies which are 
complex because of the country’s constitutional restrictions, but as will be explored in this chapter, 
also represent the domestic dimensions, or unit-level factors of Japan’s policy response to the 
structural drivers underpinning the wider expansion of Japan’s engagement in Africa.  Furthermore, 
structural considerations are changing the parameters in which the domestic debate around Japan’s 
security policy is deliberated – along with underpinning the economic and energy security 
imperatives at the heart of Japan’s re-energised engagement in Africa.  The presence of 
peacekeepers in South Sudan and the MSDF in Djibouti therefore links the domestic discourse 
around the role of the security forces in shaping Japan’s identity as a state with its international 
identity as a multilateral aid donor and investor.  In this regard the decision by Tokyo to expand its 
presence in Africa to include a security dimension targets multiple audiences – both foreign and 
domestic.      
 
The deployment of a GSDF engineering battalion to UNMISS in November 2011 was therefore a 
significant indicator in building the relationship between Japan and South Sudan, as well as signalling 
Japan’s intention to shoulder greater international commitments. The deployment of the 
engineering unit coincided with the establishment of a permanent diplomatic office – later upgraded 
to an embassy, which was well received by the government in Juba.  A South Sudanese government 
minister noted that “out of the ‘A’ groups of countries, Japan is the only country that contributes to 
the peacekeeping forces in the state.”714  Significantly, Minister Marial Benjamin also went on to 
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reference Japanese Sogo Sosha Toyota Tsusho’s involvement in conducting a feasibility study for the 
proposed oil pipeline to Lamu.  The government thereby indicated that the multiple dimensions of 
Japan’s engagement in South Sudan are recognised as being linked, and effectively build upon one 
another in cementing relations.   
 
Similarly as Professor Kataoka points out, “Japan considers South Sudan very important”715 and the 
UNMISS deployment is also seen as part of a greater engagement that includes targeted ODA, 
investment and the expansion of Japan’s regional presence and relevance.   The professor continues 
by noting that Japan’s immediate recognition of South Sudan’s independence in 2011 was unusual, 
in that the wheels within MOFA tend to move much more cautiously – and slowly.  But the presence 
of Japan’s vice minister for foreign affairs at South Sudan’s independence ceremony716 in Juba was 
recognition of Japan’s steadily increasing role among the international players in South Sudan.  
Indeed when responsibility for Sudan within MOFA was transferred from the Middle East Bureau to 
Africa Bureau One in 2007, the profile and importance of Sudan within Japan’s Africa policy, and 
ultimately its foreign policy more generally, increased considerably.  In this regard as Professor 
Kataoka continues, “Japan started to see Sudan as important from that time.”717   
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, Japan was involved in supporting the implementation of the CPA.    
JICA had reopened an office in Khartoum a few years previously, and Japan later took an active role 
within the international community’s efforts to support and monitor the CPA milestones through the 
provision of multilateral grant aid in support of the 2010 elections and the referendum in 2011.  The 
greater importance afforded to Sudan within MOFA after its transfer to the Africa Bureau in 2007 
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also reflected the importance that the United States was placing on securing peace in Sudan, and 
therefore its prominence as an international issue.  Considering UN Security Council resolutions in 
2007, 66 per cent of the resolutions passed related to conflict in Africa and of those ten per cent 
were related to Sudan.718 Consequently Japan’s desire to play a more important international 
security role would require a peacekeeping engagement in Africa.  This began with a modest 
deployment of three officers to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)719 in 2008.  So while 
this deployment in some way laid the groundwork for Japan’s much greater commitment to the 
subsequent UNMISS mission in independent South Sudan, it also highlights the increased political 
relevance that Tokyo placed on building relations with the newly independent state.    
 
Thus while the UNMISS contribution is interesting in terms of what it says about Japan’s 
commitment to South Sudan, it is also significant as the peacekeeping commitment  forms an 
integral part of Japan’s international security contribution, along with the anti-piracy operations in 
the Horn of Africa.  The decision to send peacekeepers to South Sudan no doubt contained within it 
elements of foreign policy imperative interpreted via the domestic considerations so central to 
Japan’s security policy.  As Dr Michishita observes, the deployment to South Sudan was “easy and 
necessary.”720 Following the withdrawal of the Japanese contingents from the Golan Heights721 and 
Haiti,722 there was increasing international pressure on Japan combined with domestic perceptions 
that China was contributing troops to peacekeeping missions and that Japan should also be seen to 
do so.  Furthermore, as Dr Michishita continues, the fact that South Sudan was close to Western 
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countries and important to US policy in Africa meant that providing peacekeepers in South Sudan 
was a “win-win situation for us [Japan].  It allows us to revive our presence in the international 
security community, support our allies, kind-of compete with China and establish a stepping stone to 
bolster our position in Africa.”723  
 
6.1 GSDF Deployment to South Sudan  
  
Japan began the deployment of a GSDF engineering unit of 330 personnel to South Sudan in 
November 2011, tasked with infrastructure projects such as the restoration of roads, as well as 
maintenance and improvement of UN logistics facilities.724 In addition, approximately 20 personnel 
are stationed at a Coordination Centre and liaise with relevant organisations, while a further three 
staff officers are stationed at UNMISS Headquarters.725   
 
In outlining the rationale for the deployment the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes two priorities 
underlining the deployment:   
1. The Government of Japan recognises that peace and stability of South Sudan is important for 
the peace and stability of Africa, and that support for the nation-building and stability of 
South Sudan is one of the significant challenges for which the international community 
needs to work on cooperatively. 
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2. The Government of Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, 
remains committed in cooperating with the international community and making proactive 
efforts toward the achievement of peace and stability in South Sudan.726 
 
In laying out these priorities the government placed the UNMISS deployment in the context of 
Japan’s decade-long support for human security which has been a central pillar of ODA policies in 
Africa, as well as its desire to meet international commitments –  and thereby entrench its position 
as a relevant and major player within the international community.  As Professor Fukushima 
observes, “Japan’s overseas commitments are changing in nature, what began twenty years ago with 
special legislation is now experiencing an expanding scope of operations.”727  This combined with a 
more targeted ODA strategy means that Japan’s engagement in South Sudan reflects a new 
approach.  Indeed, as Professor Nakanishi points out, in South Sudan Japan is “combining human 
security objectives with strategic gains.”728     
 
The decision to commit peacekeepers to UNMISS has allowed Japan to refine a concept first coined 
during Japan’s commitment to UN operations in Haiti – an “All Japan” project.  Namely extensive 
coordination between all components of Japan’s operations in the country: SDF, MOFA, and JICA 
harmonised in terms of the overall ODA budget priorities in that country.729 Though increasing 
coordination between the SDF and JICA began in Iraq, where Japan’s experience in Samara 
effectively created a new framework for overseas deployment,730 the deployment in South Sudan is 
significant in that it was envisaged from the outset as an integrated mission.  Indeed as Professor 
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Kataoka explains, “the “pillars" of Japan’s engagement in Africa are interactive”731 and the 
formalisation of this relationship in South Sudan demonstrates a significant evolution in Japan’s 
overseas commitments.   
 
The deployment of peacekeepers in South Sudan within the framework of an “All Japan” project 
therefore underlines the linkages between Japan’s tactical approaches to realising its strategic 
objectives in Africa.  The Japanese embassy in Juba is largely tasked with coordinating Japan’s 
activities in South Sudan – at all levels ranging from budgets and data collection to the 
implementation of projects.  And while Professor Fukushima explains that “in the past aid people 
had a hesitation of working with uniformed guys”732, the changing reality of Japan’s international 
engagement in South Sudan is altering that mind-set.  As previously discussed, Japanese bilateral 
ODA is increasingly being used to facilitate opportunities for Japanese investment and to 
differentiate Japan from the Western donors and China.  In this context the inclusion of a 
coordinated security dimension to Japan’s presence in South Sudan strengthens the overall impact 
of the provided assistance as well as the message to the government in Juba that Japan is a 
committed partner.   
 
The coordinated approach to Japan’s ODA and security engagement in South Sudan along with the 
anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa that will be examined later in this chapter all point to an 
expanded role for Japan’s military within the country’s external engagements.   Yet in exploring the 
transformation of Japan’s public perception from a pacifist state to one with an international 
security identity, it is important to first understand the evolution of the human security approach 
within Japan’s security discourse.  As the following section will outline, the concept of human 
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security has become fused with domestic debates around constitutional interpretations of collective 
security – and have therefore directly impacted on Japan’s UNMISS deployment.  
 
6.1.1 Human Security and Peacekeeping   
 
The literature related to the evolution of Japan’s peacekeeping within its broader security discourse 
is quite extensive – including work by Dobson,733 George,734 Ishizuka735 and Yanai.736 Yet the 
underlying principle of human security can be traced throughout.  As Suzuki notes, the human 
security approach became “a guiding principle for Japan to remain relevant in the post-Cold War 
world, within the ‘pacifist’ constitutional constraints which limit Japan’s active engagement in 
traditional security issues.”737  Indeed Prime Minister Abe remarked at the UN General Assembly in 
September 2013 that,  
until now Japan has continually promoted the concept of “human security.”  The 
implications of this concept will surely expand as well [… ] Japan is determined to 
further spread the concept and build actual practices.738   
 
Abe then continued by committing Japan to serving as a “proactive Contributor to Peace […] even 
more actively engaged in UN collective security measures, including peacekeeping operations.”  Thus 
Abe effectively linked the UNMISS deployment in South Sudan to Japan’s key international policy 
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position.  In doing so, Abe highlighted the significance of South Sudan within Japan’s Africa policy – 
the embodiment of the “comprehensive” human security response ranging from ODA to 
peacekeeping – but also addressed a domestic audience on the issue of how Japan’s involvement in 
collective security should be interpreted.    
 
The concept of human security emerged as a response the “new” security challenges of the post-
Cold War era and sought to look beyond the state to focus rather on individual people in developing 
security approaches.  Thus the prevalence of intra-state conflicts, refugees and continuing 
development inequalities prompted a view that focused on health, development and education 
initiatives.  Emerging in the 1990s, the notion fitted well with Japan’s pursuit of a non-military 
international presence and became a central element in the country’s ODA and foreign policy 
agenda – with MOFA and JICA absorbing the concept as an institutional norm.  Former Prime 
Minister Keizō Obuchi (1998-2000) defined the concept as the “key which comprehensively covers 
all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens 
the efforts to confront those threats.”739  Moreover Japan’s Diplomatic Blue book for the year 2000 
described human security as a key perspective in developing Japan’s foreign policy.740  
 
Whereas the notion of human security generated considerable debate and analysis (for example see 
works by Acharya741, Lam742 and Paris743), it remained largely undefined and allowed states and 
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international organisations to interpret it in terms of their prevailing policy agendas.  Indeed as Paris 
points out, “the most ardent backers of human security appear to have an interest in keeping the 
term expansive and vague.”744 Accordingly as the UN evolved ever more interventionist 
peacekeeping policies throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, so too did Japan broaden its 
interpretation of human security to involve a greater role for peacekeeping troops – resulting in the 
“All Japan” approach that unites ODA and peacekeeping strategies today in South Sudan.      
 
The evolution and development of Japan’s peacekeeping engagements have continued through both 
LDP and DPJ administrations.  Indeed the decision by former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama to 
commit Japanese peacekeepers to South Sudan was continued by his immediate successors Naoto 
Kan and Yoshihiko Noda, as well as being enthusiastically supported by current Prime Minister Abe.   
This process has been made possible by passing small incremental pieces of legislation to manoeuvre 
around the restrictions of the constitution – for example, 21 pieces of security legislation were 
passed between 1992 and 2005.745  
 
The Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other 
Operations, also known as the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) of 1992 authorised Japan 
to send troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations for the first time.  Arguably, the 
legislation reflected the response of the Toshiki Kaifu administration to the loss of international 
standing and criticism following the Gulf War where Japan’s contribution was limited to financial 
support.  Shinoda notes that although the resultant IPCL legislation did not serve the original 
objective, “it provided Tokyo with a new diplomatic tool for contributing personnel to the 
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international community.”746 In addition, it was also becoming increasingly apparent to Japan’s 
government that narrowly defined security policy was incongruent with the new security culture of 
the early post-Cold War period.  As Singh points out, “instead of retreating into the background as it 
did/could during the Cold War, Japan had to demonstrate its membership of international society by 
claiming a stake and contributing to the post-Cold War security order.”747 The result was 
peacekeeping commitments constrained to operate within the so-called “Five Principles” which 
govern Japan’s peacekeeping operations and do not allow for collective self-defence.  This effectively 
means that Japan’s UNMISS contingent rely on Rwandese soldiers to provide their security,748 and 
they are restricted to operate in Juba.749   
 
The development of the legal framework for Japan’s peacekeeping operations is best understood 
through the perspective of neoclassical realism.  As described above, Japanese policymakers 
responded to changing structural conditions and international pressures in the context of the 
particular domestic dynamics that define the country’s security considerations.  In this respect the 
domestic intervening factors interpret systemic conditions as well as define – or in the case of 
Japan’s constitution, restrict  – the state’s potential responses.  Thus as Rose explains, states are 
“likely to want more rather than less external influence, and pursue such influence to the extent 
they are able to do so.”750 This chapter will therefore explore how security engagement in Africa 
since 2008, while reflecting new structural pressures and existing domestic dynamics, has also 
significantly advanced the evolution of Japan’s international security engagement.     
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Japanese peacekeepers in South Sudan are therefore still required to conduct their work around the 
complex interpretations of the constitution.  As such, they are unable to engage in collective self 
defence of their fellow UNMISS peacekeepers and South Sudanese civilians – despite the fact that 
protection of civilians remains central to the UNMISS mandate.   As Dr Michishta points out, “there is 
a relationship between the current debate around collective self-defence and peacekeeping 
operations.  But as far as [South] Sudan is concerned, we don’t assume there would be such a 
situation, so don’t debate it in that [context].”751  However the violence that erupted in South Sudan 
in December 2013 was just such a situation, and challenged the Abe administration to find a balance 
between the domestic restraints of the constitution and the international perceptions of Japan as a 
reliable partner in security operations.      
 
Thus while the evolution of Japan’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations reflects the 
complex and convoluted nature of Japan’s post-war security identity, and the apparent de facto 
dissolution of Japan’s image as a pacifist state  (see Hughes,752 Johnson753 and Mathur 754) the crisis 
in South Sudan nonetheless posed a considerable challenge to the Japanese government.  The 
deployment was the centrepiece of Japan’s commitment to an integrated human security 
programme in Africa and had featured strongly in Prime Minister Abe’s speech only months before 
at the UN General Assembly.  Moreover the outbreak of violence effectively meant that the debate 
on collective self-defence was now at the very forefront of Japan’s ability to carry out its 
international security commitments.   
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When considering what Izumikawa refers to as “Japan’s dramatically changed attitude toward 
overseas military involvement”755, some authors such as Johnson have claimed that the “the 
Japanese government has launched a stealth programme of incremental rearmament.”  And that the 
impetus towards “normalisation” of the military includes – among others – the sending of troops 
abroad, and a growing acceptance of military solutions to international problems.756 Thus by 
implication, the many pieces of peacekeeping legislation passed since 1992, bolstered by a further 
series of context-driven “exceptions” to the strict rules of engagement for Japanese peacekeepers 
are effectively changing the context around which the constitutional debate is occurring in Japan.  
Indeed, the outbreak of violence in South Sudan arguably created a scenario that provided the Abe 
administration with enough justification to radically alter the constitutional interpretation of 
collective defence by appealing to the clearly “exceptional” circumstances facing Japanese troops.   
 
The announcement by the Japanese government that they will supply ammunition757 to South 
Korean peacekeepers in South Sudan is just such an example.  Citing the urgency of the crisis in 
South Sudan Japanese officials made an exception to the long-standing arms embargo that restricts 
the sale and distribution of weapons.  In making the decision, the National Security Council decided 
to overlook the “three rules on arms exports” and its official interpretation of the peace cooperation 
law.  Shortly thereafter in January 2014, Prime Minister Abe called for the three principles to be 
revised to allow “Japan to keep up with the times.”758     
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These developments are noteworthy in the context of this study in that they demonstrate the 
significance of Japan’s peacekeeping operations in South Sudan within the broader framework of 
Japan’s ambitions to play a greater international security role.  Certainly Japan’s response to the to 
the conflict is telling in that the Japanese government was quick to confirm that its troops would 
remain in South Sudan despite the outbreak of violence.759  Furthermore, when Prime Minister Abe 
addressed the African Union (AU) in January 2014 he committed a further US$ 25 million760 to 
address the crisis in South Sudan, reiterating his support for Japan’s peacekeeping operation.  
Indeed Abe continued his policy speech by calling for a stronger economy, and for Japan to play a 
greater security role abroad.  Professor Hughes reiterates this point by noting that ODA and TICAD is 
not enough – a security presence is needed in Africa to demonstrate that Japan is global power.761  
 
Thus while peacekeeping-related security policy transformed Japan’s security identity from a pacifist 
state into one with a distinct international security presence; the development of Japan’s 
international security role, supported in turn by more confident security policy-makers, drove 
Japan’s involvement in another African security operation.  The strategically significant Anti-Piracy 
operations further push the boundaries of Japan’s security legislation, but more importantly, they 
entwine Japan’s strategic global objectives with its Africa policies.       
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6.2 Anti-piracy Operations in the Horn of Africa  
 
The second component of Japan’s contribution to multilateral international security is its anti-piracy 
operation in the Horn of Africa. This deployment is an important element within Japan’s 
international security presence and also links to a number of areas included in this study such as 
ODA, energy security, responding to the rise of China and broader narratives around Japan’s more 
visible international presence.  Indeed the anti-piracy contribution is significant in that it sends a 
strong signal about Japan’s ambitions to increase its relevance in the international security context, 
and is thus a noteworthy element within the broader Japanese strategic response to changing global 
conditions.   
 
Furthermore, through participation in the anti-piracy operation, the Maritime Self Defence Force 
(MSDF) has established a naval base in Djibouti762 – the first outside Japan since the end of the 
Second World War.  Thus in establishing a physical presence in the region, Africa will remain central 
to discussions around Japan’s evolving security identity and its future contribution to international 
security operations.  For these reasons this study recognises Djibouti as the northern point of a 
strategic arc of emerging Japanese interests that stretches across East Africa to Mozambique in the 
south.  In this context, Japan’s anti-piracy operations consolidate its peacekeeping contribution in 
South Sudan and reinforce the importance of Africa within Japan’s international security policy.  This 
section will therefore examine Japan’s presence in the Horn of Africa in the broader context of the 
country’s international security policies and the neoclassical realist perspective underpinning this 
study.      
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MOFA outlines the following activities that Japan has undertaken in addressing Piracy in the Horn of 
Africa:763   
1. Enacting the "Anti-Piracy Measures Law" which criminalises the act of piracy and enables 
Japan’s naval vessels to protect any ship from pirates regardless of her flag.  The law came 
into effect on 24 July 2009.   
2. Deploying two MSDF destroyers with Japan Coast Guard law enforcement officers on board 
from March 2009, as part of the international effort to enhance maritime security through 
naval patrols and escort operations.  As of 5 September 2012, Japan’s vessels have escorted 
2,805 ships in 389 escort missions. 
3. Deploying two P-3C maritime patrol aircraft to the Gulf of Aden.  These aircraft began patrol 
missions out of Djibouti on 11 June 2009.  
4. Establishing MSDF facility for counter-piracy mission in Djibouti, operations from the facility 
began on 1 June 2011. 
5. Actively participating in discussions in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(CGPCS) established pursuant to UNSC resolution 1851 and its Working Groups.  Japan is 
committed to working in cooperation with other participants in the CGPCS. 
6. Providing financial assistance of approximately US$ 229 million since 2007 through 
international organisations, for improvement of the humanitarian and security situations in 
Somalia. 
7. Contributing US$ 14.6 million to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Djibouti 
Code Trust Fund.  
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8. Initiating multi-donor trust fund for capacity-building in coastal countries neighbouring 
Somalia, and a further US$ 3.5 million to the Trust Fund to Support Initiative of States 
countering pirates off the coast of Somalia for the purpose of prosecution of suspected 
pirates. 
9. Sending survey/ODA missions to the coastal countries including Djibouti and Kenya to 
consider possible assistance in the area of maritime security toward TICAD V (held in June 
2013 in Tokyo).  Japan has also invited coast guard officials of coastal countries neighbouring 
Somalia to training courses and experts meetings in Japan. 
 
In detailing Japan’s contribution to multilateral efforts against piracy, there are a number of aspects 
worth considering.  Firstly, the balance between intervening domestic considerations (enacting 
special legislation), and Japan’s commitment to playing a constructive international role is evident.  
Moreover, linking anti-piracy security operations with ODA objectives and TICAD V further illustrates 
the evolution of Japan’s engagement in Africa.  Indeed, integrating security objectives with targeted 
ODA in a strategically important region one can see parallels with the “All Japan” approach to 
peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. The parallels between the two operations are also 
testimony to what has been referred to as the “deepening and widening” of Japan’s international 
security posture taking place in the context of declining ODA budgets764 – thus requiring a more 
targeted and strategic approach to engagement in Africa.  An approach to East Africa which this 
study recognises  as including ODA and energy-linked investments, as well as securing energy supply 
routes – all of which are essentially strengthened by a military presence in the Horn of Africa.   
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The threat of piracy to Japan’s maritime interests in the region also encouraged Japanese 
policymakers to develop a more collaborative approach to the issue of maritime security, given that 
Japan faces particular obstacles when it comes to multilateral engagement in security matters.  Yet 
Japan’s latest NSS (released December 2013), identifies Japan as a “proactive contributor to 
peace”765, a role which includes the protection of Japan’s access to global supply chains and natural 
resources – including energy.  As Bateman points out, “deploying warships to counter piracy 
operations off the Horn of Africa also serves the purpose of governments wishing to establish a 
strategic presence and influence in a region that is politically unstable but vitally important as a 
source of energy.”766  The anti-piracy operations therefore provide a multi-purpose platform for 
establishing a strategic footprint.  Bateman further notes that while the anti-piracy deployments 
were ostensibly to protect Japanese merchant ships, 
Japan was also concerned about its prestige and image in the region, 
particularly after China had decided to deploy warships to anti-piracy 
operations off the coast of Somalia.  The deployments also aligned with 
Japan’s desire to attain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and 
helped the MSDF to justify its substantial budget.767  
Indeed as previously discussed, the role of African support for UN Security Council reform is 
recognised in Tokyo where the TICAD initiative was ostensibly launched in 1993 as a mechanism 
towards achieving that goal.  Thus the presence of Japanese peacekeepers in South Sudan and MSDF 
ships in Djibouti further establishes Japan’s credentials as committed to the region.   
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Japan’s contribution to anti-piracy operations therefore bring together a number of areas included 
in this research project: namely ODA, energy security, Japan’s response to a rising China, and a 
broader discourse on Japan’s engagement in Africa reflecting a “revitalised” and more assertive 
international presence.  While Japan’s ODA policy was discussed in Chapter Four and energy security 
formulations in Africa were discussed in Chapter Five, it is worth noting a few salient aspects that 
embed these issues within the analysis of Japan’s anti-piracy operations.   
 
Firstly, Japan’s aid policy has evolved to reflect a changing approach and priorities towards 
engagement in Africa.  Among those changes are a more targeted and strategic use of aid in line 
with Japan’s broader strategic objectives and the interaction between the country’s ODA policies 
and international security presence.   For example, as Aoki points out, TICAD V featured three official 
themes: robust and sustainable economy, inclusive and resilient society, and peace and stability.768 
In terms of the commitment to peace and stability, Japan resolved to share Asian experiences in 
combating piracy as well as committing to support peacekeeping on the continent.  In addition, a 
special conference on Somalia769 was convened on the margins of TICAD V which highlighted Japan’s 
security contribution in the region as well its status as a leading international aid donor.  The 
inclusion of the conference on Somalia thus reflected the incorporation of Japan’s international 
security presence within the broader context of its Africa policies.  Indeed the “Yokohama 
Declaration” which emerged from TICAD V reflected not only Japan’s growing security presence in 
Africa alongside its well established role as an ODA provider, but it also reflected Japan’s broader 
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global ambitions by reiterating the country’s “determination to urgently reform UN bodies, including 
the Security Council.”770  
 
Secondly, Japan is almost completely dependent on imported energy resources – the majority of 
which originate in the Middle East, and of which 99 per cent of oil and 96 per cent of LNG are 
imported by sea.771  Graham argues that an “ingrained perception” of vulnerability and dependency 
regarding access to vital resources pervades policymaking in Japan.772  Consequently as Japan’s NSS 
highlights, the region is central to Japan’s energy security policies, “vulnerability is also increasing in 
sea lanes of communication, spanning between Japan and the Middle East, on which Japan is largely 
dependent for its natural and energy resources.”  In this regard the NSS outlines a combination of 
military and political initiatives in expanding effective alliance relationships but highlighting the need 
for Japan to “proactively advance its national interests.”773    
 
Thus while Graham argues that “piracy is more of an irritant to the global maritime transportation 
system than a system threat”774, it has certainly resulted in focused attention from policy makers in 
Japan – while also enabling Coast Guard and MSDF lobbies to defend budgetary claims.  Likewise as 
Bateman observes, apart from the direct threat of piracy there is also a broader strategic context to 
consider, “Piracy has allowed Japan to establish a strategic presence in key areas where Japan has a 
vital interest in securing the safety and security of SLOCs”775 (Sea Lanes of Communication). Indeed, 
as a Professor Fukushima points out, “having an international presence is a message, and the SDF 
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gains more utility in a strategic sense”776 than it does from merely preventing Japanese ships from 
being targeted by pirates.  Thus when considering that the Bab-el-Mandeb strait777 between Yemen 
and Djibouti which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden is a recognised “choke point”778 in an 
area vital to Japan’s trade and energy security – establishing a permanent foothold in the region 
through the Djibouti MSDF facility is a strong position from which advance Japan’s interests.   
 
Furthermore, the presence of Japan’s ships as part of an international operation supports the 
development of closer ties between Japanese forces and their existing allies such as the US, and 
potential future allies such as India.  While the MSDF works closely with the organised naval task 
forces in the region such as the European Union’s ATALANTA, US-led CTF 151 or NATOs operation 
Ocean Shield, Japan is not a part of a distinct task force.  Yet beyond areas of cooperation Bateman 
observes that “piracy has served the broader strategic interests of all three rising powers of Asia – 
China, India and Japan.”  All three nations have sought to play a role in anti-piracy operations off the 
coast of Somalia, but with “an element of strategic competition.” They have all deployed warships to 
Somalia on anti-piracy operations and have provided capacity building assistance to local security 
forces.  But as Bateman concludes, “these actions have been as much about competing for regional 
power and influence as about countering piracy.”779  
 
Indeed as Hughes points out, Japan took “special note” of China’s first decision to dispatch 
destroyers to the Somali coast in 2008.  It is also worth recognising that this event coincided with the 
other factors identified by this study as significant turning points for Japan’s approach to Africa that 
took place in and around 2008.   As Hughes goes on to explain, it was not just the modernisation of 
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China’s military capabilities that concerned Japan, but “that it has a new appetite to project military 
power outside its own territory”780 – an appetite that Japan now shares and has consolidated with 
the MSDF facility in Djibouti.  Both Japan and China have demonstrated that their presence in the 
waters off the Horn of Africa arguably extends far beyond the immediate threat of Somali pirates, 
but rather to a more sustained and long-term securitisation of the SLOCs along which Asia’s vital 
energy resources travel.   
 
6.2.1 Developing a Military Footprint in Djibouti 
 
Japan’s anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa encompass a range of factors that contextualise 
and underpin the broader narrative around Japan’s re-engagement in Africa.  Including Japan’s more 
proactive, assertive international presence developed in response to concerns over energy security 
and China’s growing influence in Africa and the Western Indian Ocean.  The strategic opportunity 
created by the piracy threat is such that Japan has established a permanent facility for the first time 
outside of Japan since the end of the Second World War.  The facility brings together an integrated 
team of approximately 200781 MSDF, GSDF, Japan Coast Guard, aircraft maintenance crews and 
security officers.  And this is happening in Africa – reflecting a new engagement that has 
strengthened and evolved to incorporate new dimensions.    
 
Japan’s military presence in Djibouti began in May 2009 when the MSDF P-3 (maritime patrol plane) 
detachment rented space at Camp Lemonnier782 – the only official US military base in Africa.  The 
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base is located alongside Djibouti’s airport and makes use of its runway783 and in July 2011 the 
Japanese contingent moved to a purpose built facility alongside Camp Lemonnier.  Formally known 
as the “Japanese Facility for Counter-Piracy Mission in Djibouti”, it is notable that the Japanese 
government avoids the word “base” as this implies a permanent deployment – though the 
government currently estimates a presence of ten years in Djibouti.784 A position endorsed by 
Hughes who points out that with an estimated 2,300 merchant ships of concern to Japan passing 
through the Gulf of Aden annually it “will ensure that the MSDF remains on station for the long 
term.”785 
 
As Professor Fukushima points out, the facility in Djibouti provides unparalleled opportunities for 
intelligence-gathering, and “communicating with other actors”786 – mostly the United States.  Camp 
Lemonnier is home to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)787 which apart from 
piracy is tasked with combating extremism and executes the United States’ “War on Terror” 
operations in the region.  As Professor Kataoka explains, the “US factor”788 was an important 
consideration for Japan in opening their base in Djibouti.  Since strengthening the Japan-US alliance 
through practical engagement and developing interoperability of systems and processes is vitally 
important for Japanese military planners.  Interoperability refers to the ability of different military 
organisations to conduct joint operations, and it allows forces, units or systems to operate 
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together.789  By developing a common doctrine and procedures through long term engagement in 
the Horn of Africa, Japan’s military is overcoming a very practical hurdle that is rarely included in the 
debates around Japan’s collective defence capabilities.  Indeed as Hughes points out, while Japan’s 
participation in anti-piracy operations will be useful addition to international security efforts, “more 
importantly it will enable the [SDF] to expand and prolong its presence in the Indian Ocean and 
beyond.”790  
 
Thus extending and broadening Japan’s military presence beyond East Asia is hugely important for 
building alliance structures, as well as demonstrating Japan’s ambitions as an internationally 
responsible and relevant security actor.  The NSS confirms this by underscoring Japan’s intention to 
be more proactive – but in the broader alliance context, in which the relationship with the US is 
paramount.  What is underscored in the new strategy therefore is the importance of blending 
military, security and political initiatives together in expanding the effectiveness of Japanese alliance 
relationships.791  
 
Djibouti is also very strategically located, not only sitting on the chokepoint of the Gulf of Aden, the 
tiny country is a pivot connecting Northern, Eastern and Central Africa with the Arabia peninsula and 
the Persian Gulf.  Indeed as an analyst of Japan’s security policy points out, “Djibouti is a very 
important strategic point, and the government of Japan is thinking that the base will be used as a 
hub to deploy SDF in the Middle East if required.”792  A MOFA official however makes a different 
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though no less significant observation”, there is rising demand for PKO in Africa and the Middle East.  
Being able to swiftly deploy forces to trouble spots can contribute to the [security of] neighbouring 
nations.”793   
 
This point was highlighted when Prime Minister Abe visited Djibouti in August 2013 as part of a 
Middle East tour to Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar.  It was the first visit to an African country by a sitting 
Japanese Prime Minister since Junichiro Koizumi in 2006, and foreshadowed Abe’s official visit to 
Mozambique, Côte D’Ivoire and Ethiopia in January 2014.  The visit also reflected the political 
importance of the MSDF facility in Djibouti.  As the Asahi Shimbun notes, “Abe pushed for a visit to 
Djibouti because he wanted to use it to illustrate to both domestic and foreign audiences the 
contributions being made by Japan to the international community.”  The article goes on to note 
that apart from seeking to secure stable energy supplies, “Abe has also reached agreement with his 
counterparts in Bahrain and Kuwait to hold national security discussions.”794  Abe thus reinforced the 
message that Japan is a security player in the region – as well as a major buyer of oil and gas, and 
that having a presence in Djibouti is central to realising this position.  In this context, the antipiracy 
operations are a tactic utilised by the Japanese government in achieving the broader strategic 
objectives outlined in Chapter Three – namely ensuring energy resource security and establishing a 
Japanese international security presence.   In this way anti-piracy operations are also significant in 
that they bring together important themes that underpin Japan’s engagement in Africa, from energy 
security to targeted ODA and the evolution of Japan’s international security policies.      
 
                                                          
793
 Japan Security Watch, “More details on Djibouti base”, 28 May 2011, accessed 4 January 2014, available at 
http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=6462   
794
 Asahi Shimbun, “Abe pushes national security, energy during Middle East trip”, 28 August 2013, accessed 4 
January 2014, available at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201308280069  
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
255 
 
6.3 The international Context of Japan’s Security Operations in Africa  
 
This research demonstrates the multi-layered approach of Japanese engagement in South Sudan – 
an approach accentuated and strengthened through the addition of a security dimension.  Yet the 
deployment of UNMISS peacekeepers and MSDF personnel and ships to the Horn of Africa also 
reflects a Japanese response to the structural pressures and rewards previously described which are 
driving Japan’s participation in international security operations – and which also underpin the 
neoclassical realist framework of analysis employed in this study.  Indeed Pyle argues that through 
the course of its modern history Japan has “adopted its foreign policies” and “restructured its 
internal organisation” to take advantage of, and reflect changes to, the structure of the international 
system.795  While Katzenstein on the other hand, maintains that “Japan’s security policy will continue 
to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international balance of power.”796  Accordingly, the 
neoclassical realist framework underpinning this study stresses the causal primacy of structural 
factors – albeit interpreted via the intervening considerations of domestic policy, perceptions and 
norms. And in the case of Japan’s security policies, the domestic intervening considerations are 
particularly significant and will be addressed below, but it is nonetheless important to briefly 
recognise the broader international context in which Japan’s African security operations are taking 
place.    
 
Professor Fukushima’s previously mentioned observation that “Japan’s overseas commitments are 
changing in nature”797 is significant when considering that what began over twenty years ago with 
Japan’s first peacekeeping deployment has evolved to incorporate an expanding scope of 
operations.  This combined with a greater focus around how ODA is targeted, means that Japan has 
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far greater ability to pursue its own strategic interests.  Interests which in Africa include greater 
investment opportunities, access to resources and political support from African states in Japan’s 
perennial ambition to gain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.  Indeed Japan’s security 
engagement in Africa is thus central to underpinning a broader political relationship on the 
continent that has for many years been defined by the pursuit of a permanent seat on the Security 
Council.  A political objective that is as dependent on garnering support from African countries, as 
demonstrating Japan’s willingness to shoulder international security responsibilities.  Prime Minister 
Abe has reminded African leaders that “Japan and Africa share common interests” in reforming the 
Security Council, and as such committing Japan to peacekeeping operations in Africa – alongside 
extensive ODA commitments, goes some way towards building the political support that Japan 
requires.   
 
Moreover, Japan’s new National Security Strategy even states that it is “necessary for Japan to 
enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner 
support for Japan’s position in the international community” – a position considerably enhanced by 
shouldering the burden of peacekeeping and committing to anti-piracy operations.  This stance also 
signals a desire within Japan to carve out a more defined – and arguably independent diplomatic and 
security presence.   
 
Thus the evolution of Japan’s official perception of the security environment to one that includes 
piracy and terrorism goes some way to understanding the evolution of Japan’s overseas security 
engagements.  As Bosco observes, China’s rise is complicating the dynamics of Japan’s security 
relationship with the US – a relationship that has been the fulcrum around which all Japanese 
strategic thinking revolves.  Bosco points out that mutual fear of “entrapment” and “abandonment” 
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are beginning to emerge in the US-Japanese security discourse.798 Though as Hughes also points out, 
Japanese support for US actions in the “war on terror” effectively created a de facto precedent of 
cooperation with the US.799 As Hughes continues to explain, Japan is thus “learning the habits of 
multilateral interaction” under US instruction and ultimately towards the primary empowerment of 
US strategy and interests.800  
 
The US-Japan Security Alliance therefore effectively delineates the context against which much of 
Japan’s security policy is defined – including Japan’s emerging security presence in Africa.   Indeed a 
joint US-Japan press briefing notes a shared commitment between the two countries to “promote 
peace, stability and economic growth throughout the world, including Africa.” 801 In this context it is 
important to recognise the role of the United States in influencing Japanese engagement more 
broadly in Africa.  The following section will thus examine Japanese alignment with US policy in 
Africa in the particular context of US policy towards South Sudan.    
 
6.3.1 Alignment with United States’ Policy in Africa    
 
As previously discussed Japan’s peacekeeping presence in South Sudan underlines and accentuates 
the other aspects of Japan’s engagement in the country.  And while the mandate of Japan’s 
peacekeepers is very narrowly defined in terms of the UNMISS mandate and Japan’s complicated 
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legal framework, it is still important to consider the influence of US policy alignment when 
considering Japan’s broader engagement in South Sudan.    
 
There is considerable jostling for influence amongst the international players operating in South 
Sudan.  This is largely driven by a combination of the country’s substantial development backlog and 
unexploited mineral resources resulting in the prospect of mining, oil and agricultural concessions as 
well as infrastructure contracts.  But when viewed in light of South Sudan’s strategic location that 
connects East Africa with Muslim-majority Arab North Africa and the importance that the US placed 
on securing and sustaining the country’s independence, the Japanese decision to commit 
peacekeepers can be viewed from a number of perspectives that provide a broader context from 
which to assess Japan’s peacekeeping commitment.   
 
Relations between the US and Sudan were defined by first the Cold War and what would later be 
referred to as the “War on Terror.” The poor relations between the two countries throughout the 
1980s and 1990s reflected the presence of Islamist groups in Khartoum, combined with Sudan’s 
support for Iraq during the first Gulf War.  Consequently, the US played a significant role in 
supporting the southern Sudanese rebels, the CPA negotiations (as part of the Troika which also 
comprised the United Kingdom and Norway), and finally the realisation of South Sudan’s 
independence.  As the New York Times summarises, “South Sudan is in many ways an American 
creation, carved out of war-torn Sudan in a referendum largely orchestrated by the United States, its 
fragile institutions nurtured with billions of dollars in American aid.”802  Indeed a bipartisan 
Congressional coalition, known in recent years as the Sudan Caucus, pushed three successive US 
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presidents to make Sudan a foreign policy priority.803  Support for southern Sudanese independence 
united African Americans, evangelical Christians with Democrats and Republicans.  Thus US interests 
in independent South Sudan are extensive and range from training security forces,804 to providing 
hundreds of millions of dollars805 in development assistance.   
 
Moreover as in Japan, there is an emerging discourse in the United States around the need to 
compete with China in Africa.  As former US Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Princeton 
Lyman observed, “China is not a strategic threat to the United States in Africa.  But it poses serious 
challenges for political and commercial influence.”806 Indeed Secretary of State John Kerry was 
questioned during his confirmation hearing before Congress on how the United States should 
compete with China’s growing footprint across Africa.  Kerry’s response notes that China’s influence 
is extensive and admits that in places, the “US is not in the game.”807  In South Sudan however, this is 
not the case and despite recognition in Juba that the US has already played its most important 
leverage card – ensuring independence for South Sudan808 – Washington will remain a critically 
important ally for the foreseeable future.  As Large describes, the government in Juba appears “to 
prioritise its ‘special relationship’ with the US.”809 
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Thus South Sudan’s independence was seen by some as an apparent focal-point of US-China 
competition in Africa – along with Libya during the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011.  This is due in 
part to the view that China’s large investments in Sudan’s oil industry had resulted in its interests 
being strongly aligned with maintaining the status quo – a unified Sudan.   American interests on the 
other hand were focused on achieving independence for South Sudan.  Indeed as a former United 
States Ambassador in the region explains, the Sino-US competition discourse is accentuated when 
“the United States tries to isolate or punish countries like Sudan” which are deemed by China to be 
important in maintaining its own energy security.810   
 
Against this backdrop, and given Japan’s primary strategic objective of continuing its policy 
alignment with its most important ally, the strategic advantages of establishing a Japanese presence 
in South Sudan are further enhanced.  Japan has in many respects been a model ally of the US, and 
aligning its policy in South Sudan with American policy priorities makes sense for both Japan and 
South Sudan.  As LeRiche and Arnold point out, South Sudan’s foreign policy prospects at 
independence are mixed, but clearly focused on US political backing, East African economic 
integration and defence of the northern border.811 In this regard, Japan’s ODA infrastructure 
developments such as the Nile bridge and the infrastructure provided by the UNMISS engineers, as 
well as the proposed oil pipeline contribute to these objectives by supporting South Sudan’s road 
links and oil exports – all key logistical elements underpinning South Sudan’s integration into east 
Africa.   In this regard Japan’s own interests in the region are aligned with those of the US and South 
Sudan – namely to realise a viable state – and have come at a time when Tokyo has a renewed 
enthusiasm to pursue deeper political and economic relations in the region.   
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Thus while maintaining and consolidating the US-Japan alliance remains a central strategic objective 
for Japanese policymakers, the rise of China is impacting Japan’s tactical approaches towards policy 
implementation.  Indeed Japan’s renewed presence and multi-pronged engagement in the East 
African region has also been seen by some analysts as a component of a broader discourse on Sino-
Japanese competition spilling over into Africa.  The following section will therefore explore some of 
the dynamics of Sino-Japanese engagement particularly related to Japan’s peacekeeping and anti-
piracy commitments in Africa.   
 
6.3.2 The “China Factor” and Japan’s Security Engagement in Africa  
 
The role of China’s presence in Africa as a factor driving Japan’s re-engagement on the continent is a 
theme that emerges throughout this research project.  The rise of China was explored in Chapter 
Three as a structural influence on Japanese foreign policy, and as such the “China factor” must be 
considered among the elements driving Japan’s security engagement in South Sudan and in Africa 
more broadly.   
 
As previously discussed, China has been unable to exert the same levels of influence in South Sudan 
as it has in many other African countries – this is due in large part to its close ties with Khartoum and 
how this relationship is perceived in Juba.  But China’s investments and oil purchases from both 
countries have meant that it is still a significant and involved player in the region.  Moreover as Patey 
explains with reference to the oil dispute in 2012, China wants to be seen as a responsible player by 
the international community for “doing their share to build peace alongside other international 
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actors, particularly the US.”812 In this regard both Japan and China are using peacekeeping 
deployments as elements within a broader strategy of advancing their respective international 
profiles through international security commitments.   
 
Therefore China’s contribution of a medical and engineering contingent to UNMIS was continued 
after South Sudan’s independence with a deployment to the subsequent UNMISS peacekeeping 
mission.813  Based in Wau, Bahr El-Ghazal State since 2005 the deployment was seen at the time – 
especially by the Western media – as being linked to China’s extensive oil investments and political 
ties with Khartoum.  China committed further troops to the hybrid UN-African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007 and as Large points out China’s multidimensional role in Sudan was rooted 
in the “full spectrum of economic, political, military and cultural relations.”814 Consequently as 
Hughes notes, Japan’s decision to post three staff officers to UNMIS was “in part a response to 
China’s growing peacekeeping presence in Africa.”815  Moreover, the fact that South Korea has also 
deployed a contingent of engineers to South Sudan further compels Japan to demonstrate an active 
security presence if it is to successfully develop the narrative of leadership in Asia to which it aspires.   
 
Japan’s military presence in the Indian Ocean however predated the anti-piracy operation:  the 
MSDF provided support for the US-led invasion of Afghanistan between 2001 and 2007 by deploying 
destroyers and a fuel supply ship.  Thus the anti-piracy deployment once again offers Japan an 
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opportunity to establish a presence in a region strategically and politically significant for Japan’s 
longer-term power calculations and alliance development.  Before being elected in December 2012, 
Prime Minister Abe published a perspective of Japan’s strategic future entitled “Asia’s Democratic 
Security Diamond” in which he outlined his vision,” I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, 
Japan and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching 
from the Indian Ocean region to the Western Pacific.” Abe went on to state that he is prepared to 
invest, “to the greatest possible extent”, Japan’s capabilities in this diamond.816 
 
In realising this strategic framework, Japan has sought closer ties with India, framing the 
engagement in terms of the two countries as potential sources of regional stability in the face of 
China’s rise.  Indeed in outlining the “Security Diamond”, Abe notes “the need for the Indian and 
Japanese governments to join together to shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational 
freedom across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.”817 Perhaps most significantly in Japan’s calculation 
however, is the fact that India is closer to Washington than Beijing, and containing China’s influence 
in the Indian Ocean ultimately underpins this strategy.  Indeed in January 2014 India and Japan held 
their first bilateral naval exercise in Indian waters following a similar exercise in Japanese waters in 
June 2012 – in addition, both countries have taken part in the multilateral “Malabar” naval exercises 
with US, Australian and Singaporean ships.818 Thus the MSDF presence in Djibouti allows Japan to 
not only project power into the Western Indian Ocean, and secure SLOCs, but also to build important 
alliances and establish a platform for projecting a more assertive international position.     
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Dr Michishita however also expressed a concern over the establishment of the MSDF facility in 
Djibouti.  Noting that it “cuts both ways” and despite the contribution it makes to Japan’s 
international standing, “through the establishment of a permanent base we can become drawn into 
a conflict situation in the Middle East or North Africa.” Pointing out that a situation could arise 
where if Japan does not respond – due to domestic pressure or legal interpretations, it would once 
again be labelled a “free-riding rich nation.”819 This view again highlights that Japan’s growing 
security presence on the international stage must be understood in the context of an evolving 
domestic debate around Japan’s security policies.   
 
The following section will therefore explore the particular domestic dynamics around which Japan’s 
security policies are developed.  Furthermore, in terms of the neoclassical realist framework 
underpinning this study, the following section explores the intervening considerations through which 
systemic pressures are translated by elites in the development of Japanese security policy.   
 
6.4 The Domestic Context of Japan’s Peacekeeping and Anti-Piracy 
Commitments  
 
As this research demonstrates, Africa is gradually entering the strategic imagination of Japan’s 
policymakers – steadily shifting from the periphery to the arena in which Japan’s security policy is 
being implemented.  And while structural circumstances provide the dominant rationale behind 
Japan’s security policy, the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this research maintains that 
structure alone cannot explain Japan’s security policies in Africa.  As such, domestic factors must be 
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considered.  According to Desch,820 the absence of international systemic pressures gives domestic 
factors such as elite perception greater influence in the policy-making process, and conversely when 
structural pressures are overwhelming, the influence of domestic factors decreases.  However the 
neoclassical realist model maintains that external factors are translated through elite perceptions 
and can therefore at times override structural considerations.  This is particularly true of Japan’s 
security policy generally and peacekeeping in particular.  This section will therefore explore the 
particular domestic dynamics associated with Japan’s security policy in the context of its 
deployments in South Sudan and the Horn of Africa.     
 
It should be also noted at the beginning of this section that this study is not attempting to show a 
causal link between the “normalisation” of Japan’s military and its peacekeeping deployment in 
South Sudan or anti-piracy operations.  However it remains important to appreciate the domestic 
factors which make the UNMISS commitment and the anti-piracy operations significant to a deeper 
understanding of Japan’s motivations in Africa.  Indeed it is these domestic perceptions and 
interpretations of Japan’s global imperatives which led to the UNMISS and Djibouti deployments.  
Thus when the extremely sensitive issue of constitutional reform or interpretation is debated in 
Japan, the parameters of the debate are being effectively shifted by events taking place in Africa.   
 
As such, Japan’s peacekeeping deployment in South Sudan and anti-piracy operation in Djibouti tie 
together long-held commitments to human security, with an emerging foreign policy agenda – a 
global foreign policy that this study demonstrates is “occurring in the context of ‘Japan’s 
Comeback.’” 821  As Professor Nakanishi goes on to note, Abe is using this message to remind people 
that Japan is not a fading country, and as such, its peacekeeping operations are “now part of the 
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‘Japan revitalised’ discourse.”  A discourse that is an essential domestic perspective through which 
to interpret Japan’s expanding international security commitments.  Indeed as Kitchen explains, 
“neoclassical realism understands that the ideas held by powerful actors within the state matter.”822 
Thus Abe’s message is as much targeted towards a domestic audience as an international one, and 
the context in which Japan’s African security operations are occurring must be understood in light of 
the particular domestic interpretations of the international structural considerations that frame 
Japan’s security policies in Africa.   
 
Japan’s peacekeeping operations have in many respects always reflected a balance between 
competing pressures:  international and domestic.  As Singh has noted, the collective security culture 
of the early 1990s put pressure on Japan because the “norm of burden sharing among member 
states of the UN challenged the prevailing domestic norms that were responsible for Japan’s strategy 
of separating economics from politics and resultant passive involvement in international security 
affairs.”823  These international norms are interpreted in Japan as gaiatsu, or external pressure – 
often emanating from the United States.  As Cooney explains, “the official Japanese explanation for 
many of the nation’s defence and security policy decisions is essentially that ‘the Americans made us 
do it.’”824 In this way gaiatsu becomes a lightning rod for unpopular decisions that Japanese leaders 
want to make.  As Cooney further points out Japan’s security policies are an example of a “two-level 
game”, where for instance the US wants Japan to do something that is in Japan’s overall interests 
(such as sending forces to contribute to international peacekeeping operations) and Japanese 
leaders want the same outcome – such as becoming a “normal” nation.  But the public, and in many 
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cases elements within the ruling party are unlikely to support it.  Thus as Cooney continues to 
explain,  
Japanese leaders will use the excuse of foreign pressure as a way of convincing 
internal interests, both in government and the public at large that Japan is being 
forced to pass the PKO law and that Japan cannot afford to say no to the foreign 
interests [the United States].825    
 
Though the extent to which gaiatsu as a structural imperative dictates Japanese policy is 
disputed.  Calder, Hirose,826 and Wolferen827 for example take the view that external pressure 
(most significantly from the United States) does dictate Japan’s policy formulation – best 
captured by Calder’s view of Japan as a “reactive state.”828  Calder argues that the pluralistic 
and fragmented nature of Japan’s political system has resulted in so much infighting and 
bureaucratic rivalries that no grand strategy is even possible.  This view is rejected however 
by Heginbotham and Samuels who argue that “Japan’s leadership is both pragmatic and 
strategic”,829 and point to Japan’s “duel hedge”830 strategy where Japan continues to rely on 
the US for military balance while seeking additional commercial opportunities and expanding 
influence.   
 
Thus while the extent and impact of gaiatsu is contested, it is apparent that notions related to 
military contribution through peacekeeping and multilateral cooperation were accepted and 
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interpreted by policymakers in such a way as to not contradict the peace constitution.  As Singh 
further explains, peacekeeping became a policy option to Japan during the 1990s and thereafter a 
part of the national security discourse.831  While Midford832 argues that Japan’s policy and opinion 
changes in recent years are much less significant than widely believed as the political elite and 
Japanese public have long supported the role of the SDF, others such as Hughes,833 Pyle,834 
Samuels,835 and Wada836 maintain that Japan’s security posture has expanded in terms of military 
strength and through its contributions to the regional and international security environment.   
 
Primarily this was achieved by developing its role as a contributor to international peacekeeping 
operations, and deepening and widening the responsibilities of the SDF through a greater 
institutionalisation of the US-Japan Security Alliance – referred to by Samuels as the “mother of all 
catalysts.”837  However as Samuels also goes on to note, Japan’s military capabilities were enhanced 
through progressive relaxation of the SDF’s rules of engagement for each successive peacekeeping 
deployment. 838  And as such, peacekeeping underpinned the evolution of Japan’s domestic security 
discourse – through the creation of a legal framework and the precedent created through SDF 
deployments in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, Haiti, and South 
Sudan.839   As a MOFA director confided, “in my personal view, peacekeeping operations serve a dual 
purpose” in that “the government uses international peace activities as a tool so that the SDF can be 
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recognised [as valuable] in Japan.”840  In this regard the strategic value that peacekeeping operations 
offer for the government in unravelling the restrictions of the constitution is that the Japanese public 
remain relatively disengaged, and Africa is perceived as far away and marginal to domestic political 
issues – but where the SDF can also be shown to be performing a valuable international service.  
 
Professor Nakanishi reiterates this view by noting that “human security and peacebuilding have wide 
domestic support in Japan – and the government is conscious of this.  So when perhaps only 30 per 
cent of the population support a reinterpretation of the constitutional restraint on collective 
defence – it is not easy to sell.” But peacekeeping operations are a tactical move by the 
government’s public relations arm to “sell the idea to the public.”841 Thus looking beyond Prime 
Minister Abe’s professed “historical mission”842 to amend the constitution, the professor observes 
that “the second Abe administration is trying to wrap up the incremental changes of the last two 
decades.”  Whether interpreting security policy or strengthening the US-Japan Alliance, these issues 
have been on the shelf since Abe’s first cabinet – and resultantly, “peacekeeping operations and 
pirate action is easier to sell to the population than complex ideas of collective security.”843  
However, the peacekeeping tactic is “dependent on one assumption: that it is safe.  If it gets unsafe 
it will put policymakers in a difficult position.”  Remembering that pacifism is still a key part of post 
war Japan’s policies and that since World War II no one has been killed by the SDF.  “But once that 
happens, it will be a very serious first-time experience [...] if a Japanese soldier kills someone it will 
change the debate in Japan.”844  Emphasising Berger’s view that domestic political attitudes towards 
the use of force vary significantly among states situated similarly in the international system.845  
                                                          
840
 Authors interview with director, MOFA, Tokyo 5 November 2013   
841
 Author’s interview with Professor Nakanishi, Tokyo, 1 November 2013 
842
 Asahi Shimbun, “Abe on ‘historical mission’ to amend constitution”, 13 August 2013, accessed 17 May 2014, 
available at  http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201308130045 
843
 Author’s interview with Professor Nakanishi, Tokyo, 1 November 2013 
844
 Ibid 
845 Berger, Thomas, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism” 
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
270 
 
Indeed as Aoi has argued, Japan’s “current restrained approach reflects the desire to avoid a heavy 
global security commitment while keeping alive the option of again making a bid for a permanent 
UN Security Council seat.”  As Aoi continues to point out, perhaps the most fundamental hurdle for 
Japan is to “develop a more responsive and responsible political leadership that begins to grasp the 
implications of the changed security environment of today from a global perspective.”846  It is further 
apparent that in line with neoclassical realist analysis Japan’s response to the global security 
environment is interpreted and defined within the realm of domestic political discourse between the 
so-called “revisionists” who aspire to Japan becoming a “normal state” and those who continue to 
identify with Japan as a “pacifist state.”  Indeed Vosse’s work on Japanese public attitudes towards 
the military reiterates this by acknowledging that “the gradual foreign policy changes in the last sixty 
years and particularly those of the last fifteen years have not had the effect of making Japanese 
embrace military options to a significant level.”847  Consequently, the complicated and unstable 
environment in South Sudan is no doubt challenging Japan’s lawmakers and as the situation 
continues to unfold it will test the public’s tolerance for Japan’s commitments in Africa.   
 
As such, it is the very fact that Africa is perceived to be distant and poorly understood by the 
majority of the Japanese public that the “peacekeeping tactic” is so effective.  Public weariness of a 
“normalised” military in Japan is centred on what Izumikawa describes as the “three elements” of 
Japan’s antimilitarism: “pacifism, anti-traditionalism and fear of entrapment”848 – meaning that as 
the junior partner in the US-Japan Security Alliance, Japan would become drawn into all future US 
conflicts.849  Thus the outbreak of violence in South Sudan will challenge the Abe administration to 
manage the new threats posed by the instability, and the resultant opportunities to advance the 
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debate on collective self-defence as well as Japan’s role as a responsible international security 
partner.   
 
The domestic dimension of Japan’s UNMISS deployment therefore relates to the interpretation of 
collective self-defence.850  As such, it is important to distinguish between removing or revising Article 
Nine, from changing the interpretation of Article Nine – see Hagström.851  This much debated article 
in the Japanese constitution outlaws collective self-defence and has been at the forefront of the 
national question about what type of state Japan should be.  As Samuels indicates, the article “was a 
useful way to avoid entanglements in US cold war strategy […] and [is] an indispensable instrument 
for protecting Japanese interests within the US-Japan alliance”852, but it is becoming increasingly 
incompatible with the Japanese government’s international security objectives and commitments.  
As Professor Fukushima points out, “most countries do not distinguish between self-defence, 
collective self-defence and collective security” – and having obscure interpretations of these 
concepts “means that Japan has less choices than our peers from other countries involved in 
peacekeeping operations.”853  Consequently changing the interpretation of the notion of collective 
self-defence as well as the right to exercise collective self-defence would give Japan the same policy 
choices as other countries.   
 
But the consequences of those policy choices are still unwelcome to many Japanese.  For example an 
editorial in the Asahi Shimbun encapsulated these views in criticising the NSS unveiled by the 
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government in December 2013.  The newspaper noted that in calling for “proactive pacifism” “the 
Abe administration is paving the way for changing the traditional interpretation of Article Nine to 
enable Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defence.”854  The point underlined by the Asahi 
Shimbun is that the NSS – along with Japan’s response to developments in South Sudan, reflect a 
major turning point in Japan’s national security policy.    
 
Peacekeeping operations therefore serve as the testing grounds for much broader considerations 
that are central questions of Japanese national security policy.  The debate rests on whether Japan 
should use “the right to collective self-defence” – that is, whether Japan should use force or engage 
in combat operations for friends and allies.  Dr Michishita outlines the four specific scenarios Prime 
Minister Abe argues should allow Japan to use collective self-defence:  
1. US and Japanese vessels on joint patrol and attacked by a third party – currently Japan 
cannot use force in this situation.   
2. North Korea missile attack against Guam or Hawaii flies over Japan – currently Japan is not 
able to shoot it down despite having ballistic missile defence capabilities.  
3. Peacekeeping operations – currently Japan is unable to assist forces of another country 
when they come under attack.  
4. Similar situation but related to logistical support.  Japan is currently able to provide logistic 
support to military operations however if the ally comes under attack Japan is not able to 
provide logistical support in a combat situation (when they are most likely to need it).855   
 
Of particular relevance to the UNMISS deployment are the last two points and the manner of 
response from the Japanese government to the crisis in South Sudan.  While there have been no 
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reports of Japanese peacekeepers called on to defend other UNMISS forces in South Sudan, the 
death of two Indian peacekeepers856 is indicative of the dangers present in the country.  Thus while 
the government made an exception in providing ammunition to South Korean peacekeepers; they 
refused a UN request to transport military personnel and weapons in South Sudan.857 On the same 
day that Prime Minister Abe committed Japanese support to South Sudan at the African Union the 
government was tying itself in constitutional knots.  As the Japan Times reports, “the administration 
was worried it would go against Japan’s policy of not exercising the right to collective self-
defence.”858  
 
Thus despite the steady drip of legislation that first allowed the SDF to undertake peacekeeping 
operations and then increasingly broadened its mandate – the reality still remains that the SDF is far 
better equipped in terms of military hardware than the regulatory and legal “software” that defines 
its rules of engagement.  As the SDF’s activities expanded to include dangerous and unstable 
overseas missions such as in South Sudan – these shortcomings are being made increasingly 
apparent.  Indeed following the withdrawal of peacekeepers form the Golan Heights citing the 
violence in neighbouring Syria,859 Japan’s entire commitment to international peacekeeping rests 
with the UNMISS mission and withdrawing from that mission would certainly damage Japan’s 
standing as a reliable international security partner.    
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Japan’s commitment to anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa however has a somewhat 
different historical development to that of peacekeeping – but is no less significant in understanding 
the intervening domestic context in which Japan’s African security operations are conducted.   While 
Hughes,860 Kersten,861 Pyle,862 Midford863 and Samuels864 address these aspects in greater detail, 
Japan’s rear-guard support for United States action in Afghanistan in 2001 was significant for both its 
intent and the speed with which special legislation was developed and passed to facilitate it.  
Likewise as Kersten points out “when Japan symbolically joined the fray in Iraq in February 2004 […] 
it represented more precedent-making action on the part of the hitherto constitutionally 
constrained nation.”865 Consequently as Bateman notes, when Japan sought to join the multilateral 
anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia in 2009 it again “provided the catalyst for widening 
the scope of the Japanese constitution to permit overseas deployment by the [MSDF].”866  
Furthermore, as Professor Fukushima explains, a study group is currently looking into how to 
interpret the constitution in terms of the new legislation, and they believe that Japan can defend sea 
lanes as part of an alliance – if so requested by alliance partners867 – thereby radically widening the 
scope of operations covered under the legislation.         
 
Before the Somali operation, the Japan Coast Guard was primarily responsible for anti-piracy 
operations, and under Article 82 of the Self Defence Force Law the MSDF could only protect 
Japanese ships from piracy on the assumption they were only protecting the lives and assets of 
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Japanese nationals.868 However following increased pirate attacks in 2008 and a growing 
international response, the Diet869 passed the “Anti-Piracy Measures Law” in June 2009 and 
dispatched MSDF destroyers to the Horn of Africa.  Significantly, the legislation allowed for the first 
operation abroad for Japan’s SDF that was not restricted to rear-area support such as transportation 
or refuelling and it enabled the MSDF to protect any ship – including those without Japanese 
connections.   
 
Black and Hwang further argue that Japan’s anti-militarist norm has shaped the country’s non-
military contributions to international society,870 yet by self-identifying as pacifists when 
participating in multilateral security operations Japan is effectively creating a new norm around 
multilateral security engagement.  This assessment, while failing to appreciate the importance of the 
international system in driving the changes occurring in Japan’s security posture and policies, does 
highlight the overall importance of norms in understanding Japan’s security policy – particularly anti-
militarism as identified by Berger871 and Katzenstein.872  Thus while pacifist norms are important 
intervening considerations in a neoclassical realist analysis of Japanese security policies, they are not 
fixed but tend to be fluid and interpreted by elites and policymakers in response to systemic 
pressures.  Indeed research by Vosse identifies exceptionally high levels of threat perception among 
Japanese concerning global and domestic issues yet non-militarist values also remain strong.873     
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Japan’s contributions to multinational security operations in Africa have therefore impacted on the 
evolving debate within Japan around its future as a security actor in the international arena.  While 
anti-piracy operations have created an important mechanism for operationalising the Japan-US 
alliance outside of Japan’s territory, peacekeeping in South Sudan has created an important platform 
from which to signal Japanese commitment to multilateral engagement.  Yet ultimately in terms of 
this research project, it further demonstrates the significance of security operations in Africa within 
the context of its broader engagement on the continent in response to a changing global 
environment.  Moreover, when considering Japan’s peacekeeping presence in South Sudan, the 
essential message to emerge is that what happens there matters because it impacts on the debate 
around the interpretation of collective self-defence – and thus ultimately shapes Japan’s security 
policies.  This “accidental agency” must therefore be included when considering the impact of 
Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and along with the anti-piracy operations, remains a key factor 
in the broader analysis of Japan’s evolving engagement in Africa.   
 
Thus while peacekeeping has been a significant factor in the evolution of Japan’s domestic debate 
around state pacifism, it has also played an important role in altering domestic perceptions of the 
military and the influence of the SDF amongst policymakers.  The following section will consequently 
explore the expanding influence of Japan’s military in foreign policy development with particular 
reference to Japanese engagement in Africa.     
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6.4.1 Evolution of the SDF’s Role in Japan’s Security Discourse   
 
As Hughes874 and Singh have observed, Japan’s peacekeeping policy served as a crucial catalyst in 
carving out a new role for the SDF – “namely expanding the SDF’s identity from a force with a 
national defence mission to one that incorporated an international dimension.”875  The SDF’s identity 
was transformed from a military designed solely to address the threat from the Soviet Union against 
Japan, which precluded the deployment of SDF forces beyond the country’s borders, to one that 
allows for participation in international peacekeeping operations overseas under the aegis of the 
UN.  As Yamaguchi reiterates, the SDF thus “began their transformation from forces devoted strictly 
to assuring Japan’s own defence within the framework of the US–Japan Security Treaty, to ones that 
could share the tasks of assuring international security.”876 And while this expansion is still occurring 
within the tight confines of the particular vocabulary permissible for official discussion on security 
matters – jietai (self-defence force) as opposed to the United States’ guntai (military force), the 
inclusion of peacekeeping within the mandate of the SDF broadened the capabilities and perceptions 
of the SDF within Japan.    
 
In this context, the military have their own perspective on the value of their deployment in South 
Sudan.  For example, the Ground Self Defence Forces (GSDF) see peacekeeping operations offering 
unrivalled opportunities for the logistical training and equipment testing necessary for the military’s 
growing role in Japan’s geopolitical position.  In addition, the military’s response to the Tōhoku 
earthquake in 2011 went a long way in developing a positive domestic image for the SDF as well as 
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showing lawmakers the value of a large force that could deploy 100,000 soldiers to lead 
humanitarian and rescue efforts.877  But beyond these issues, Dr Michishita explains that,   
The GDSF has latent fears that the force will be reduced significantly.  Japan’s 
force structure is lopsided and unbalanced:  top heavy, with a disproportionally 
high number of officers and Non-commissioned officers.  Thus while this is not 
a public debate – there is a widely held view that at some point we have to 
significantly reduce the size of the Ground SDF. 878   
 
As Hughes has observed, in order to respond to multifarious security challenges “Japan has found it 
necessary to embark on successive revisions of its national defence doctrines and capabilities.”879 
Consequently the government is currently revising its basic defence policy paper – the National 
Defence Programme Guidelines.  The Guidelines were last revised in 2010 and are being reviewed 
again following the election of Prime Minister Abe and the new LDP administration.  But as Dr 
Michishita points out, regardless of how much this issue is being discussed in this current review, it is 
likely to come back and the GSDF will be defensive.  In response the GSDF will attempt to transform 
into a new force with amphibious capabilities – a small number are now training with the US Marine 
Corps.  Yet while the primary justification for maintaining the size of the GSDF in their view is the 
need to strengthen defence of contested island chains – “it is also good when they can say they are 
deployed overseas.”880   
 
Indeed the SDF is understood to have an increasingly strong voice when it comes to influencing 
security policy.  It has been observed that army officers are astute and make good arguments to 
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maintain the size and force structure of the SDF – demonstrating their political awareness by “taking 
off their uniforms to lobby parliamentarians in Nagatachō.”881  Thus while the complicated 
constitutional debates continue in the Diet and Kantei (prime minister’s residence) that constitute 
the halls of influence in the Tokyo district of Nagatachō – the SDF’s view is that Africa matters.  The 
combination of peacekeeping in South Sudan and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia 
constitute Japan’s entire international security cooperation commitment and are important sites to 
project influence, build security partnerships as well as test equipment and systems.   Furthermore, 
they will not need to remind lawmakers of the hard security challenges that characterise the region.   
In this regard the SDF – encompassing all three forces (Ground, Maritime and Air) are considered to 
be in a strong political position, “we are in no way short of threats to justify continued investment 
on defence.”882  Indeed Japan’s increased military budget883 for 2014884 indicates the growing 
relevance of the SDF in determining how Japanese policy makers interpret and respond to a 
changing global environment.    
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
The long-established view on Japan’s strategic ambition is that the country privileged economic 
strength over military might, yet authors such as Hughes,885 Samuels,886 and Singh887 point to 
growing evidence that Japan’s future strategic ambitions will be bolstered by a strong international 
military presence.  In doing so, a gradual new consensus is emerging around Japan’s foreign and 
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security policy – and while for now many questions remain about how the country will resolve the 
legal contortions that surround its existing security policy – it is apparent that Japan’s African 
Security engagements will play a central role in those developments. 
 
This chapter has therefore explored the role of Japan’s security engagement in Africa as a response 
to the structural pressures identified in Chapter Three and interpreted via the particular domestic 
perspectives and norms that influence the country’s security policies.  The neoclassical realist 
perspective underpinning this research maintains that the basic parameters of a country’s foreign 
policy are defined by domestic interpretations of shifting power dynamics at the structural level.  In 
this respect Japan’s security engagement in Africa reflects Kitchen’s observation that international 
politics and the formation of a state’s strategy is a “complex and multi-layered undertaking.”888  As 
such, the decision to deploy peacekeepers to South Sudan and shoulder anti-piracy operations in 
Djibouti reflects a combination of objectives that intimately tie Japan’s Africa policies with a broader 
narrative around Japan’s place in the world and what kind of state it wishes to be.  As well as 
creating a platform upon which to build experience, test equipment and develop interoperability 
with allies.   
 
The deployment of peacekeepers to South Sudan is also a significant reflection of the growing 
importance of Africa within Japan’s foreign policy objectives.  The addition of a Japanese security 
element in South Sudan further supports and solidifies the other components of Japan’s presence in 
the country – in terms of infrastructure development, but also as an indicator of Japanese 
commitment towards building relations with Juba.  Moreover the expansion of Japanese 
engagement in Africa to include a security dimension is significant as it creates important precedents 
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that are in turn influencing the debate and development of Japan’s security policies.  Thus given the 
significance of the UNMISS deployment and anti-piracy operation within the broader context of 
Japan’s international security presence, the continent will remain essential to the further 
development of Japan’s security policies.  
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7. Conclusion  
 
This study has ultimately been about change:  changes in Japan’s approaches and attitudes towards 
Africa and the structural changes driving Japanese policymakers to explore new frontiers and new 
methodologies.  Referencing Prime Minister Abe’s narrative that “Japan is back”,889  this thesis has 
sought to understand how Japan’s interactions in South Sudan, and more broadly in Africa, 
demonstrate a renewed interest and a new approach towards engagement with the continent.  In so 
doing a conceptual metaphor of the frontier was employed to describe Japan’s engagement in South 
Sudan as expanding the boundary of an arc of interests that stretches from Djibouti to Mozambique 
across East Africa.   
 
As the previous chapters have outlined, Japan’s presence in Africa since 2008 has grown in absolute 
terms, but more importantly it has also developed in terms of the breadth of its engagement and 
how it reflects new attitudes and perceptions of the continent.  As Japanese policymakers 
interviewed for this research explained, Africa has gone from a place of charity to a place of 
investment, a market and a location from which Japan can expand its international presence.  
Consequently this study was also about relevance and how Japanese policymakers are responding to 
the shifting structural conditions of a global order in which its place is no longer assured.  For this 
reason neoclassical realism was employed as a vehicle of analysis as it accommodates systemic 
conditions, cognitive factors of perception and misperception as well as the domestic considerations 
of state institutions and norms in theorising foreign policy formation.   
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Accordingly, in applying neoclassical realism as a lens of analysis, this thesis maintains that Japan’s 
policies in Africa – and activities in South Sudan in particular – reflect policy responses to specific 
structural pressures interpreted via the perceptions and norms of Japanese policymakers.  This study 
therefore sought to demonstrate that dynamics within the structure of the international system 
such as Japan’s relative economic decline,  energy security imperatives, pressures to contribute 
toward international security operations or the rise of China are driving a more active and refocused 
engagement with the African continent.   
 
Thus as the previous chapters have outlined, Japanese engagement in Africa is multifaceted and 
driven by complex and at times overlapping dynamics, yet Japan’s presence in Africa is expanding 
and South Sudan is a particularly relevant location from which to better understand the evolution of 
Japanese relations with Africa.  It is the only country in which Japan is providing development 
assistance in conjunction with pursuing a complex oil pipeline project as well as developing key 
infrastructure and deploying peacekeepers.  These multiple layers of interaction reflect Japan’s 
growing presence on the continent but also the extent to which Japanese engagement in South 
Sudan can be seen as a testing ground as well as a precedent for Japan’s future interaction in Africa 
and beyond.  In this respect the emergence of a more assertive and risk-tolerating Japanese 
approach to external engagement is likely in the coming years.       
 
The significant contribution of this study therefore is that it explores a little-known dimension of 
Japan’s foreign relations and places that engagement in the context of the country’s policy response 
to changing global and domestic conditions.  Yet this thesis also references two overriding realities.  
Firstly, that Japan is the world’s third largest economy and an important contributor to international 
institutions, and as such all dimensions of the country’s foreign policy are significant.  Secondly, what 
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happens in Africa matters.  This research outlines a particular dimension of what is a growing 
realisation around the importance of Africa as a site for investment and trade.  Consequently, better 
understanding the dynamics driving Japan’s Africa policies provides not only the rationale for this 
thesis, but also its value.    
 
This concluding chapter will therefore provide a brief overview and synthesis of the primary findings 
of this study.  In so doing, this short chapter will address the research questions underpinning this 
thesis while also recognising limitations of the study and identifying areas for potential future 
research.   
 
7.1 Overview of Findings  
 
This study sought to answer the primary question, what explains Japan’s engagement in South 
Sudan?  And in doing so it explored the particular activities undertaken by Japan in South Sudan so 
as to frame a deeper analysis of the broad strategic considerations underpinning Japan’s Africa 
policy.  Yet as Chan and Sylvan have pointed out, “the domain of analysis for foreign policy decision 
making is vague and subject to disagreement.”890  For this reason theory was integrated into this 
study as a framework through which descriptive observations are interpreted, and its findings 
comprise a history of the present with themes that echo with theory.  Put another way, the aim of 
this research was never to forge a new paradigm or provide a universal defence for a particular 
perspective of international relations but rather to operationalise a framework that matched the 
primary data uncovered through key informant interviews.    
                                                          
890
 Chan, Steve, Sylvan, Donald, Foreign Policy Decision Making – Perception, Cognition, and Artificial 
Intelligence, New York: Praeger, 1984, p. 2  
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When considering the dominant perspectives within international relations, it was apparent that 
neither a purely systemic theory of international outcomes, such as neorealism, nor a purely 
innenpolitik theory of foreign policy would adequately capture the nuance, impact or rationale for 
Japan’s presence in South Sudan.  Japan’s re-engagement in Africa was therefore interpreted in this 
study through the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism which conceptually ties together 
the methodological approach with the primary findings to emerge from the research.  In this context 
neoclassical realism proved to be a practical mechanism through which to appreciate an empirically-
driven study of an evolving dimension of Japan’s foreign policy – while further accentuating the 
descriptive accuracy and policy relevance of the study.  Indeed key informants interviewed for this 
study identified global dynamics driving Japan’s renewed enthusiasm for engaging in Africa as well as 
corresponding domestic factors that shape the specific priorities and methods of Japanese 
engagement in Africa.  Yet this research focused only on those strategic objectives where the tactical 
approach to achieving the objective was reflected in Japan’s presence in South Sudan or broader 
Africa policy.   
 
As described in Chapter Three, structural factors establish the parameters of Japan’s engagement in 
Africa – the why factors.  Yet the limitations of a purely systemic analysis are clear: it is unable to 
adequately capture the nuance and context necessary for understanding how Japanese policy 
towards Africa is developed.  This is due in part to the homogeneity of state behaviour often 
associated with the realist perspective.  This study therefore relied on the eclectic umbrella of 
neoclassical realism in combining a structural frame with elements of constructivist thought such as 
the perceptions of policymakers and norms particular to Japan to better understand  how Japan’s 
structural pressures are realised as policy.  This was achieved by highlighting the linkages and 
connections between the structurally-motivated drivers of Japanese engagement in Africa with the 
specific dimensions of Japan’s activities in South Sudan.  In this respect the preceding chapters 
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reflect the model (Figure 5)891 outlined in Chapter Two which illustrates the relationship between 
the broad strategic objectives of Japan’s presence in Africa with its tactical approaches, and finally, 
the particular aspects of Japan’s presence in South Sudan.  Thus the case study of South Sudan 
demonstrated that Japanese engagement in the country comprises distinct elements within Japan’s 
tactical approach towards Africa – which in turn reflects overarching structural pressures.   
  
Chapter Three explored the systemic context underpinning this research.  It examined aspects such 
as Japan’s economic stagnation, its energy security imperatives, the rise of China and pressure to 
contribute towards international security operations as factors shaping the country’s tactical 
approaches in Africa.  These factors also serve as a foundation upon which the following empirical 
chapters are built.  As such, these elements reflect policymakers’ perceptions of structural dynamics 
– or perceptions of Japan’s relative power in the international system.  The dynamics explored in this 
chapter therefore reflect the neoclassical realist perspective of international hierarchy and a state’s 
perceptions of itself with regards to other states.  For example the complexities of Sino-Japanese 
relations influence policymaker’s perceptions of China’s economic and political influence in Africa 
and are in turn creating a sense of urgency in Japan’s policy response towards the continent.   Thus 
as this chapter demonstrated, structural pressures are forcing Japan’s policymakers and business 
leaders to reconsider the strategic and economic value of Africa, and this is best observed through 
the evolution of Japan’s primary forum for African engagement – the TICAD process.    
 
TICAD IV in 2008 was in many respects the turning point of Japan’s Africa policy – measured by a 
large increase in aid as well as private sector commitments of greater trade and investment with the 
continent.  As described in Chapter Four, these changes were in fact recognition of the economic 
growth that Africa had experienced since 2000 and the broader structural dynamics affecting Japan’s 
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 See page 75 
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relative power in the international system.  The continent was therefore no longer perceived merely 
as a location for aid but as a location from which to begin responding to the country’s structurally-
determined economic and political strategic objectives.  Significantly, while the broader objectives of 
Japanese policymakers to revive the country’s economy and strengthen its international presence 
are well documented, this research explored the links between these processes and Japan’s 
development policies in South Sudan.  Indeed by exploring new approaches and situating its aid in a 
wider strategic context Japan’s development engagement in South Sudan offers significant insight 
into the future of Japanese interactions in emerging countries.  Especially in terms of how the 
country is seeking to differentiate itself from both the Western donors and China, improve 
coordination among the various entities operating in the country and to focus Japanese aid in those 
countries identified as being of particular strategic value.   
 
As outlined in the chapter, ODA has been the most visible and effective element of Japan’s foreign 
policy in the post-war era.  And as such it remains the cornerstone of Japan’s Africa policy and is a 
fundamental element in creating openings for private sector investors and establishing diplomatic 
relationships.  But significantly, since 2008 there has been a noted realignment of Japan’s attitude 
and approach to ODA – reflecting both structural pressures and a domestic discourse around the 
role of ODA within the country’s foreign policy framework.  Furthermore, the evolution of Japanese 
ODA approaches towards Africa also reflects a refocused ODA relationship with the continent and a 
broader ambition to develop a more assertive and distinguishable international presence – centred 
on a policy of differentiating Japan’s aid approach from those of the Western donors and China.    
 
Thus in the context of Japan’s presence in South Sudan, it is ODA that ties together the various 
elements of Japanese engagement in the country and it remains the primary means of interaction 
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across the region.  Japan’s ODA projects in South Sudan are significant in that they represent a 
return to the infrastructure-led approach that long defined Japan’s development assistance and 
reflect South Sudan’s own development priorities by strengthening the country’s physical links with 
East Africa.  Moreover, these factors are noteworthy not only because of what they say about 
Japan’s approach towards South Sudan and East Africa, but what they say about the future 
trajectory of Japanese overseas engagement – not least of which the goal of increasing overseas 
investment to drive economic growth at home.   
 
The evolution of Japan’s Africa strategy to increase focus on investment and to secure access to 
energy and mineral resources is examined in Chapter Five.  Centred on the particular case study of 
Toyota Tsusho’s bid to develop an alternative oil export pipeline from South Sudan, the chapter 
explores Japan’s ever-present imperative of energy security and the emerging policy of acquiring 
equity energy resources.  The proposed pipeline is therefore significant in that it combines two 
important dimensions of Japan’s emerging presence in Africa: energy security and increased 
investment, resulting in the private sector-led pursuit of Hinomaru Oil.          
 
In line with the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this study, Chapter Five examines how 
distinct changes in the structural conditions of world energy markets reinforced the perception 
amongst policymakers of Japan’s energy vulnerability and led to the identification of East Africa as a 
potential location for Japanese companies to secure stakes in its emerging energy sector.  The 
chapter therefore contextualises Japan’s energy imperatives in terms of the structural pressures 
driving change and the perceptions and norms that determine how the country’s energy policies are 
developed and prioritised.  Most notably, these include the impetus towards reconsidering Japan’s 
reliance on energy markets and encouraging the exploration and development of oil resources by 
Jeremy Taylor  
564257 
289 
 
Japanese companies.  The bid by Toyota Tsusho to develop an alternative oil pipeline from South 
Sudan to the Kenyan port of Lamu is therefore an element within a much broader initiative to drive 
Japanese energy-based investment in East Africa.  As such, the pipeline represents an important 
dimension of Japan’s new approach and objectives in the region – and is thus understood by this 
study as both a test-case for Japan’s evolving approach to energy investment and a physical 
manifestation of the outer edge of Japan’s arc of engagement in East Africa.  
 
Thus despite diversification of supply having been an – albeit unsuccessful – cornerstone of Japan’s 
energy security policy for decades, this chapter provided a unique perspective on how this strategy 
is being pursued in East Africa through the particularly complicated and contentious example of 
South Sudan.  In examining the historical, logistical and political dimensions of the proposed project 
for South Sudan and its relations in the region, the chapter explored the relevance and impact of the 
pipeline far beyond the transportation of oil.  As such, the pipeline also demonstrates a willingness 
by Japan to challenge existing norms of business and foreign relations to undertake a politically 
sensitive, economically risky yet potentially rewarding project.  The potential investment is also 
noteworthy in that it matches South Sudan’s strategic objectives with Japan’s energy security 
concerns and a desire to demonstrate its status as a committed contributor and investor in Africa.   
 
Chapter Six explored what is perhaps the most significant and single biggest change in the evolution 
of Japan’s Africa policy – namely the inclusion of a security dimension within the relationship.  The 
deployment of peacekeepers to South Sudan and anti-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa 
tie Japan’s Africa policies to structural shifts, complicated domestic debates on the country’s state 
pacifism, as well as broader narratives around Japan’s place in the world and the type of state it 
wishes to be.  While the long established view on Japan’s strategic ambition is that the country 
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privileged economic considerations over military, it increasingly appears that the country’s future 
strategic ambitions will be bolstered by a strong international military presence – and this chapter 
explores these debates in the context of Japan’s African operations.       
 
Comprising a unit of GSDF engineers deployed to UNMISS in South Sudan and MSDF deployment in 
the Horn of Africa, these operations are significant in that they are a strong indicator of Japan’s 
ambitions to increase its international security role.  Moreover as described in the chapter, Japan’s 
military engagements in Africa comprise important test-cases that effectively create precedents and 
advance the boundaries of Japan’s constitutional debate in locations far from the public 
consciousness.  Thus as new precedents in the deployment and mandate of Japanese military forces 
abroad are effectively being developed in Africa, so too is a gradual new consensus emerging around 
Japan’s foreign and security policy.   
 
Again reflecting this study’s neoclassical realist framework of interpretation, this chapter also 
explored the structural considerations such as pressure from the United States, the rise of China as a 
potential military threat and Japan’s undiminished ambitions for a seat on the UN Security Council as 
factors driving the country’s growing international security presence.  In addition, the chapter also 
examined the steadily increasing role and profile of the SDF in the context of Japan’s pacifist norms 
and the domestic debates around the interpretation of Japan’s constitutional restrictions such as the 
right to collective self-defence.  Thus as Chapter Six concluded, despite many questions remaining 
about how the country will resolve the legal contortions that surround its existing security policies, 
expanding the country’s engagement in Africa to include a security dimension has allowed events on 
the continent to have a significant impact on the evolution of Japan’s own security identity.   
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7.1.1 Research Questions Revisited  
 
The analytical objective at the heart of this study has been identification and analysis of the factors 
underlying Japan’s engagement in South Sudan – and in so doing exploring the systemic and 
domestic-level factors influencing Japanese policy in Africa.  The following section will therefore 
briefly synthesise the analysis outlined in the previous chapters in terms of the research questions 
guiding this study.      
 
1. What explains Japan’s extensive engagement in South Sudan?  
Each element of Japan’s presence in South Sudan can be seen to reflect specific structural pressures 
driving Japan’s re-engagement in Africa, yet particular conditions in South Sudan are responsible for 
the extent and nature of Japanese activities in the country.  Simply put, South Sudan is an energy-
rich country on the frontier of a region significant to Japan’s broader Africa strategy.   Moreover as 
this study outlined, South Sudan is a strong ally of the United States, has complicated relations with 
China and is actively seeking new investors and allies.  In this context the country is a space into 
which Japan has expanded the range and approach of its African engagements:  taking on more risk, 
expanding its ODA approaches and incorporating a security element in the relationship.  In 
conceptualising South Sudan in the broader context of Japan’s foreign policy, this study utilised a 
metaphor of the frontier in explaining the manner and motives of Japan’s presence in the country.  
South Sudan therefore represents a key location from which to examine the expansion of Japan’s 
presence on the continent as well as the potential for future evolution in Japan’s engagement in 
Africa.   
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2. Does this engagement reflect the ambitions and approaches of Japan’s broader Africa 
strategy? 
As each of the primary empirical chapters outlined, Japan’s presence in South Sudan can be 
interpreted as evidence of a more assertive and proactive Japanese foreign policy approach that 
increasingly recognises the importance of Africa as a location in which to expand Japan’s 
investments and international presence.  In this respect Japan’s approach to engagement in South 
Sudan reflects the broader ambitions of its Africa strategy.  Moreover Japan’s activities in South 
Sudan can also be viewed as elements that feed into wider strategic foreign policy considerations 
such as reform of the UN Security Council, relations with the United States, and balancing Chinese 
influence in Africa.  The empirical examination of Japan’s presence in South Sudan thus provided a 
theoretically-informed explanation of the factors driving Japan’s broader engagement in Africa.   
 
3. To what extent can Japan’s presence in Africa be understood to reflect a policy response to 
structural forces at the global level perceived through the lens of domestic considerations 
and priorities?    
Through analysis of Japan’s activities in South Sudan it is apparent that structural factors provide the 
motivation and the parameters for Japanese engagement in Africa.  Indeed as this study 
demonstrates, structural dynamics delineate Japan’s strategic objectives in Africa, and define its 
priorities on the continent.  Yet while Japan’s broad policy objectives towards Africa are determined 
by structural conditions, its methods of engagement on the continent reflect the domestic political 
considerations of policymakers – influenced by societal norms and their own perceptions.  In this 
respect particular domestic considerations such as energy security or norms around state pacifism 
influence and colour Japan’s policy responses to structural pressures.  These unit-level or intervening 
factors are described in this study with reference to the particular dimensions of Japan’s activities in 
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South Sudan and are a central component within the neoclassical realist framework underpinning 
this research.     
 
7.1.2 Caveats  
 
As with any study, there are certain caveats which should be identified in this research project.  In 
this respect, while the study sought to examine Japan’s engagement in South Sudan as a barometer 
of broader Japanese approaches and attitude towards Africa, it was not possible given the limits of a 
thesis to examine the full extent of Japan-Africa relations.  This is due in part to the rapid expansion 
of Japan’s engagement on the continent in recent years, and the wide range of activities included 
within that engagement.   This study therefore did not address Japan’s long-standing relations with 
South Africa, growing energy-driven ties with North African states such as Algeria, nor did it examine 
the full range of Japan’s private sector presence on the continent.  This is because the historical 
dimensions of Japan-South Africa relations have been extensively analysed in works by Ampiah,892 
and Morikawa,893 while Japanese engagement in North Africa is largely defined by Tokyo’s Middle 
East policies – see works by Özçelik,894 Katakura895 and Miyagi.896     
 
Moreover, given the contemporary nature of this study, it must be considered that future events can 
alter Japan’s policies towards Africa – this could be the result of significant shifts in structural 
conditions or domestic political considerations.  Although as this study demonstrated, widespread 
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re-engagement with Africa began under a DPJ government and has been continued by the current 
LDP administration of Shinzo Abe.  In this regard there does appear to be a certain amount of 
political consensus around the importance of increasing Japan’s presence in Africa – be it through 
investment, targeted ODA or political engagement.  Thus while the conclusions of this study point to 
a broad realignment of Japan’s policies towards Africa, the exact manner of future engagement or 
policy implementation may differ from the approaches identified by this study.   
 
This is particularly true of Japan’s engagement with South Sudan.  As previously described, the 
period of research included in this study ended as conflict in South Sudan broke out and at the time 
of writing the conflict is unresolved and stability in the short to medium-term for South Sudan 
remains unlikely.  The political uncertainty within South Sudan therefore has potential implications 
for Japan’s engagement in the country – primarily affecting the proposed oil pipeline project and 
Japan’s peacekeeping contingent, but also impacting ODA priorities and broader political relations.  
The conflict in South Sudan has largely centred on the oil producing regions in Unity and Upper Nile 
states and has resulted in oil production dropping to 165,000 barrels per day from 245,000 before 
the civil war began in December 2013.897 This has also meant that further expansion in South 
Sudan’s oil sector is on hold and it is likely to delay securing financing for the Toyota Tsusho pipeline, 
or the development of Block B.  Yet the fundamental elements of the project remain the same: 
South Sudan’s desire to build an alternative pipeline, Toyota Tsusho’s willingness to build it, and the 
energy security concerns of Japan’s policymakers supporting the project.          
 
As discussed in Chapter Six, the current conflict in South Sudan has changed the dynamics around 
Japan’s peacekeeping commitment, and events within the country could lead to a radical rethink in 
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 Sudan Tribune, “ South Sudan admits conflict has hampered oil production”, 25 May 2014, accessed 19 
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Tokyo with regards its security commitment in South Sudan.   As Professor Nakanishi explains, if the 
peacekeeping mission were to become more dangerous, or if a Japanese soldier were to kill 
someone it will put policymakers in a difficult position and effectively “change the debate in 
Japan.”898 Yet as the previous chapter explored, the government stood firm on its peacekeeping 
commitment despite the deteriorating security environment.  Moreover as a number of key 
informants interviewed for this study pointed out, there is a growing realisation in Japan that the 
country will have to develop a higher tolerance for risk if it is to increase its presence and profile in 
the emerging countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.    
 
Finally it should be noted that this study focused on Japanese engagement in South Sudan but not 
on the bilateral relationship.  Given that the research sought to understand the motivations and 
context of Japan’s presence in the country, there was consequently limited exploration of South 
Sudanese views on Japan’s activities and bilateral relations more generally.899 Thus despite a high-
level advisor to the government and representatives of the ruling SPLM party being interviewed for 
this study, the research did not extensively examine South Sudanese perspectives on the particular 
dimensions of Japan’s activities in South Sudan.  And while these perspectives would have 
augmented the study by providing a further level of context, it was not necessary to understanding 
the factors underlying Japan’s renewed presence in Africa.      
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7.1.3 Future Research  
 
This study has identified a distinct trajectory of renewed Japanese engagement in Africa, and in so 
doing has unearthed a number of related areas where future research can be undertaken.  Indeed 
given the current instability in South Sudan, a further examination of Japan’s policy responses to the 
outbreak of conflict and resultant uncertainty could be undertaken.   Yet in addition to these aspects 
there are also a number of avenues for future research that emerge from the findings of this study.   
 
This research project identified three primary tactics or methods of engagement employed by Japan 
in Africa: peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations, “strategic” ODA, and resource-focused 
investment – and from each of these further questions emerged.  In the years since 2008 Japan’s 
policies towards the continent have expanded but also shifted focus to encourage private sector 
investment – thus also opening new avenues for future Japanese activities in Africa.  Moreover as 
described in Chapter Four, this policy of investment-driven engagement in Africa includes ODA-
linked infrastructure development as well as the promotion of Africa as an investment destination 
for a variety of Japanese businesses.  In this respect further research can be undertaken on Japan’s 
evolving ODA strategies – particularly with respect to the debate emerging in Japan around the 
limitations of the DAC donor guidelines in comparison to the perceived benefits of China’s approach 
towards Africa.  Furthermore this study outlined the evolving investment-oriented focus of TICAD 
conferences, and further research is required to track not only the implementation of the 
commitments made at TICAD V in June 2013, but also the longer-term impact on the overall nature 
of Japan’s presence in Africa.   
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In terms of the growing significance of resource-based investments that were discussed in chapter 
Five a number of experts interviewed for this study indicated that Mitsui’s equity stake in the 
Anadarko gas field in Mozambique has raised the profile of Africa’s energy potential, and that the 
success of the project would encourage other Japanese companies to pursue African equity 
investments.  Future research can therefore be undertaken in exploring the emerging importance of 
Hinomaru Oil in Japan’s energy security strategy as well as the outcome and impact of Toyota 
Tsusho’s proposed pipeline in South Sudan.  Or on the other hand, future research could assess 
Japan’s policy response to current low oil prices and how this will impact on the current 
commitment to equity energy investments.  Yet as this study also identified, the pipeline project 
creates an opportunity for a Japanese company to play a central role in East Africa’s developing 
energy sector – and this also warrants further investigation.  
  
There are also a number of avenues for future research to emerge from Japan’s security 
engagement in Africa that was explored in Chapter Six.  As previously discussed, Africa is a significant 
location for Japan’s international security commitments, and arguably demand greater scrutiny 
following the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan and the government’s reinterpretation of the 
constitution.900 While some of the policy implications in Japan of South Sudan’s conflict were 
identified in Chapter Six, the broader repercussions and possible expansion of Japan’s international 
security presence following the landmark reinterpretation of the constitution merit further research.  
The decision by Abe’s cabinet to reinterpret the constitution and allow for “collective self-defence” 
was ostensibly in response to worsening relations with China – but it has ramifications for both 
Japan’s peacekeeping commitments and its contribution to anti-piracy operations in the Horn of 
Africa.   
                                                          
900
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7.2 Where Next for Japan-Africa Relations?  
 
In examining Japan’s activities in South Sudan as a window through which to better understand the 
broader dynamics of Japan’s re-engagement in Africa, this study has sought to analyse an evolving 
and contemporary aspect of Japanese foreign policy.  This section therefore offers some concluding 
thoughts on the future of Japan’s presence in South Sudan and its relations with Africa.   Key 
informants interviewed for this study were unanimous in their view that the trajectory of Japan’s 
growing relations with Africa would continue to expand.  Pointing to the multiple dynamics outlined 
in this thesis that are driving and sustaining Japanese engagement in Africa, many of those 
interviewed noted the growing discourse that Africa is the last great investment frontier – and as 
such, critical to Japan’s own economic revitalisation.   
 
This study has shown that Japan’s presence in South Sudan reflects changing global realities and 
changing perceptions of Japan’s interests in Africa.  Yet South Sudan is neither typical of Japanese 
engagement in Africa nor is it representative of African states.  But rather South Sudan 
demonstrates the multiple dimensions of Japan’s presence in a particularly complex environment, 
and through the dynamics of this relationship reveals the multiple factors underpinning Japanese re-
engagement in Africa.  As such it is more difficult to predict the future of Japan’s relations with South 
Sudan – especially given the on-going conflict in the country.  Thus beyond the uncertainties of 
South Sudan’s immediate future and the resultant impact on the ability of donors and investors to 
operate in the country, South Sudan is a compelling precedent of Japanese engagement in a fragile 
post-conflict state.   
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As this study has also demonstrated, Japan’s re-engagement in Africa is notable as much for its new 
approaches and attitudes as it is for an increased Japanese presence on the continent.  In this 
respect there is a growing realisation that if Japan is to reaffirm its aspirations to become a great 
power, it will need to change the way that it operates.  Many of those interviewed for this study 
noted an emerging discourse among policymakers that in order to change the way Japan operates – 
both at home and abroad – the country will need to take risks, be bold, and increase its presence in 
the complicated and uncomfortable places of the world.  There is therefore an emerging view in 
Japan that it is in the country’s own interest to have a presence in Africa – resultantly, Japanese 
engagement with the continent is likely to continue to grow.  Moreover, the identified trends within 
the structural factors underpinning Japan’s policies in Africa are unlikely to change in the short term, 
thus further emphasising the expansion of Japan-Africa relations and an increasing Japanese 
presence in complex emerging African states.     
 
There are however hurdles that will have to be overcome if Japan is to establish itself as a 
meaningful presence in Africa.   Not least of which is the extent to which the continent remains 
distant and poorly understood by the Japanese public and many businesses.  Overcoming domestic 
perceptions of Africa as dangerous, corrupt and too poor to buy Japanese products will thus remain 
a basic element within the government’s broader objectives towards Africa.   Furthermore, these 
efforts will be accompanied by an attempt to differentiate Japan’s aid and investment approach 
from those of the Western countries and China.  As previously described, policymakers recognise the 
need to create a unique identity for Japan’s undertakings in Africa given that it cannot compete with 
the extent of Chinese investment or the cultural and linguistic ties that continue to define relations 
between European powers such and Britain or France and their former colonies in Africa.   
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Much of the rhetoric around Africa’s international relations in the post-colonial era has been defined 
by pledges of “long term” relations and the development of the continent.  In this respect Japan’s 
ambitions and the commitments outlined at TICAD V are no different – and the coming years will 
test these pledges of aid and investment.  But in returning to this thesis’ primary question of what 
explains Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, this study has shown that through a multifaceted 
presence in the country, Japan’s relations in Africa go beyond rhetoric and reflect new approaches 
and new dimensions in its foreign policy.  In this respect, the example of South Sudan also 
demonstrates the widening of Japan’s ODA-based relationship to a more transactional and varied 
engagement which expands the boundaries of its foreign policy options in a strategic space on the 
frontier of East Africa.  This study has therefore sought to demonstrate that South Sudan represents 
a significant frontier in which the new paradigms and strategies of Japan’s Africa policies are evident, 
and which challenges its previous norms around engaging in Africa.   
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